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Abstract
5G networks are the next generation of mobile telephony systems, offering faster
speeds, more reliable connections and a platform for various vertical industries.
However, 5G also comes with potentially enormous privacy risks. It is therefore
crucial for a successful 5G future that these privacy issues be resolved at the earliest.
This thesis examines the current state of subscription privacy in 5G and highlights
outstanding privacy problems and viable approaches to their resolution.
One of the most pressing privacy concerns in mobile networks relates to the exposure
of the subscribers’ permanent identifier, known as IMSI-catching attack. Since these
identifiers uniquely identify the subscribers, malicious third parties in the past have
misused their exposure to physically locate and track subscribers. Although 3GPP,
the defacto international body for mobile telephony standardization, has introduced
a public-key based protection mechanism to counter this threat in 5G, the proposed
solution is marred with various shortcomings. Keeping in view the long-term deploy-
ment timeframes of 5G, the most significant of these shortcomings is the insecurity
of the proposed mechanism against a quantum adversary. This technical problem
of private identification in 5G remains open in symmetric-key settings; i.e. does
there exist an efficient symmetric-key solution for private identification in 5G? This
thesis answers this question positively and presents an alternative private identifi-
cation scheme for 5G that works within the symmetric-key domain and overcomes
the other limitations of the existing 3GPP scheme.
Another potent threat to 5G privacy is that of downgrade attacks, where a fake
base station forces the connection down to one of the previous generations and then
exploits the existing privacy vulnerabilities. Keeping this threat in mind, this thesis
also explores the feasibility of combining the symmetric private identification scheme
with a recent downgrade protection proposal to come up with a 5G identification
mechanism that is both quantum-secure and downgrade-resistant.
This problem of private identification within the symmetric-key domain is of interest
in other application areas too. The techniques utilized for the 5G private identifi-
cation scheme are further extended to address the problem of key establishment for
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) in a privacy-preserving manner without re-
sorting to public-key cryptography. This is significant because the nodes in a WBAN
are energy constrained and require battery-efficient security solutions. Moreover, by
avoiding public-key cryptography, a quantum-secure key agreement solution with
advance security properties for the WBAN standard IEEE Std 802.15.6 is achieved.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides an executive summary of the thesis. We explain the motivation
for our research and describe the structure and contributions of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
This thesis is motivated by the application of recent cryptographic research to real-
world scenarios. The aim is to focus on practical research contributions, which have
the potential for widespread societal implications. One of the most viable way to
achieve this is to consider improvements to existing cyber security standards.
During the last few decades a broad range of standards have been developed covering
many areas of cyber security. These standards have been issued by national and
international standardization bodies, as well as by industry consortia. Many of these
standards have been very widely adopted - for example, the ISO/IEC 27000 series of
standards has become the default basis for information security management within
organizations. Despite their widespread use, there is always room for improvement
in these standards and a need to revise existing security standards.
Modern communication is evolving at a rapid pace, with new paradigms being in-
troduced by emerging ICT standards such as 5G. End-user privacy in these mod-
ern communication systems is of great importance because of the envisaged hyper-
connectivity and the potential of the unprecedented services (virtual reality, machine-
type communication, vehicle-to-everything, IoT, etc.) being offered. Much of the
emphasis within these emerging standards has been placed on provisioning of pri-
mary security guarantees such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, etc., and
rightly so. However, pertinent privacy aspects that could have made it into the spec-
ifications with relatively little effort have often been overlooked during this process.
Moreover, a reliance on public-key cryptography in some of these communication
14
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standards puts them at risk of being vulnerable to quantum cryptanalysis. In this
thesis we focus on the privacy gaps along with the substitution of public-key cryptog-
raphy with symmetric cryptography to avert quantum threats. We identify security
and privacy gaps in two of the emerging communication standards, 5G and the IEEE
Std 802.15.6 and propose improvements to address these gaps.
1.1.1 Privacy - More Than A Modern Technological Issue
“Privacy is not about having something to hide. Privacy is about protec-
tion, and that is who you are and what you believe in. That is who you
want to become. Privacy is a self right. Privacy is what gives you the
ability to share with the world who you are on your own terms.”
The above statement, made back in 2016 by Edward Snowden [127], presents one of
the most contentious issues of the today’s modern society - privacy. In this digital
era, privacy has become even more important as it is not just another technological
question but, many would argue, a fundamental human right. Privacy is a concept
that cuts across many areas: for example, it can be concerned with something as
simple as an opt-in or opt-out to an online marketing survey, or it can concern the
tracking of one’s online and offline activity. In the context of modern communication
systems, privacy is usually concerned with one’s personally identifying information,
such as a subscriber’s long-term credentials in the case of mobile telephony sys-
tems or an individual’s health data in the case of Wireless Body Area Networks
(WBANs) [70, 86].
1.1.2 Privacy in Mobile Telephony Systems
With the passage of time, we have come to rely more and more on our mobile phones.
These devices have become part and parcel of our daily lives. It is now more impor-
tant than ever before that end-user privacy be ensured in mobile telephony systems.
The segment of mobile telephony systems where privacy controls are required the
most is the radio access network, which is the most vulnerable to various privacy
threats. In this thesis we analyze privacy controls for the 5G radio access network,
point out the shortcomings and propose appropriate improvements.
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1.1.3 Security and Privacy in WBANs
Another area of increasing concern is the security and privacy issues facing our
health data. Health-related data has been shown [57] to be worth more than any
other type of data record. This is because health information has a long shelf-life and
is unalterable. With an ever-increasing aging population [111], remote healthcare
seems to be the way forward. WBANs have emerged as a key technology for the
realization of remote healthcare systems. IEEE Std 802.15.6 [3] is the international
standard for WBANs.
Compliance requirements for health-related data, such as the U.S. based HIPPA
Privacy Rule [117], try to ensure that privacy is upheld. But laws like HIPPA still
need to be augmented with robust security standards concerning the underlying
technologies such as WBANs, which should respect privacy as a right of the patient.
Unfortunately, in the case of IEEE Std 802.15.6 this has not been the case. This
thesis addresses this issue for IEEE Std 802.15.6.
1.1.4 Moving Towards Quantum-Secure Standards
Many examples of a preference for public-key cryptography can be witnessed in the
latest communication standards. While it is true that key distribution and manage-
ment are relatively easy to handle in the public-key domain, a reliance on public-key
cryptography puts standards at risk of being vulnerable to quantum cryptanalysis.
Moreover, key management becomes a “real” issue only when the number of users
grows, which is not always the situation for some standards. For example, in IEEE
Std 802.15.6, the maximum number of users that a WBAN is allowed to handle is
64 [3]. It is thus arguable, in this case, that the risk exposure greatly outweighs
the purported benefits. Hence, it is worth considering whether it is possible to re-
place public-key cryptography with symmetric-key cryptography to avoid exposure
to future quantum threats.
1.2 Research Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
 This thesis presents a comprehensive literature review of subscription privacy
on the 5G wireless interface. Moreover, various aspects of subscription privacy
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are contextualized in chronological order, which provides an insight into the
standards' development cycle. We highlight privacy issues that are yet to be
addressed by the 5G standard. To address the identified privacy gaps, we also
propose improvements for future versions of the 5G standard.
 The thesis also provides an analysis of the privacy attacks on 5G by [38]. The
findings of our analysis contradict some of the claims made in [38]. Specifically,
we show that the activity monitoring attack is infeasible to execute in 5G
networks. We also demonstrate that the location confidentiality attack is a
direct extension of an existing privacy vulnerability that exploits linkability of
the authentication failure messages.
 We propose an alternative identification scheme which overcomes the limi-
tations of the current public-key based identification mechanism of the 5G
standard. We also develop a novel security framework titled Symmetric Up-
datable Private Authentication (SUPA) and provide a detailed formal security
and privacy analysis of the proposed scheme in this framework.
 The existing identity protection mechanism of 5G and our alternative proposal
are both vulnerable to downgrade attacks; i.e. an active attacker is able to
force the connection down to one of the previous generations and exploit known
vulnerabilities. This thesis also shows how a downgrade protection proposal
for 5G [89] can be seamlessly integrated with our identity protection scheme to
come up with a quantum-secure and downgrade-resistant identification mech-
anism for 5G.
 We propose two key agreement protocols for IEEE Std 802.15.6. These proto-
cols, in addition to being efficient and provisioning advance security properties,
also offer essential privacy attributes necessary for WBANs. The protocols are
also quantum-secure as they are independent of any public-key based oper-
ations. We also develop a formal security and privacy model called Privacy
Preserving Key Agreement (PPKA) in an appropriate complexity-theoretic
framework and prove the proposed protocols secure in this model.
1.3 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 provides the requisite technical background and preliminary material
for Chapters 3 to 6. This chapter outlines the historical evolution of security and
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privacy in various generations of mobile telephony standards. It also provides a
description of the mobile telephony ecosystem and its pertinent security and privacy
mechanisms.
Chapter 3 reviews the current status of subscription privacy on the 5G radio inter-
face. Although 5G offers better privacy guarantees than its predecessors, this work
highlights that there still remain significant gaps which need rectifying.
Chapter 4 analyzes two privacy attacks on 5G by Borgaonkar et al. [38]. We evaluate
these attacks for their effectiveness, practicability and potency against 5G.
In Chapter 5, we present an alternative identity protection scheme for 5G which
utilizes only symmetric cryptographic primitives and formally analyze its security
and privacy properties.
In Chapter 6, we show how a downgrade protection proposal can be combined with
our alternative identification scheme to provide a quantum-secure and downgrade-
resistant private identification for 5G.
In Chapter 7, we further evolve the concepts and techniques which we develop in
Chapter 5 to come up with two key agreement protocols for another international
communication standard, the IEEE Std 802.15.6.
Finally, Chapter 8 provides concluding remarks and discusses future research direc-
tions.
1.4 Associated Publications
In the course of my PhD I have been fortunate to collaborate on my research ques-
tions with other talented researchers. In the following, I will expand on my role in
each of these pieces of work, but wish to emphasize that all work was a collaborative
effort, and could not have been possible without the contributions of all co-authors.
 Haibat Khan, Benjamin Dowling and Keith M. Martin. Identity Confiden-
tiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems. In 4th International Conference on
Security Standardization Research, SSR 2018, Darmstadt, Germany, Novem-
ber 26-27, 2018. Proceedings Ed. by Cas Cremers and Anja Lehmann, LNCS
Volume 11322, pp. 120-142, Springer, 2018 [83].
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In this work, we presented our proposal for an alternative identity protection
mechanism for 5G (Chapter 5). Being the main author, the overall conceptu-
alization, research and writing of the draft was undertaken by myself.
 Haibat Khan, Benjamin Dowling and Keith M. Martin. Highly Efficient
Privacy-Preserving Key Agreement for Wireless Body Area Networks. In 17th
IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security And Privacy In Comput-
ing And Communications, TrustCom 2018, New York, NY, USA, August 1-3,
2018, pp. 1064-1069, IEEE, 2018 [82].
This paper presented our key agreement protocols for WBAN standard IEEE
Std 802.15.6 (Chapter 7). The major write-up, initial conceptualization and
investigation was undertaken by me. Due to a limit on the number of pages
of the conference proceedings, an abridged version of our work was published
at this venue. A full version of this work is available online at https://
eprint.iacr.org/2020/045 and is currently under submission.
 Haibat Khan and Keith M. Martin. On the Efficacy of New Privacy At-
tacks against 5G-AKA. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference
on Security and Cryptography, SECRYPT 2019, Prague, Czech Republic, July
26-28, 2019. Proceedings Ed. by M. S. Obaidat and P. Samarati, pp. 431-438,
SciTePress, 2019 [84].
This paper detailed our analysis and evaluation of the privacy attacks against
5G (Chapter 4). Most of the work including research, investigation, drafting,
etc. was undertook by myself.
 Haibat Khan and Keith M. Martin. A Survey of Subscription Privacy on the
5G Radio Interface - The Past, Present and Future. Journal of Information
Security and Applications, vol. 53(102537), pp. 1-17, Elsevier, 2020 [85].
This paper presents a state of the art survey of subscription privacy on the 5G
wireless channel (Chapter 3). Majority of the work on this project was carried
out by me.
Additionally, the following work was conducted during the course of this PhD but
is not included in this thesis:
 Haibat Khan. An Identity based Routing Path Verification Scheme for Wire-
less Sensor Networks. International Journal of Sensor Networks, vol. 26(1),
pp. 54-68, Inderscience Publishers, 2018 [81].
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Chapter 2
Background and Preliminaries
This chapter provides the requisite technical background and introduces the notation
and symbolism for the rest of the thesis. It starts by outlining the standardization pro-
cess and the historical evolution of mobile telephony followed by a description of its
ecosystem and pertinent security and privacy mechanisms. Thereafter, background
regarding WBANs is described and the interconnection between mobile telephony and
WBANs security and privacy problems is explained.
2.1 3rd Generation Partnership Project
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is the de facto international body
responsible for mobile telephony standardization. 3GPP unites seven telecommu-
nications standard development organizations (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI,
TTA, TTC), known as “Organizational Partners”, and provides their members with
a stable environment to produce the reports and specifications that define 3GPP
technologies. The project covers cellular telecommunications technologies, includ-
ing radio access, core network and service capabilities, which provide a complete
system description for mobile telecommunications. The three Technical Specifica-
tion Groups (TSG) in 3GPP are:
 Radio Access Networks (RAN);
 Services & Systems Aspects (SA);
 Core Network & Terminals (CT).
The TSGs are further divided into specialized Working Groups (WGs). Most of
the work carried out on this thesis deals with the security and privacy aspects of
5G radio access technology and comes under the scope of SA WG3 (SA3), which
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is a specialized group responsible for security and privacy of 3GPP systems. SA3
performs analysis of potential threats to 3GPP systems. Based on the threat anal-
ysis, SA3 determines the security and privacy requirements for 3GPP systems, and
specifies the security architectures and protocols.
2.2 Evolution of Mobile Telephony Security
The First Generation (1G) of mobile telephony systems was based on analogue
technology whose commercial deployment started during the 1980s. Various 1G
technologies were deployed both regionally and globally, the most widespread of
which was AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone System). 1G systems offered no security
to its users.
The first digital systems were introduced by the Second Generation (2G) of mobile
telephony which additionally provided SMS and data services along with voice. 2G
networks were commercially launched as Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) in 1991 in Finland. As indicated in Table 2.1, 2G plugged glaring holes in
1G security, offering payload encryption and authentication of mobile subscribers to
the networks.
The Third Generation (3G) of mobile telephony introduced in 2001 as Universal
Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS) upgraded 2G systems for faster data
transfer speeds (at least 144 kbit/s) and paved the way for mobile broadband access.
The security improvements in 3G systems were also significant. One-way authenti-
cation was transformed into mutual authentication between mobile subscribers and
their service providers. Moreover, publicly-known encryption and integrity algo-
rithms with improved key lengths (128-bits) were introduced.
The Fourth Generation (4G) systems, which commercially debuted as Long Term
Evolution (LTE) in 2009 in Norway, re-utilized a few of the 3G encryption and
integrity algorithms. One security improvement that 4G offered was that the au-
thentication protocol additionally assured the mobile subscriber of the identity1 of
its service provider. Moreover, from 4G onwards, use of different encryption and
integrity algorithms resulted in the derivation of distinct keys, unlike earlier gener-
ations.
The latest Fifth Generation (5G) of mobile telephony systems has recently been
1In 3G, the user was only assured of the legitimacy of the service provider.
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Table 2.1: Security evolution in mobile telephony generations.
Security Aspect 1G 2G 3G 4G 5G
Authentication No One-way Mutual
Proves the ex-
act network to
the user
Prevents roam-
ing billing fraud
Cipher Key
Length
No 54/64-bits 128-bits 128-bits 128-bits
Encryption
Algorithm
Strength
N/A Weak Strong Strong Strong
Public Algorithms N/A Not Public Public Public Public
Distinct Keys for
Algorithms
No No No Yes Yes
Signalling In-
tegrity
No No Yes Yes Yes
Traffic Integrity No No No No Yes
standardized and is now undergoing commercial deployment. The significant secu-
rity enhancements offered by 5G systems are the ability to integrity protect user
plane traffic (payload) in addition to the control plane traffic (signalling), and the
protection from roaming billing fraud by giving increased control to the home net-
work during the execution of the authentication and key agreement protocol. In
5G, the home network of the mobile subscriber is also provided with a proof of
authentication after a successful user authentication (see §2.7 for more details).
2.3 Mobile Telephony System Architecture
The mobile telephony architecture consists of three main domains; Home Network
(HN), Serving Network (SN) and User Equipment (UE) (see Figure 2.1). The sub-
scribers carry UE, which typically refers to Mobile Equipment (ME) (the phone)
containing a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) (the SIM card). The HN
domain represents the network functions that are conducted at a permanent loca-
tion regardless of the location of the subscriber. The HN is where a subscription
initially gets registered. It stores the subscribers’ credentials and is responsible for
management of subscription information. The SN domain is the part which provides
the subscribers access to the telephony network and its services. It represents the
network functions that are local to the user’s access point and thus their location
changes when the user moves. The SN is responsible for routing calls and transport
of user data/information from source to destination. It has the ability to interact
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with the HN to cater for user-specific data/services.
Often UEs may have to operate in areas where their operators have no network cov-
erage (i.e., base stations). In such scenarios called roaming, other service providers,
who have a roaming agreement with the subscriber’s operator, provide SN services.
Hence, in this paper, we treat SN as a semi-trusted entity to whom a subscriber’s
long-term credentials can not be exposed (barring a few exceptions). Note that ac-
cording to the 3GPP standard [14], HNs and SNs are further divided into logical
sub-entities. The security and privacy properties being discussed in this thesis do
not require this level of granularity.
(a) When not roaming, both HN and SN belong to the same mobile network operator.
(b) When roaming, the SN and HN belong to distinct mobile network operators.
Figure 2.1: The mobile network architecture. The channel between UE and SN is
initially unprotected while that between SN and HN is assumed to be protected.
It is within the UICC that the application Universal Subscriber Identity Module
(USIM) runs. The USIM represents the relationship between a subscriber and its
issuing HN. During a subscription registration, the HN stores the subscriber’s long-
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term identifier, Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number (MSISDN)
(the telephone number) and other subscriber related data, including a 128-bit se-
cret key K and 48-bit monotonically increasing counters called Sequence Numbers
(SQNs), within the USIM. The key K never leaves the USIM and any processing
that requires key K as an input is executed within the USIM. These SQNs are uti-
lized for the purpose of replay prevention. While an SQN should be synchronized
between the UE and HN, sometimes it may become out-of-sync due to the loss of
messages on the wireless channel. We therefore use SQNUE and SQNHN to refer to
the state of SQN in UE and HN respectively. These subscription parameters are also
stored within the HN’s database and form the basis of a security context between
UEs and HNs and by extension (during roaming) between UEs and SNs. The SNs
provision services to UEs after establishment of a secure channel between them with
help of the HNs.
2.4 Identifier Types and Terminologies
In mobile telephony systems, networks allocate to each subscriber a unique long-term
identifier, known up to 4G as a International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
and since 5G as a Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). A SUPI, as defined
in 3GPP TS 23.501 [15], is usually a string of 15 decimal digits and acts as the
long-term identifier of an individual subscriber. The first three digits represent the
Mobile Country Code (MCC), while the next two or three form the Mobile Network
Code (MNC), which identifies the network operator. The length of the MNC field
is a national affair. The remaining (nine or ten) digits are known as the Mobile
Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN) and represent the individual user of that
particular operator. Each decimal digit of the SUPI is represented in binary by
using the Telephony Binary Coded Decimal (TBCD) encoding [12].
Authentication between a user and its service provider is based on a shared sym-
metric key (details in §2.7), which means it can only take place after an initial user
identification. However, if the IMSI/SUPI values are sent in plaintext over the ra-
dio link for this purpose, then subscribers can be identified, located and tracked
using these permanent identifiers. To avoid this privacy breach, subscribers are
assigned temporary identifiers called Globally Unique Temporary User Equipment
Identities (GUTIs) by the SNs. A GUTI uniquely and globally identifies a partic-
ular subscriber. These frequently-changing temporary identifiers are then used for
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identification purposes over the wireless link before the establishment of a secure
channel.
The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), which uniquely identifies the
ME, is a string of 15 digits. If the IMEI is sent in plaintext over the radio inter-
face then it could compromise user privacy as it is also uniquely identifying from
a subscription viewpoint. However, the 3GPP specifications prohibit a UE from
transmitting the IMEI until after establishment of a secure channel with the net-
work [118].
2.5 Security Assumptions
2.5.1 Assumptions on Channels
According to 3GPP TS 33.501 (sub-clause 5.9.3) [14], the channel between SN and
HN should provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication and replay prevention.
The channel between UE and SN, essentially being a wireless one, is subject to
eavesdropping, interception and injection of messages by malicious third parties.
2.5.2 Assumptions on Parties
The USIM and its associated HN are fully trusted entities. The shared secret data
being stored by these two entities is assumed to be protected from third parties.
Specifically, the UICC (upon which USIM is stored) is considered to be a tamper-
resistant security module whose contents cannot be read by a malicious entity. MEs
are semi-trusted devices because the long-term key K of the USIM is never revealed
to them. SNs are also semi-trusted entities in the sense that during the secure
channel establishment the long-term shared secret keyK and sequence numbers SQN
should not be revealed to them while SUPI is provisioned to them. The provisioning
of SUPI is essential for accurate billing purposes.
2.5.3 Assumptions on Cryptographic Functions
All the cryptographic functions (detailed in §2.7) are assumed to provision both
confidentiality and integrity protection to their respective inputs.
25
2.6 Initialization of Authentication
UE
(SUPI, K, SQNUE)
SN
(SNname)
HN
(SUPI, K, SQNHN )
Authentication Method Selection
5G-GUTI
(Registration Request message)
SUPI, SNname
(Authenticate Request message)
(a) Authentication procedure utilizing 5G-GUTI.
UE
(SUPI, K, SQNUE)
SN
(SNname)
HN
(SUPI, K, SQNHN )
1. SUCI to SUPI de-concealment
2. Authentication Method Selection
(Identifier Request message)
SUCI
(Identifier Response message)
SUCI, SNname
(Authenticate Request message)
(b) Authentication procedure utilizing SUCI.
Figure 2.2: Initiation of authentication procedure.
2.6 Initialization of Authentication
As we will see in §2.7, secure channel establishment between subscribers and their
service providers is done via challenge-response protocols which are based upon the
shared secret key K. Thus, before such protocols can be executed, it is imper-
ative that the service provider correctly identifies the subscriber with whom this
channel needs to be established. 3GPP TS 33.501 (sub-clause 6.1.2) [14] details
the procedures for this subscription identification and selection of the subsequent
authentication method. The same is being depicted pictorially in Figure 2.2.
The SN may initiate an authentication with the UE during any procedure estab-
lishing a connection with the UE. The UE sends the SN either the 5G-GUTI in a
registration request message (Figure 2.2a) or the Subscription Concealed Identifier
(SUCI) as a response to an identifier request message (Figure 2.2b). SUCI is a
randomized public-key encryption of SUPI (see §5.4 for details). In the case of a
5G-GUTI, the SN extracts the corresponding SUPI from its database and forwards
it along with its global identity Serving Network Name (SNname) to the HN in an
authenticate request message. Otherwise, the SUCI is sent instead of the SUPI.
Upon receipt of the authenticate request message, the HN checks whether the SN is
entitled to use the serving network name in the request message by comparing the
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Table 2.2: Description of 5G-AKA parameters.
Parameter Content/Description
RAND Random Challenge
AK Anonymity Key
CK Confidentiality Key
IK Integrity Key
RES Response
MAC Message Authentication Code
CONC Concealed Sequence Number
AUTN Authentication Token
AUTS Resynchronization Token
XRES Expected Response
HRES/HXRES Hash of RES/XRES
KAUSF Intermediate Key
KSEAF Anchor Key
incoming serving network name with the expected serving network name. The HN
stores the received serving network name temporarily. If the SN is not authorized
to use the serving network name, the HN responds with a “serving network not
authorized” message. If the SUCI is received in an authenticate request message by
HN, it de-conceals the SUPI from it and chooses the authentication method based
upon its policy.
2.7 The 5G-AKA
The security of communication between telephony subscribers and their service
providers requires mutual authentication and key agreement. In 5G systems, these
requirements are fulfilled by either EAP-AKA' or 5G-AKA, which are both Au-
thenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocols. EAP-AKA' and 5G-AKA are quite
similar, with identical message flows, but with a little difference in way the various
keys are derived. We therefore only consider 5G-AKA in this thesis. 3GPP TS
33.501 (sub-clause 6.1.3.2) [14] defines the details of the 5G-AKA protocol. The
security of 5G-AKA is based upon the shared symmetric key K, while SQN provi-
sions replay protection. To initiate authentication, the UE sends the SN either the
5G-GUTI in a registration request message, or the SUCI as response to an identifier
request message as explained in §2.6.
Figure 2.3 shows the 5G-AKA and its associated failure mechanisms. Table 2.2 de-
tails the various acronyms used in Figure 2.3. In this figure, RAND is a uniformly
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UE
(SUPI, K, SQNUE)
SN
(SNname)
HN
(SUPI, K, SQNHN )
RAND
$← {0, 1}128
AK ← f5(K,RAND)
MAC ← f1(K,SQNHN‖RAND)
CONC ← SQNHN ⊕AK
AUTN ← CONC‖MAC
CK, IK ← f3(K,RAND), f4(K,RAND)
XRES ← f2(K,RAND)
XRES∗ ← KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖RAND‖XRES)
HXRES∗ ← SHA256(RAND‖XRES∗)
KAUSF ← KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖CONC)
KSEAF ← KDF (KAUSF , SNname)
SQNHN ← SQNHN + 1
XCONC‖XMAC ← AUTN
AK ← f5(K,RAND)
XSQNHN ← XCONC ⊕AK
MAC ← f1(K,XSQNHN‖RAND)
Check (i) XMAC
?
= MAC
(ii) XSQNHN > SQNUE −4
SQNUE ← XSQNHN
RES ← f2(K,RAND)
...
RES∗ ← KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖RAND‖RES)
KSEAF ← KDF (KAUSF , SNname)
HRES∗ ← SHA256(RAND‖RES∗)
Check HRES∗
?
= HXRES∗
Check RES∗
?
= XRES∗
MAC∗ ← f1∗(K,SQNUE‖RAND)
AK∗ ← f5∗(K,RAND)
CONC∗ ← SQNUE ⊕AK∗
AUTS ← CONC∗‖MAC∗
RAND,AUTN,HXRES∗RAND,AUTN
RES∗
RES∗
Success,KSEAF , [SUPI]
MAC Failure
Sync Failure, AUTS
If (i) and (ii) then:
If ¬(i) then:
If (i) and ¬(ii) then:
Figure 2.3: The 5G-AKA protocol and its associated failure mechanisms.
chosen 128-bit random number and functions f1,. . ., f5, f1
∗ and f5
∗ are symmetric
key algorithms. Functions f1, f2 and f1
∗ act as message authentication algorithms,
while f3, f4, f5 and f5
∗ are used as key derivation algorithms. Key derivation is per-
formed using the Key Derivation Function (KDF) specified in 3GPP TS 33.220 [11].
A successful 5G-AKA culminates in the derivation of the anchor key KSEAF by both
SN and UE from which further keys for subsequent communication are derived. The
two cases of authentication failure for the 5G-AKA are as follows:
1. MAC Failure: As the first step in authentication confirmation, the UE
checks whether the received MAC value is correct or not. In case of a failure
(Case ¬(i) in Figure 2.3), the UE replies with a MAC Failure message back
to the SN.
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2. Sync Failure: After MAC verification, the UE checks the freshness of the
sequence number SQNUE received in the authentication challenge. In case of
this failure (Case (i) and ¬(ii) Figure 2.3), it responds with a Sync Failure
message along with a re-sync token AUTS. Note that in Figure 2.3, the
sequence number freshness check is denoted by XSQNHN > SQNUE − 4.
What this actually means is that there is some “window” of size 4 within
which sequence numbers smaller than the current sequence number of UE will
be accepted given they previously had not been received by the UE. This
mechanism is there to handle out-of-order delivery of challenge messages from
HN to UE.
During the execution of 5G-AKA, it is crucial that SQN is protected from an eaves-
dropper during the exchange of messages between the UE and SN, as its exposure
may lead to the compromise of the identity and location of a subscriber. We will
see in §3.5.2 how SQN leakage can manifest into privacy vulnerabilities. Also note
from Figure 2.3 that at the culmination of a successful 5G-AKA, the HN provides
the SUPI of the UE to the SN. This is required essentially for two main purposes
- accurate billing and Lawful Interception (see §2.9). The SUPI is later also used
as an input to the key derivation functions between UE and SN. This ensures that
the SUPI value provisioned by the HN is the one claimed by the UE, otherwise the
communication breaks down.
2.8 Paging Messages
When a UE does not have any ongoing data transmissions, it enters an idle state in
order to preserve energy. If delivery of a network service like a call or SMS needs to be
delivered to the UE, the network probes the idle UE by sending a “paging” message
and the UE responds correspondingly. The paging procedure works because even
when in the idle state, the UE keeps on monitoring for the paging message at certain
device-specific time intervals. The device is able to preserve battery because, at other
times, it switches off its receiver. The idle UE decodes these broadcast probes and
if it detects its identity in these messages, it randomly acquires an available radio
channel and requests the concerned base station for “connection setup” for exchange
of further signalling messages. It is worth mentioning that a new authentication may
be initiated by the SN after the UE responds to a paging message.
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2.9 Lawful Interception
Lawful interception (LI) refers to the facilities in telecommunication networks that
allow law enforcement agencies with court orders or other legal authorization to
selectively wiretap individual subscribers. Usually network data collection under LI
is for the purpose of analysis or evidence. Such data generally consists of signalling
or network management information or, in fewer instances, the content of the com-
munications. The collection of data could or could not be in real-time and can be
performed in either core or edge network.
3GPP TS 33.126 [25] specifies various LI requirements for telecommunication op-
erators. As such not all requirements in this document will apply in all national
jurisdictions or to all 3GPP operator deployments. Various LI architectures and
functions are detailed in 3GPP TS 33.127 [24]. This document provides an LI archi-
tecture supporting both network layer based and service layer based interception.
3GPP TS 33.128 [26] describes the protocols and procedures required to perform
LI within a 3GPP network. It addresses both internal interfaces used internally
with a 3GPP network and external handover interfaces used to handover intercepted
communications to law enforcement. It describes the detailed targeting of commu-
nications in each point of interception within a 3GPP network and the information
that a point of interception needs to be able to capture. Furthermore, the detailed
data formats for both the internal and external interfaces are also defined.
2.10 Wireless Body Area Networks
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) consist of miniaturized computing devices
with the aim to provide low power, short range, and extremely reliable wireless
communication within the surrounding area of the human body, supporting a vast
range of data rates for different applications [44]. These devices talk to a designated
centralized node (Hub) which further communicates with external networks via a
Gateway [110]. The general layout of a typical WBAN is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Note that the Hub and Gateway are functionally two separate entities, but are
usually combined into a single physical node.
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Figure 2.4: Generic architecture of a typical WBAN.
2.11 WBAN System Model
We now describe a system model suitable for the deployment scenarios of WBANs.
In this model, a System Administrator (SA) initializes the network. The network is
composed of three types of nodes: a Hub Node (HN2), Intermediary Nodes (IN) and
Normal Nodes (N). As the HN is usually a resourceful device with better hardware
protection mechanisms in place, we assume it to be trusted and its long term secret
master key (kHN ) to be protected. As the role of HN is usually undertaken by
a modern smartphone in a generic WBAN, this argument is supported aptly by
the real-world example of the “FBI-Apple encryption dispute” [2] where, even for
resourceful parties like government agencies, it is not easy to crack into a smartphone.
Normal nodes N are resource-constrained and their transmission range is assumed
to be limited; in particular, they are not always able to communicate directly with
HN. Intermediary nodes IN are also located in and around the body but, at a
particular time instance, are in direct communication with both N and HN, thus
acting as intermediary nodes for the purpose of relaying traffic between HN and N
when required. We assume a Dolev-Yao [56] adversary A who can listen, modify
and synthesize any messages of his choice in this model.
2Note that the notation HN has also been used in this thesis to refer to the home network of
mobile telephony systems. However, within the context of WBANs, HN refers to the hub node.
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2.12 IEEE Std 802.15.6
Mindful of the peculiarities of communicating in and around the human body, the
IEEE published the standard IEEE Std 802.15.6 [3] for WBAN communications in
2012. Being part of the 802 series of IEEE standards, which comprises of a family of
networking standards that cover the physical layer specifications of technologies from
Ethernet to wireless, IEEE Std 802.15.6 describes the physical (PHY) layer and the
medium access control (MAC) sublayer for WBAN communication in accordance
with the IEEE 802 reference model. The standard contains three specifications of
PHY layer; narrowband, ultra wideband and human body communications. Direct
communication between a node N and a hub node HN transpire at the PHY layer
and MAC sublayer as specified in this standard. Additionally, the standard also de-
scribes the frame formats and various functional elements associated with the MAC
sublayer. As high-power transmissions are harmful to humans and WBAN nodes
are energy constrained, this standard provisions an optional two-hop communication
architecture via a relay node to enable nodes to communicate with the Hub node.
Message security services occur at the MAC sublayer, and security key generation
functionality can take place inside and/or outside the MAC sublayer. In addition to
conventional security guarantees, privacy is of utmost importance for typical target
application areas of WBANs such as healthcare and the military [136]. The elliptic-
curve based key agreement (termed as security association within the standard) pro-
tocols of IEEE Std 802.15.6 have been shown to have security weaknesses [134], but
also do not provide the privacy features that should be expected of a WBAN [102].
In Chapter 7 we propose two key agreement protocols for IEEE Std 802.15.6 which
in addition to the requisite security properties, also offer privacy guarantees. Next,
we discuss the interconnection between the works carried out in Chapters 5 and 7.
2.13 Two Sides of the Same Coin
As one progresses through this thesis, they may notice the similarities between the
techniques utilized for coming up with a private user-identification scheme for 5G
(Chapter 5) and the privacy-preserving key agreement protocols for IEEE Std 802.15.6
(Chapter 7). Both utilize only symmetric cryptographic primitives in a much similar
style and manner to cope with slightly varying problems. The reason for this is that
the threat model, associated trust assumptions, security and privacy objectives, etc.
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are quite similar for both scenarios, which enabled us to import techniques from
one setting to handle the problems of the other. In both settings, there is a central
trusted entity (home network for the mobile telephony and hub node for WBAN)
which can be bootstrapped securely, both demand similar kind of privacy guaran-
tees like anonymity and unlinkability and both want to avoid the use of public-key
cryptography. In the case of mobile telephony, we are only concerned with the user-
identification in a private manner which forms the basis of the later key agreement
via a separate 5G-AKA. However, in the case of WBANs, we go a step forward
and transform the private identification scheme into a full fledged key agreement
protocol.
Next we explain the evolution and developmental connections between the results
of Chapters 5 and 7. From a temporal viewpoint, the work in Chapter 7 was carried
out before than that of Chapter 5. The initial inspiration for the work of Chapter 7
came from Li et al.’s scheme [103]. After analyzing and later improving Li et al’s
scheme, it became clear that such techniques could also be utilized for the private
identification problem in mobile telephony networks. Note that by that time, the
public-key based identity protection scheme (see Section 5.4.1) was yet not pub-
lished by 3GPP. Though, the basic premise was same as that of WBAN, in mobile
telephony the various cryptographic guarantees were required to be ensured via the
already available primitives.
2.14 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided the background information for the mobile telephony systems.
It presented an overview of evolution of security through different generations of mo-
bile telephony. Further, the security architecture was outlined and pertinent security
and privacy mechanisms were reviewed. Specifically, various types of user identifiers
utilized within the mobile telephony systems along with the associated user identi-
fication and authentication protocols were detailed. Thereafter, an introduction to
WBANs and its international standard IEEE Std 802.15.6 was provided
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State of Subscription Privacy in 5G
This chapter reviews the current state of subscription privacy in 5G systems. The
scope of the privacy study undertaken is limited to the wireless part of the 5G system
which occurs between the service provider’s base station and the subscriber’s mobile
phone.
3.1 Introduction
Mobile telephony subscribers’ personal information has become an attractive target
for online advertisements and other connected industries. Besides the commercial
arena, the Edward Snowden revelations show that national intelligence agencies also
collect telephony subscribers’ personal information on an unprecedented scale [67].
Apart from the danger that this personal information is utilized for nefarious political
agendas, it may also be misused for personal advantages. Thus, privacy has turned
out to be a primary consideration for end users when selecting and using a telephony
service today. From a regulatory compliance perspective, the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [137] obligations for protecting personal data of
subscribers are directly applicable to mobile telephony operators. With penalties
that can reach as high as EUR 20 million or 4 percent of total worldwide annual
turnover, there is a huge financial risk for mobile operators in the event of potential
non-compliance. Hence, protecting end-user privacy is all the more important for
the latest international mobile telephony standards such as 5G.
3GPP released the first documents pertaining to 5G at the end of the year 2017. The
development of the 5G system was planned in two phases: 5G Phase 1 (formally
called Release 15) and 5G Phase 2 (formally Release 16).As 5G Release 15 – the first
full set of 5G standards – was frozen 1 in June 2019 (see Figure 3.1), this seems to
be an appropriate occasion to undertake a comprehensive review of one of the most
1After ”freezing”, no additional functionality can be added to a Release.
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Figure 3.1: 3GPP time-lines pertaining to various Releases.
prominent privacy aspects of 5G based mobile telephony, i.e., subscription privacy
on the wireless channel.
5G security and privacy documentation [14] often refers to previous generations for
elaboration of various security and privacy requirements. The same is true in the
case of subscription privacy where Release 15 refers to 3GPP TS 33.102 [9] for the
requirements which are listed below:
 User Identity Privacy: The permanent identity of a user to whom a service
is delivered cannot be eavesdropped on the radio access link.
 User Location Privacy: The presence or the arrival of a user in a certain
area cannot be determined by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
 User Untraceability: An intruder cannot deduce whether different services
are delivered to the same user by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
An important point to note here is that the use of the phrase “cannot be eaves-
dropped” in the above statements should not be misinterpreted if it only refers to
a passive adversary 'eavesdropping' on the radio interface. This certainly is not the
case here and a few previously published papers [33] fell prey to this misnomer.
3GPP has always considered active adversaries for its security and privacy scenarios.
A pertinent example of this is the 3GPP study TR 33.899 [8] which was conducted to
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collect, analyze and further investigate potential security threats and requirements
for 5G systems and contains explicit references to active adversaries.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the state of subscription privacy on the 5G
radio interface. Keeping the aforementioned privacy objectives in mind, this chapter
evaluates, systematizes, and contextualizes the requisite aspects of 5G subscription
privacy in three chronological categories; past, present and the future. The past
category looks at the state of subscription privacy before the advent of 5G Release
15. In present, the improvements provisioned to user privacy by Release 15 are
explored. Finally, the future category discusses the privacy aspects which still could
be improved in subsequent Releases.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: §3.2 discusses the scope of the privacy
study while §3.3 details the past vulnerabilities. 5G Release 15 improvements are
discussed in §3.4. §3.5 highlights the outstanding issues and new vulnerabilities.
§3.6 discusses the related work and §3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Scope of the Study
There are three aspects which play a pivotal role in defining the scope of the study
undertaken in this chapter:
 We confine the privacy study undertaken in this chapter to the wireless part of
the 5G system. This is primarily because this medium is open and can easily
be exploited by any malicious party and, as a result, is the most vulnerable.
 In this study only those aspects of subscription privacy are discussed which
come under the purview of 3GPP. Modern-day smart phones have evolved into
powerful devices with functionality that goes beyond just telecommunications.
These multitasking devices are now being utilized for all sorts of computational
purposes which may or may not affect the end-user privacy that 3GPP is trying
to protect. There are numerous other sources of leakage affecting user privacy
such as Wi-Fi [74], Bluetooth [75], etc. which do not fall under the purview
of 3GPP. We do not consider privacy leakages via these other sources in this
work.
 Lastly, as work on 3GPP Release 16 (Phase 2 of 5G) is still under active
development, we do not consider the ever-evolving Release 16.
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Table 3.1: Summary of privacy attacks in the previous generations.
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3.3.2 (Raw) IMSI-probing [51]
3.3.3 Unauthenticated IMEI Request [120], [53], [113]
3.3.4 GUTI Persistence [32], [129]
3.3.5 GUTI-MSISDN Mapping [129], [97], [114], [72]
3.3.6 C-RNTI based Tracking [77]
3.3.7 GUTI Reallocation Replay Attack [32], [30]
3.3.8 Localization through Measurement Reports [129], [61] ?
3.3.9 IMSI-paging Attack [31], [129], [32], [132]
3.3.10 ToRPEDO Attack [73]
3.3.11 AKA Protocol Linkability Attack (LFM) [32], [31], [39]
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3.3 The Past - Inherited Challenges
The first and foremost task for 5G Release 15 was to address the privacy vulner-
abilities that existed in the previous generations. Hence, before we discuss the
improvements offered by Release 15, we take a look at the vulnerabilities that al-
ready existed in the early generations that affect subscription privacy on the radio
channel. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the attacks on subscription privacy in
earlier generations.
3.3.1 IMSI-catching
As mentioned in §2.4, for obvious privacy reasons, GUTI is utilized for subscription
identification purposes over the wireless interface before the establishment of a secure
channel. However, there are certain situations where authentication through the use
of these temporary identifiers is not possible. For instance, when a user registers with
a network for the first time and is not yet assigned a temporary identifier. Another
case is when the network is unable to resolve the IMSI from the presented GUTI.
An active man-in-the-middle adversary can intentionally simulate this scenario to
force an unsuspecting user to reveal its long-term identity. These attacks are known
as “IMSI-catching” attacks [104] and persist in mobile networks including LTE [108,
118].
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IMSI-catching attacks have threatened all generations of mobile telephony for
decades [63]. In IMSI-catching, the attacker through the use of identifier request
messages (§2.6) can get the identities of every subscriber present in the attack area.
The attacker needs no previous assumption of who might be there, and needs no
previous information about the victim. Thus, it is a powerful attack, breaching the
subscription privacy completely. IMSI-catching is well documented as a Key Issue2
in 3GPP TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.7.3.2) [8].
3.3.2 (Raw) IMSI-probing
In its discussions, 3GPP distinguishes between “IMSI-catching” and “IMSI-probing”.
IMSI-probing is where an attacker already knows the subscription identity, like an
IMSI or an MSISDN plus some associated information, and wants to find out whether
the subscriber with this identity is present in a given area. This is a far less pow-
erful attack than IMSI-catching. There are many possible ways to carry out such
an attack, for example by sending a bunch of (if possible silent [51]) SMSs or other
“activity triggers” to the target MSISDN and seeing whether there is a correspond-
ing flurry of signalling in the cell being tested. Preventing all sorts of IMSI-probing
attacks would be difficult and would involve a lot of overhead, such as including ex-
tensive dummy signalling to conceal when the real signalling happens. Consequently,
it was not thought worthwhile to try addressing by 3GPP.
3.3.3 Unauthenticated IMEI Request
In GSM and UMTS systems, it was possible for an attacker to request the subscriber
for its IMEI via an unauthenticated identity request message [53, 113, 120]. How-
ever, from LTE onwards, such provisions were removed and now the network can
only request the user for its IMEI after establishment of a secure channel between
them [16]. However, under certain special circumstance, e.g., when the UE has no
IMSI or no valid GUTI during emergency attach, the IMEI is sent before a secu-
rity context is activated. This is to restrain the misuse of ME for placing invalid
emergency calls [6].
2Key Issue is the terminology used in 3GPP studies for potential security or privacy problem.
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3.3.4 GUTI Persistence
Temporary subscriber identifiers like GUTI are used as a privacy measure to mitigate
subscription identification and tracking by eavesdroppers on the radio link, making
it harder to track the location or activity of a particular subscriber. In LTE, the
updating of GUTI is recommended on the following occasions:
 When the SN gets changed or during a new attach procedure;
 During a Tracking Area (TA) update;
 When the SN issues a “GUTI reallocation command”.
The major problem with the mechanism of GUTI allocation in the current LTE
system is that it is up to the SN policy configuration when, and if at all, to reallo-
cate the GUTI. It is also possible for the SN to keep (re)allocating the same GUTI
to the UE. The UE neither takes part in the generation of the GUTI nor verifies
the freshness of the newly allocated GUTI. This opens up possibilities for either
poor implementations or poor configuration that keeps the GUTI the same for a
long time. Evidence of these poor practices has been found in real mobile network
operators [129, 32] where the operators tend not to frequently update the GUTI
on these occasions. The reason ascribed to such practices is to avoid the signalling
storms [27] within the networks. In LTE networks, acquiring or tracking the tempo-
rary subscription identifiers has been one of the most prominent attack strategies in
compromising the subscription privacy [129]. GUTI persistence has been identified
as a Key Issue in 3GPP TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.7.3.1) [8].
3.3.5 Mapping between GUTI and MSISDN
These attacks are somewhat related to the IMSI-probing ones, but are more fine-
grained. In these attacks, the attacker starts with similar assumptions about know-
ing one of the subscription long-term identities and the aim is to locate and then
further trace that subscriber. The attack uses the usual techniques of either ini-
tiating phone calls [97] or sending silent SMSs [114] to the target MSISDN. This
results in triggering of their paging procedures which ultimately leads to a mapping
between the known identity (usually MSISDN) and the GUTI [72]. This enables
an attacker to track a particular subscriber over a long duration due to infrequent
updating of GUTI in LTE (as already detailed in §3.3.4). Note that in these attacks
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paging messages are sought by the attackers instead of looking out for a generic
signalling flurry.
3.3.6 C-RNTI based Tracking
The Cell Random Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI) is a physical layer 16-
bit identifier unique within a given cell and is assigned to each device during the
“Random Access Procedure” (see Section 3.3.9 for details). Passive analysis of real
LTE traffic has revealed that the C-RNTI is included in the header (in unencrypted
form) of every single packet [77]. This leads to linking of the radio traffic (both
user and control plane) by a passive adversary. Further mapping to a user’s GUTI
or MSISDN is trivial and can be undertaken via the use of silent text messages.
Through tracking of the C-RNTI value, an attacker can easily determine how long
a given user stays at a given location.
Further analysis of captured LTE traffic has revealed that during mobility handover
events these physical layer identifiers can be linked together. This leads to trace-
ability of users when they move from cell to cell. This was because the captured
handover triggering messages were sent in the clear. According to the response of
the standardization bodies, these messages are not suppose to be in the clear.
3.3.7 GUTI Reallocation Replay Attack
As explained in §2.4, subscribers communicate with the networks using GUTIs as
their identifiers for privacy purposes. To avoid traceability of subscribers based upon
GUTI, it is imperative that these temporary identifiers are updated frequently. To
update the GUTI, the mobile networks use a process called “GUTI Reallocation
Procedure” (sub-clause 5.4.1 of TS 24.301 [22]). Figure 3.2 depicts this procedure
as defined for LTE in [22]. In this figure, oGUTI depicts the old GUTI and nGUTI
is the new GUTI, while CK is the “confidentiality key”. The procedure works as
follows:
 The UE identifies itself to the network on a dedicated channel via its currently
allocated temporary identifier oGUTI.
 The network identifies the UE and establishes the means of ciphering for sub-
sequent communication.
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UE
(IMSI, oGUTI, CK)
Network
(IMSI, oGUTI, CK)
new nGUTI
deallocate oGUTI deallocate oGUTI
oGUTI
{GUTI REALLOC CMD, nGUTI, nLAI}CK
{GUTI REALLOC COMPLETE}CK
Ciphering management; CK established
Figure 3.2: GUTI reallocation procedure.
 Thereafter, a new GUTI (nGUTI) is sent to the UE in a message encrypted
with CK via a GUTI Reallocation Command. If required, this message may
also contain the identity of the current location area (nLAI).
 Upon receipt of the GUTI reallocation command, the GUTI replies via the
GUTI Reallocation Complete message to acknowledge receipt of the new
GUTI.
If the network does not receive the expected acknowledgment from the UE, it main-
tains both oGUTI and nGUTI for the concerned IMSI. The standard defines two
methods for the means of ciphering; i.e. for the establishment of the confidentiality
key CK: (1) either a new key is established via the authentication procedure or
(2) a previously established ciphering key is restored via the security mode setup
procedure. The option of using the restored keys allows a linkability attack on the
GUTI reallocation procedure [32, 30]. As the GUTI Reallocation Command does
not contain a replay protection mechanism, an adversary is able to exploit this weak-
ness. The adversary first captures a GUTI reallocation command. Later, when the
UE has already updated its GUTI but not yet the ciphering key CK, the attacker
replays the captured reallocation command. The victim UE has no way to detect
this replay attack. It successfully decrypts this reallocation command and replies via
a GUTI Reallocation Complete message. This allows the adversary to distinguish
the target UE from any other, as other UEs will not be able to decrypt the reallo-
cation command and hence will not reply the completion message, even though in
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the meantime the target UE was assigned with an updated GUTI. This results in
the adversary being able to track the target user with minimal effort.
3.3.8 RRC Protocol Vulnerabilities / Misimplementations
The Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol is used to set up and manage the radio
connectivity between the UE and SN. The major functions of the RRC protocol
include connection establishment and release functions, broadcast of system infor-
mation, radio bearer establishment, reconfiguration and release, RRC connection
mobility procedures, paging notification and release, etc. Within the protocol stack,
it exists at the network (IP) layer. The RRC protocol is specified in 3GPP TS
25.331 [13] for UMTS and in 3GPP TS 36.331 [17] for LTE. In LTE, when the UE
selects a cell in RRC idle mode, it does not validate whether the base station is
authentic or fake. As a result, the UE may clamp on to a rogue base station. So far,
the mobile telephony systems have focused on providing secure communication in
the RRC connected state and security aspects in RRC idle state have not been con-
sidered. This vulnerability of UE to false base station attacks during the RRC idle
state has been acknowledged as a Key Issue in TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.4.3.1) [8].
The LTE RRC protocol also contains a “network information broadcast” function
in which GUTIs associated with the SNs are broadcasted over the air [129]. These
broadcasts are neither encrypted nor authenticated, hence can be decoded easily
by an adversary. Since these broadcasts are location specific, techniques described
in [97] can be exploited to reveal presence of subscribers in that specific area (a type
of IMSI-probing attack, as explained in § 3.3.2). Another type of RRC message
which contains subscriber-specific sensitive information is the “UE measurement
report”. In particular, two types of UE measurement reports have been exploited
in the literature [129] to compromise location of subscribers:
 Measurement Report: Measurement report is a necessary part of the han-
dover procedure of LTE networks. The SN sends a “measurement configura-
tion” message to the UE indicating what type of measurement is to be per-
formed. In response, the UE compiles and sends the appropriate measurement
report. The earlier LTE specifications (Version 12.5.0 of TS 36.331 and earlier)
allowed transmission of these RRC messages before establishment of a secu-
rity context between the UE and SN. This has been exploited to compromise
the location of subscribers by decoding of the location information contained
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within these messages [129, 61]. However, later the specification was updated
to allow measurement report transmission only after establishment of the se-
curity context between UE and SN. Although the attack descriptions in [129]
mention “mapping between GUTI and IMSI via semi-passive attacks”, it is
unclear whether knowledge of the victim’s IMSI contributes towards these at-
tacks - hence the property unknown label (?) in Table 3.1.
 Radio Link Failure (RLF) Reports: RLF reports are used to troubleshoot
signal coverage issues. These reports contain serving and neighboring base
stations’ identifiers along with their corresponding power measurements, which
can be used as inputs to trilateration techniques such as [42] to determine
an accurate position of the UE. The LTE standard (Appendix A.6 of [17])
does not allow transmission of RLF reports before establishment of a security
context between the UE and SN. However, practical investigations [129] of real-
world mobile networks has found that LTE phones (baseband processor to be
more specific) do transmit these reports without a security context, leading to
location leaks of the subscribers. This shows that the related guidelines within
the standard are vague and ambiguous (described in an appendix located at
the end of a 900+ page document), which leads to incorrect implementation
by multiple manufacturers.
3.3.9 IMSI-based Paging
Figure 3.3 outlines the paging procedure in LTE. The Mobility Management Entity
(MME) (a part of the SN’s core network) is responsible for initiating paging and
authentication of the mobile device, while eNodeB is the LTE base station (part of
SN’s access network). At the commencement of the paging, the MME starts a timer
(T3413) and expects a response from the UE before the expiration of this timer. UEs
in RRC idle state use Discontinuous Reception (DRX) also known as the paging cycle
to reduce power consumption. This DRX cycle determines how frequently the UE
checks for paging messages. The default DRX cycle is broadcast by the SN via the
System Information Block (SIB). The Paging Occasion (PO) for a UE (i.e., when
it wakes up to check for paging messages) is given by three numbers: the paging
cycle T ∈ {32, 64, 128, 256}; the Paging Frame Index (PFI), which is an integer
between 0 and T − 1; and a subframe index s where, 0 ≤ s ≤ 9. The UE decodes
the RRC paging messages and if it finds its identifier within this message then it
initiates the acquirement of an available radio channel through the “Random Access
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RRC Connection Request
RRC Connection Setup
RRC Connection Setup Complete
+ Service Request
Service Request
Random Access Procedure
Figure 3.3: The LTE paging mechanism.
Procedure”. Thereafter, the UE requests the eNodeB via the “RRC Connection
Request” to configure radio resources for signalling exchange. After completion of
this RRC connection setup, the UE send a “Service Request” message and enters
the connected state.
In LTE paging, two types of identities could be used to alert idle UEs about incoming
data: temporary identifier GUTI or permanent identifier IMSI. Usually, it is the
GUTI which is utilized as an identifier within the paging messages. However, in
situations where the SN loses its context with the UE due to a crash or restart, the
provision is there to send the IMSI as the UE identifier. Using the IMSI as the UE
identifier while sending paging messages has been reported as a privacy threat to
users [129, 31, 132, 32].
A passive adversary can just observe the radio communication in an interested loca-
tion and come to know which subscribers are located in that particular area. Since
during the paging procedure a security context is not yet established between the
UE and SN, an active adversary can set up a false base station in an area of interest
(airports, hospitals, etc.). It can then start sending out IMSI-based paging requests
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to the subscribers and, based upon the responses, will come to know which IMSIs
are present in that particular area. The LTE subscribers reply to IMSI-based paging
triggers via their GUTIs. Hence, this leads to a correlation between the IMSIs and
GUTIs. This, combined with the initiation of paging mechanism via placing phone
calls to the MSISDN (§3.3.5), allows an attacker to further correlate its IMSI and
GUTI with the MSISDN. Thus active/passive listeners, fake SNs, etc. can track
down subscribers with reasonable accuracy to a specific geographic area, which has
serious privacy implications. IMSI-based paging has been identified as a Key Issue
in 3GPP TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.7.3.10) [8].
3.3.10 ToRPEDO Attack
In LTE paging, the POs are determined by the UE’s IMSI. This mechanism has
been exploited to verify the presence (or absence) of a target in a specific location
via an attack called ToRPEDO (TRacking via Paging mEssage DistributiOn) [73].
This attack leverages the fact that the PO for a specific UE is always fixed as it is
based upon its IMSI. Hence, through triggering successive paging procedures, the
attacker is ultimately able to determine the presence or absence of a target UE with
high confidence.
Moreover, in the ToRPEDO process, the attacker learns the last 7 bits of the UE’s
IMSI. We now briefly outline this leakage process. In LTE, the last 10 bits of the
subcriber’s IMSI are used for calculating the PO of a device. In this calculation,
however, the IMSI is considered to be a 14/15-digit decimal number instead of a
TBCD encoded number. Without loss of generality, if we consider T = 128, then
successfully calculating the victim’s PO will leak the last 7 bits of the victim’s IMSI.
3.3.11 Linkability of AKA Failure Messages
All generations of mobile telephony suffer from a location attack known as the
Linkability of (AKA) Failure Messages (LFM) attack [39, 31, 32]. The LFM attack
exploits the fact that in an AKA protocol (see §2.7), in the event of an erroneous
authentication challenge, the reason for the authentication failure is exposed to the
attacker, i.e., either MAC Failure or Sync Failure. This allows an attacker to link
two different AKA sessions to identify a target user. The LFM attack is simple to
execute in practice. The attacker first observes an AKA session of the target user
and records the authentication challenge (R,AUTN). Later, when the attacker
45
3.4 The Present - Privacy Improvements by Release 15
Table 3.2: Effect of 5G privacy enhancements upon existing attacks.
Section 5G Privacy Enhancing Features Existing Attacks 3GPP Reference
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3.4.1 SUPI Concealment Sub-clause 5.2.5 of TS 33.501 [14]
3.4.2 Strict GUTI Refreshment Sub-clause 6.12.3 of TS 33.501 [14]
3.4.3 False Base Station Detection Framework Annex E of TS 33.501 [14]
3.4.4 De-coupling of SUPI from Paging Sub-clause 9.3.3.18 of TS 38.413 [18]
3.4.5 GUTI-based Paging Occasion Sub-clause 7.1 of TS 38.304 [19]
3.4.6 Secure Radio Redirections TS 38.331 [20]
Legend: = resolves, applicable = partial/limited effect = does not resolves, not applicable
wants to check whether another AKA session belongs to the same user or not,
he replays the recorded authentication challenge and observes the type of failure
message received. In the case of MAC Failure it is some other user, while in the
case of Sync Failure it is the same user. Note that in an LFM attack no further
computations are required and the results are precise. Hence this is a devastating
attack (albeit under additional assumptions about the attacker’s capabilities) which
compromises subscription location and, as an extension, allows user-traceability.
3.4 The Present - Privacy Improvements by Release 15
Release 15 comes with several new features that significantly improve subscription
privacy on the radio interface [98, 123]. In this section, we review and discuss these
new features. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the effect of these new features upon
the vulnerabilities from previous generations.
3.4.1 Concealment of SUPI
Keeping in mind the severity of the threats posed by SUPI exposure via IMSI-
catching attacks (§3.3.1), 3GPP decided to address this problem in 5G Release 15
(sub-clause 5.2.5 of TS 33.501) [14]. In the case of identification failure via a 5G-
GUTI, unlike earlier generations, 5G security specifications do not allow plaintext
transmissions of the SUPI over the radio interface. Instead, a public-key based
privacy-preserving identifier containing the concealed SUPI is transmitted. The
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public-key scheme chosen by 3GPP for this purpose is Elliptic Curve Integrated
Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [131]. The concealed identifier is called SUCI. When
enabled, this feature makes it infeasible for false base stations to identify or trace
subscribers in a 5G-only system. The UE generates the SUCI with the public key
pk of the HN using an ECIES-based protection scheme. This public key is securely
provisioned to the UE during the USIM registration. Only the MSIN part of the
SUPI is concealed by this protection scheme, while the home network identifier
(MCC/MNC) is transmitted in plaintext as it is required for routing in roaming use
cases.
As the pk comes pre-configured on the USIM, a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
is not needed. Also, the subscription identification is achieved in just one pass of
communication, which helps in reducing the connection set-up time. Further, this
scheme is oblivious to desynchronization [90] of identifiers between the UE and HN
and requires simple key management, both of which lead to significant reduction
in connection failures. However, there still remain aspects which require further
improvement. These issues were communicated to 3GPP by European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute’s (ETSI) Security Algorithms Group of Experts
(SAGE) [59] and are discussed in further detail in §5.4.2.
3.4.2 Strict Refreshment of GUTI
In 5G Release 15 (sub-clause 6.12.3 of TS 33.501), it is mandatory to refresh the
5G-GUTI on the following occasions:
 Initial Registration: If the SN receives a registration request message of
type“initial registration” or “mobility registration update” from a UE, it should
send a new 5G-GUTI to the UE in the registration procedure.
 Mobility Registration Update: If the SN receives a registration request
message of type ”mobility registration update” from a UE, it should send a
new 5G-GUTI to the UE in the registration procedure.
 Periodic Registration Update: If the SN receives a registration request
message of type ”periodic registration update” from a UE, it should send a
new 5G-GUTI to the UE in the registration procedure.
 Network Triggered Service Request: Upon receiving a service request
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message sent by the UE in response to a paging message, the SN sends a new
5G-GUTI to the UE.
These mandatory update features makes identifying or tracing subscribers based on
5G-GUTI impractical. Further, it is left to a network operator’s implementation
to re-assign 5G-GUTI more frequently, for example after a service request message
from the UE not triggered by the network.
3.4.3 False Base Station Detection Framework
As evident from the description of vulnerabilities in §3.3, most attacks on previous
generations leverage false base stations before the UE can go into an authenticated
state. To counter such vulnerabilities, a general framework for detecting false base
stations has been described in 5G Release 15 (Annex E of [14]). This network-
based detection framework uses radio condition information (measurement reports
of §3.3.8)) received from the devices, which can be used to make it significantly
harder for false base stations to remain stealthy. The received-signal strength and
location information in measurement reports can be used to detect a false base
station which tries to attract the UEs by transmitting signal with higher power
than that of the genuine base stations. These reports can also be used to detect a
false base station which replays the original network broadcast information without
any modification.
To detect a false base station which replays modified broadcast information to pre-
vent victim UEs from switching back and forth between itself and the genuine base
stations (by modifying neighboring cells, cell reselection criteria, registration timers,
etc. to avoid the so called ping-pong effect), information from the broadcast informa-
tion can be used to detect inconsistency from the deployment information. Further,
false base stations using unusual frequencies or cell identifiers can be detected by
analyzing the respective information in the received measurements reports. Net-
works and devices can utilise other additional security and privacy features which
are proprietary to the operators. Effective false base station detection should re-
sult in significant privacy improvement. This is because it has already been proven
by [101] that in case of uncorrupted mobile network participants, the AKA protocol
provides anonymity guarantees to the UE.
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3.4.4 Decoupling of SUPI from the Paging Mechanism
The provision of paging UE based on SUPI has been removed from 5G (sub-clause
9.3.3.18 of TS 38.413) [18]. Moreover, the calculation of the paging frame index
and paging occasions is no longer based on SUPI and is instead based on 5G-GUTI.
Coupled with the mandatory 5G-GUTI update mechanism (§3.4.2), this makes it
infeasible for false base stations to use paging messages for identifying or tracing
subscribers.
3.4.5 GUTI-based Paging Occasions
While, in LTE, POs were determined based on the IMSI, in 5G they are based on a
temporary identifier (called 5G-S-TMSI) which is a subset of the GUTI. The result
of this change is that now the ToRPEDO attack (§3.3.10), which leveraged fixed POs
for a target UE, is no longer able to exploit the permanency in paging timings. This
enhancement, along with frequent GUTI refreshment (§3.4.2), results in enhanced
user privacy.
3.4.6 Secure Radio Redirections
It is mandatory in 5G Release 15 (TS 38.331 [20]) to integrity protect RRC messages
that redirect devices. This feature makes it infeasible for false base stations to
perform rogue redirections. As a result, the level of difficulty to launch various
privacy attacks which rely on rogue redirections increases manifold.
3.5 The Future - Outstanding Issues, New Attacks and Pro-
posed Measures
The successful deployment of future 5G systems requires resolution of the outstand-
ing subscription privacy issues. In this section, we highlight the subscription privacy
vulnerabilities which were not addressed by Release 15. We also discuss the recent
literature which either suggests improvements or presents new attacks on 5G sub-
scription privacy.
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3.5.1 Unresolved Vulnerabilities
An examination of Table 3.2 reveals that there are three privacy issues from previous
generations which were not aptly addressed by Release 15: (Raw) IMSI-probing
(§3.3.2), C-RNTI-based tracking (Section 3.3.6) and the AKA-protocol based LFM
attack (§3.3.11). Regarding (Raw) IMSI-probing, as already discussed in §3.3.2, it
is highly unlikely that 3GPP will adopt countermeasures to this particular problem
because of the overhead of the required dummy signalling. The only feasible solution
to handle the C-RNTI-based privacy breaches is to employ a network-wide PKI [79]
since this requires encryption of these pre-authentication identifiers. This is unlikely
to be a desirable option for 3GPP due to the high costs associated with deploying
and maintaining a PKI.
As regards the LFM attack, Arapinis et al. [31], while highlighting this vulnerability,
also proposed a fix to resolve this problem. The proposed fix requires the HNs to
have a public/private key pair, where each USIM stores the public key of its HN.
The AKA failure messages are then encrypted using the network’s public key. They
verified the privacy properties of their fixes using the automated symbolic analysis
tool ProVerif [35]. However, their proposed fix has been shown by Fouque et al. [62]
to be still plagued with certain privacy weaknesses. Fouque et al. presented their
own improved variant of the public-key based fix for the LFM vulnerability. However,
the solution of Fouque et al. has been shown by [94] to be vulnerable to permanent
desynchronization attacks. 3GPP has never considered adoption of these proposals,
essentially because they are public-key based and introduce significant overhead. As
the UE and HN already share common secrets between them, the better way forward
seems to resolve this issue via symmetric key solutions. We explore such approaches
further in §3.5.3.
3.5.2 New Attacks on 5G Subscription Privacy
Recently, Borgaonkar et al. [38] have presented new attacks against all variants of
the AKA protocol, including 5G-AKA, which breach subscribers’ privacy. These
attacks exploit a logical vulnerability in the AKA protocol’s failure mechanism.
The vulnerability stems from the use of XOR within the re-sync token AUTS (see
Figure 2.3), which is concatenation of two parameters: CONC∗ and MAC∗. Based
upon this logical vulnerability, [38] presented two attacks against 5G user privacy:
Activity Monitoring Attack (AMA) and Location Confidentiality Attack (LCA).
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In AMA, the adversary tries to learn the n least-significant bits of SQNUE at two
different time instances, t1 and t2. Thereafter, from the difference between the
sequence numbers (corresponding to successful authentication sessions), the attacker
infers the volume of “activity” (number of calls, SMSs, etc) a particular user has
performed between these two time instances - hence the name Activity Monitoring
Attack. In LCA, the aim of the attacker is to find out whether some targeted UE
is present in a certain location or not. We analyze these attacks in more detail for
their effectiveness, practicability and potency against 5G in Chapter 4.
3.5.3 Fixing LFM, AMA and LCA
As discussed previously in §3.5.1, a symmetric-key based solution is required which
should together resolve the three vulnerabilities of LFM, AMA and LCA. We now
briefly review some of these solutions proposed by [38].
3.5.3.1 Symmetrically Encrypting SQNUE (Fix 1)
This fix consists of modifying the sequence number concealing mechanism. Instead of
using XOR to conceal SQNUE , this fix utilizes symmetric encryption. The resulting
fix is depicted in Figure 3.4a. To counter the LFM attack, it suffices to hide the
reason for the 5G-AKA protocol failure inside the ciphertext CONC∗. The authors
of [38] claim that this fix is easy to deploy in the current cellular system as it only
requires changes in the baseband module of the UE (i.e. ME) and not USIM. This
seems strange as it is the USIM (not the mobile handset) which is directly under
the control of the mobile network operator. This solution suffers from a flaw: when
an attacker triggers a failure message by injecting the same authentication challenge
twice while the SQNUE has not being updated in the UE, then the replied CONC
∗
will be the same as before, leaking to the attacker that SQNUE is unchanged.
3.5.3.2 Correctly Randomizing AUTS (Fix 2)
Another way to fix the AMA and LCA is to generate a new random (RAND∗) to
conceal SQNUE instead of utilizing the one (RAND) received in the authentication
challenge. This new random RAND∗ needs to be sent back in clear to the HN along
with AUTS for decryption of SQNUE . Figure 3.4b depicts this solution. Note
that the original RAND must be used in calculation of MAC∗ to guarantee a fresh
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response to the received authentication challenge. Otherwise, an attacker will be
able to replay an old response back to the HN, forcing it to synchronize its SQNHN
to an older value. Also note that this fix does not resolves LFM attack on its own.
3.5.3.3 Combining Fix 1 and Fix 2 (Fix 3)
Both Fix 1 and Fix 2 have limitations of their own. Fix 1 suffers from a minor flaw,
while Fix 2 is not applicable for LFM attack. For a comprehensive solution, which
resolves both of these issues, we combine Fix 1 and Fix 2 as suggested in [38]. This
combined fix is depicted in Figure 3.4c and addresses LFM, AMA and LCA without
any known flaws / limitations.
3.5.4 Quantum-secure and Downgrade-resistant SUPI Protection
As pointed out by [109], the current ECIES-based SUPI protection solution is vulner-
able to quantum cryptanalysis. Until the publication of the 3GPP’s public-key based
protection mechanism, the technical problem of finding a SUPI protection solution
remained opened in a purely symmetric-key setting. However, later on, we proposed
a solution for SUPI protection that works entirely within symmetric-key domain.
This solution was presented at the 2018 Security Standardization Research (SSR)
conference [83] and addresses all the shortcomings of the ECIES-based mechanism.
We discuss this alternative proposal in further detail in Chapter 5. Interestingly,
another paper [89] presented at the same venue proposed a protection mechanism
for the downgrade attacks against 5G-AKA. These two solutions can be combined
together to come up with a 5G SUPI protection mechanism which is both quantum-
secure and downgrade-resistant. We present this combined solution in Chapter 6.
3.5.5 IBE-based SUPI Protection
Both the current 3GPP SUPI protection mechanism (§3.4.1) and our alternative
symmetric-key proposal (detailed in Chapter 5) hide only the MSIN part of the
SUPI, while the MCC and MNC part is sent in clear over-the-air to the SN for
routing of the SUCI to the correct HN. Also, to increase look-up efficiency, mobile
network operators divide their subscriber database into further sub-domains [140].
Therefore, it is required that the SUCI be delivered to the correct sub-domain within
the HN. Typically, this requires between one and three digits after the MCC/MNC
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UE
(SUPI, K, SQNUE)
SN
(SNname)
MAC∗ ← f1∗(K,SQNUE‖RAND)
CK∗ ← f3(K,RAND)
CONC∗ ← Enc(CK∗,Failure Reason||SQNUE)
AUTS ← CONC∗‖MAC∗
Failure, AUTS
If ¬(i) or ¬(ii) then:
(a) Fix 1: Symmetrically encrypting SQNUE .
UE
(SUPI, K, SQNUE)
SN
(SNname)
new RAND∗
MAC∗ ← f1∗(K,SQNUE‖RAND‖RAND∗)
AK∗ ← f5∗(K,RAND∗)
CONC∗ ← SQNUE ⊕AK∗
AUTS ← CONC∗‖MAC∗‖RAND∗
Sync Failure, AUTS
If (i) and ¬(ii) then:
(b) Fix 2: Correctly randomizing AUTS.
UE
(SUPI, K, SQNUE)
SN
(SNname)
new RAND∗
MAC∗ ← f1∗(K,SQNUE‖RAND‖RAND∗)
CK∗ ← f3(K,RAND∗)
CONC∗ ← Enc(CK∗,Failure Reason||SQNUE)
AUTS ← CONC∗‖MAC∗‖RAND∗
Failure, AUTS
If ¬(i) or ¬(ii) then:
(c) Fix 3: Combining Fix 1 and Fix 2.
Figure 3.4: Proposed fixes for 5G-AKA failure messages.
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in the MSIN to be sent in clear as part of the routing information [141]. All this
results in weakening of the privacy protection being offered to the mobile subscriber
as a significant part of its identity is now exposed to an attacker.
Another limitation of the 3GPP protection mechanism and our alternative proposal
is that the SN is entirely dependent upon the HN for revelation of the SUCI and the
associated LI purposes [92]. Several countermeasures have been proposed in 3GPP
meetings for handling of this issue [43, 58, 95, 115, 116]. All of these suggested
countermeasures introduce overhead either due to additional signalling messages or
due to requirement of new parameters. Moreover, there is nothing stopping the UE
and its HN from colluding to provide the SN with a false SUPI.
To counter these limitations, Khan and Niemi [91] proposed a 5G-SUPI protection
scheme based on Identity-based Encryption (IBE). In this scheme, the UE’s HN
act as the Private Key Generator (PKG). IBE-based schemes inherently resolve the
exposure of partial MSIN and provide better LI guarantees as the SN can now work
out the SUPI from the SUCI independently of the HN. The proposal by [91] can be
argued to be a better alternative to the current 3GPP mechanism, though the asso-
ciated key-revocation is quite complex. However, compared to our solution ([83]), it
is not quantum-secure and the increase in computational and signalling overhead is
much higher. Also, it is unclear whether the IBE-based solution can be used in com-
bination with the downgrade protection proposal of [89]. Given these limitations, in
the long-term, our solution seems more preferable.
3.5.6 Study on Protection against False Base Stations
Another important avenue which still requires further research is that of protection
against false base station attacks. Though 5G Release 15 provides a false base sta-
tion detection framework (§3.4.3), its status as of now is informative only. Moreover,
the provided framework is generic in nature and focuses only on the detection as-
pects. Very recently, 3GPP has initiated a comprehensive study [23] which focuses
on security enhancements against false base stations for the next 5G Release 16.
The aim is to study the potential threats and privacy issues associated with false
base station scenarios and identify potential solutions for mitigating the risks caused
by false base stations. As various attacks against 5G subscription privacy on the
radio interface exploit false base station as the underlying platform, this study will
also contribute towards subscription privacy enhancement in Release 16.
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Table 3.3: Important recent survey publications related to 5G security and privacy.
Reference Publication Year Application Area Main Contribution Relevance to 5G Privacy
[126] 2018 2G, 3G, 4G A survey of existing literature
on attacks in previous gener-
ations (GSM/UMTS/LTE) of
mobile telephony.
Suggests research directions /
improvements for 5G subscrip-
tion privacy.
[135] 2018 ICN A survey about security, pri-
vacy, and access control in
information-centric network-
ing.
The privacy attack scenarios
discussed are also applicable to
5G networking concepts.
[28], [29] 2017/2018 5G An overview of 5G security
challenges and solutions.
Discusses the privacy chal-
lenges in 5G from the user’s
perspective.
[93] 2019 5G A survey on the security and
privacy of 5G.
Focused on portraying a land-
scape of futuristic security
threats to 5G.
[78] 2019 5G A survey of remaining security
and privacy issues in 5G.
Proposes PKI integration to re-
solve outstanding issues.
[60] 2018 4G, 5G A survey of existing authenti-
cation and privacy-preserving
schemes for 4G and 5G cellu-
lar networks.
Discusses privacy attacks on
5G networks and provides rec-
ommendations for further re-
search.
[65] 2017 5G A survey on green communi-
cation and the associated se-
curity challenges in 5G net-
works.
Reviews privacy aspects of
various 5G enabling technolo-
gies like machine-to-machine
(M2M) communications, etc.
[124] 2017 SDN A survey of issues and chal-
lenges in designing SDN based
5G networks.
No explicit focus on 5G privacy
rather provides SDN based se-
curity solutions for 4G and 5G
networks.
[48] 2019 5G A survey on the security
of alternative computing
paradigms for 5G networks.
Emphasizes the applicabil-
ity of alternative computing
paradigms for enhancement of
subscriber privacy.
3.6 Related Work
We believe there does not exist any prior work in the published literature with
exclusive focus on 5G subscription privacy. The probable reason for this seems to
be that 5G is a very nascent technology within which extensive development and
upgrades were undertaken as late as June 2019. Table 3.3 presents a summary of
the related literature which has considered security and privacy in 5G or 5G-like
networks. Here, we briefly discuss the work carried out in these publications.
Rupprecht et al. [126] categorized and systematized attacks in existing mobile gen-
erations (GSM/UMTS/LTE) by their aim, impact and attacker capabilities. They
further identified future research directions for 5G networks based on these existing
security and privacy issues. The main difference between [126] and our work is that
we also consider 5G Release 15, while the privacy analysis of [126] is limited only to
the previous generations. Tourani et al. [135] have analyzed security, privacy and
access control within the scope of Information-centric Networking (ICN). ICN is a
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networking paradigm which focuses on content of the traffic rather than its origin
- a concept similar [125] to network slicing3 in 5G. Ahmad et al. [28, 29] analyzed
generic security and privacy threats to 5G networks and suggested possible solutions
to these threats from the published literature. As both of these works were carried
out before the publication of the 5G standard, they are mostly speculative in nature.
Khan et al. [93] have presented a survey about security and privacy of 5G. The 5G
privacy issues discussed in [93] are again speculative in nature as the manuscript
was drafted before the publication of 5G Release 15.
Jover [78] discussed security challenges faced by 5G. The main focus of this work was
the integration of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) within the current 5G network
architecture to resolve outstanding security and privacy issues. Ferrag et al. [60]
presented a survey of existing authentication and privacy-preserving schemes for
LTE and 5G mobile networks. They provided a classification of threat models in 4G
and 5G cellular networks in four categories: attacks against privacy, attacks against
integrity, attacks against availability, and attacks against authentication. They also
provided a classification of the respective countermeasures into three categories:
cryptographic methods, humans factors, and intrusion detection methods. It seems
that the work of [60] presumed that all the analysis and contextualization with
respect to 4G can be seamlessly applied to 5G. The reason for this is because at the
time of publication of [60] (January, 2018) even the Stage-24 of 5G Release 15 was
not completed (see Figure 3.1).
Gandotra and Jha [65] presented a survey on various energy-efficient scenarios for
green communication in 5G and the related security aspects. For improving the bat-
tery lifetime of user terminals, [65] proposed transmitting information through relays
and discussed security susceptibilities via these relays and the associated counter-
measures. However, [65] did not consider 5G privacy. Rangisetti and Tamma [124]
explored the aspects related to migration of mobile network infrastructure in LTE
and 5G to Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization
(NFV). It further elaborated security issues in migration to these new technologies
and suggested SDN-based solutions. The work by [124] is focused on the security
issues during architecture migration and not on subscription privacy. Choudhry
3Network slicing is a form of virtual network architecture which delivers greater network flexi-
bility by allowing traditional network architectures to be partitioned into virtual elements that can
be linked through software.
4“Stage-2” is a stage where logical analysis, devising an abstract architecture of functional ele-
ments and the information flows amongst them across reference points between functional entities
is carried out.
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and Sharma [48] surveyed recent computing paradigms as alternative mechanisms
for the enhancement of 5G security. This work particularly focuses on the feasibility
of catalytic and osmotic computing in 5G networks and not subscription privacy.
3.7 Chapter Summary
Although 5G offers better privacy guarantees than its predecessors, this work showed
that there still remain significant issues which need rectifying. Several privacy vul-
nerabilities that remain unresolved in 5G Release 15 were highlighted. To address
the identified privacy gaps, this chapter also proposed improvements for future ver-
sions of the 5G standard. The study concludes that new and more rigorous privacy
protection mechanisms are required to guarantee subscription privacy in 5G. In
particular, for a quantum-secure future, 3GPP should consider accompanying the
current subscriber identification protection mechanism (being the only public-key
based mechanism in 5G) with the symmetric proposal of [83].
57
Chapter 4
Efficacy of New Privacy Attacks against
5G-AKA
This chapter provides an analysis of the attacks on 5G privacy by Borgaonkar et
al. [38]. We evaluate these attacks for their effectiveness, practicability and potency
against 5G. This analysis was published at the International Conference on Security
and Cryptography 2019 [84].
4.1 Introduction
The 3GPP standard for 3G/4G mobile telephony security [16] provisions an Au-
thenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocol for establishment of a secure channel
between mobile subscribers and their service providers. The AKA protocol for 4G
networks is similar to that of 3G with slight differences in identifier and key manage-
ment. For 5G, an enhanced version of this AKA protocol called the 5G-AKA was
introduced by 3GPP [14]. Apart from typical security requirements, an important
consideration for these AKA protocols (and their associated mechanisms) is end-user
privacy.
Borgaonkar et al. [38] have revealed a new logical vulnerability in one of the asso-
ciated mechanisms (sequence number re-synchronization) of the 3G/4G/5G AKA
protocols. Based upon this vulnerability, they have presented two privacy attacks:
Activity Monitoring Attack (AMA) and Location Confidentiality Attack (LCA). The
AMA allows an attacker to learn subscribers' mobile service consumption patterns
while the LCA allows tracking of mobile subscribers, thus breaking location confiden-
tiality. Borgaonkar et al. claim that these attacks adversely affect all generations of
mobile telecommunications, including 5G. More importantly, they state that these
attacks have been acknowledged by the requisite standardization bodies and that
remedial actions are underway for the future 5G specifications.
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In this chapter, we analyze the efficacy of these new privacy attacks against 5G. The
reason for confining this analysis to 5G is due to the fact that relatively facile attacks
(IMSI-catching [63], Linkability via Failure Messages (LFM) [31]1) provisioning more
disastrous breaches of subscriber privacy already exist for the previous generations
(2G/3G/4G). Effective countermeasures for these existing attacks were not incorpo-
rated in the already-deployed standards because of the high upgrade costs involved.
It is thus too late to propose any amendments for the 2G/3G/4G specifications. The
findings of our analysis contradict some of the claims made in [38]. Specifically, we
show the following:
 The AMA is infeasible to execute in 5G networks.
 The LCA is a direct extension of an existing privacy vulnerability [31] that
exploits linkability of the AKA failure messages. Moreover, we demonstrate
that the results obtained with this extension attack are less effective than those
achieved via the existing vulnerability.
 Contrary to [38] which claims dedicated fixes are required for their attacks,
we establish that in case of effectual countermeasures introduced against the
existing vulnerability of [31], both AMA and LCA will be rendered futile.
 The associated security and privacy analysis of the modified 5G-AKA in [38],
carried out in a symbolic model, is inaccurate and error prone due to omission
of important aspects specified within the 3GPP standard.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: §4.2 provides the requisite back-
ground, §4.3 details the logical vulnerability in the 5G-AKA, AMA and LCA are
described in §4.4 and §4.5, respectively, §4.6 analyzes the attacks and §4.7 provides
concluding remarks.
4.2 The 5G-AKA
Before considering the details of the privacy attacks, we outline the 5G-AKA upon
which these attacks are based. Though §2.7 already details the 5G-AKA, we restate
the pertinent aspects here for continuity purpose. Figure 2.3 shows details of the
5G-AKA and its associated failure mechanisms. In Figure 2.3 functions f1,. . ., f5,
1This linkability attack is also valid for 5G Release 15.
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f1
∗ and f5
∗ are unrelated symmetric key algorithms, f1, f2 and f1
∗ act as message
authentication functions, while f3, f4, f5 and f5
∗ are used as key derivation functions.
Key derivation is performed using the Key Derivation Function (KDF) specified in
3GPP TS 33.220 [11] and SNname is the global identity of the SN. A successful
5G-AKA culminates in the derivation of the anchor key KSEAF by the SN and UE
from which further keys for securing various layers of communication are derived.
The two cases of authentication failure for the 5G-AKA are as follows:
1. MAC Failure: As the first step in authentication confirmation, the UE
checks whether the received MAC value is correct or not. In case of a failure
[Case ¬(i) in Figure 2.3], the UE replies with a MAC Failure message back to
the SN.
2. Sync Failure: After MAC verification, the UE checks the freshness of the se-
quence number SQN received in the authentication challenge. In case of this
failure [Case (i) and ¬(ii) in Figure 2.3], it responds with a Sync Failure mes-
sage along with a re-sync token AUTS. Note that in Figure 2.3, the sequence
number freshness check is denoted by XSQNHN > SQNUE −4. What this
means is that there is some “window” of size 4, within which sequence num-
bers smaller than the current sequence number of UE will be accepted given
they previously had not been received by the UE. This mechanism is there to
handle out-of-order delivery of challenge messages from HN to UE. We discuss
this aspect in further detail in Section 4.6.3.
In addition to the requirements of mutual authentication and data confidentiality, it
is crucial that SQN is protected from an eavesdropper during the establishment of a
secure channel between the UE and SN as its exposure may lead to the compromise
of the identity and location of a user [9].
4.3 The Logical Vulnerability
The logical vulnerability of [38] affecting user privacy stems from the use of XOR
within the re-sync token AUTS, which is concatenation of two parameters: CONC∗
and MAC∗. The parameter CONC∗ contains the current sequence number of the
UE in a masked form as SQNUE ⊕ AK∗, where AK∗ = f5∗(K,RAND). Note
that during calculation of the masking key AK∗, the value RAND is extracted
from the received authentication challenge. Hence, in the case of receiving the same
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authentication challenge twice at two different times t1 and t2, the masked sequence
numbers in their corresponding AUTS tokens will be:
CONC∗1 = SQN
1
UE ⊕AK∗1 , where AK∗1 = f5∗(K,RAND)
CONC∗2 = SQN
2
UE ⊕AK∗2 , where AK∗2 = f5∗(K,RAND),
where SQN1UE is the sequence number of UE at time t1 and SQN
2
UE is the sequence
number at time t2. Therefore, the adversary can compute:
CONC∗1 ⊕ CONC∗2 = SQN1UE ⊕ SQN2UE .
Next we detail the two attacks presented in [38] which, by exploiting this vulnera-
bility, try to compromise user privacy.
4.4 Activity Monitoring Attack
In this attack the adversary tries to learn the n least significant bits of SQNUE
at two different time instances, t1 and t2. Thereafter, from the difference between
the sequence numbers (corresponding to successful authentication sessions), the at-
tacker infers the volume of “activity” (number of call, SMS, etc) a particular user has
performed between these two time instances, hence the name Activity Monitoring
Attack. As we will see shortly, to mount this attack the adversary requires malicious
interaction with both UE and HN (via SN). Hence, the compromise of both iden-
tity confidentiality and location confidentiality of the target UE are prerequisites to
launch an AMA.
Details of a single instance of the attack at a particular time t are now explained.
The online phase of the AMA is depicted in Figure 4.1. During this phase the
attacker first fetches 2n−1 + 1 successive authentication challenges from the SN for
the targeted UE. The attacker then sends a particular n + 1 of these challenges to
the UE, each followed by a replay instance of the initially received authentication
challenge (RAND0, AUTN0), and records the corresponding n + 1 resync tokens;
i.e. AUTS‘ and AUTSj (for j = 0 to n− 1).
In the offline phase, utilizing the logical vulnerability as elaborated earlier in Sec-
tion 4.3, the attacker retrieves the following values from the recorded resync tokens:
δi = SQN
0
HN ⊕ (SQN0HN + 2i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
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UE
(SUPI, K, SQNUE)
Attacker
(SUPI or
Encrypted SUPI)
SN + HN
(SUPI, K, SQNHN = SQN
0
HN )
...
SQNHN ← SQNHN + 1
ID
RANDi, AUTNi
RAND0, AUTN0
RES0
RAND0, AUTN0
Sync Failure, AUTS‘
RAND2j , AUTN2j
RESj
RAND0, AUTN0
Sync Failure, AUTSj
for i = 0 to 2n−1 :
for j = 0 to n− 1 :
Figure 4.1: The online phase of the AMA.
Data: δi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
Result: X = n least significant bits of SQN0HN
X ← [0, 0, . . . , 0] // init an array of size n
for i← 0 to n− 1 do
// Analyze δi at bit positions i, i+ 1
(b1, b2)← (δi [i] , δi [i+ 1])
if (b1, b2)⇔ (1, 0) then
// No remainder propagates when SQN0HN + 2
i
X [i]← 0
else if (b1, b2)⇔ (1, 1) then
// A remainder propagates when SQN0HN + 2
i
X [i]← 1
else
// Not possible
Error
end
end
return (X)
Figure 4.2: SQN inference algorithm.
where SQN0HN is the initial value of the SN’s sequence number at the start of the at-
tack. Note that due to receipt of the first authentication challenge (RAND0, AUTN0)
from the adversary, the UE will also sync its sequence number to this value at the
start of the attack. Further, by feeding these n values into SQN Inference Algo-
rithm (Figure 4.2), the attacker extracts the n least significant bits of SQN0HN .
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4.5 Location Confidentiality Attack
As another consequence of the logical vulnerability of Section 4.3, [38] presented a
Location Confidentiality Attack (LCA); i.e. finding out whether some targeted UE
is present in a certain location. Note that we present LCA as explained in [38]. We
claim there are several erroneous assumptions upon which this attack is based and we
will highlight these when we undertake the corresponding analysis in Section 4.6.2.
The LCA proceeds as follows:
1. The attacker observes a 5G-AKA session of some targeted user2 UEx and
extracts the corresponding CONC∗x value by replaying the observed authenti-
cation challenge to UEx.
2. After some time, if the attacker wishes to check whether another unknown
5G-AKA session belongs to UEx or not, the attacker again replays the earlier
observed challenge from Step (1) to this unknown user and obtains CONC∗? .
3. Now based upon the value CONC∗x ⊕ CONC∗? , the attacker can infer (with
non-negligible probability) whether this new user is UEx or not. In the case
of some other user this will be a random value, while in the case of UEx it will
equate SQNoldUEx ⊕ SQN
current
UEx
due to canceling out of the common masking
key AK∗. This value (dependent upon the lapsed time) should be small in the
case of user UEx.
4.6 Analysis
4.6.1 Analysis of AMA
4.6.1.1 Infeasible Prerequisites
As elaborated earlier in Section 4.4, to launch an AMA the adversary first needs to
compromise the target’s identity and location confidentiality. While such a compro-
mise is easy to manage in earlier generations (3G/4G) via IMSI-catching attacks [63],
how this will be achieved in 5G is not clear. With a randomized public-key en-
cryption mechanism in place to protect direct exposure of the SUPI during the
identification phase, such a compromise is highly unlikely in 5G Release 15. In §5.2
2Note that it is not necessary for the attacker to know the SUPI of the user to launch this
attack.
63
4.6 Analysis
of [38], in the case of an unknown SUPI, the use of SUCI (the randomized en-
cryption of SUPI) is suggested for fetching the requisite authentication challenges
from the SN. This would require correlating the SUCI to the appropriate SUPI,
which in the case of a secure encryption scheme is not possible. The most convincing
implementation of AMA in 5G would look something like this: the attacker follows
the victim closely3 and observes the victim’s attach procedure (utilizing SUCI) to
the network. We stress that all this needs to be undertaken in isolation without the
presence of other mobile subscribers in the concerned attack area. Such requirement
of physical tracking of the target in AMA render it unattractive for its automated
use in 5G.
The prospect of the repeated use of SUCI for fetching of successive authentication
challenges from the SN to launch the AMA is possible because the current identifica-
tion mechanism in 5G [14] is susceptible to replay attacks. No dedicated replay pre-
vention mechanism has been built into the 5G randomized encryption scheme used
for SUPI protection. This was highlighted to 3GPP by the European Telecommu-
nications Standards Institute Security Algorithms Group of Experts (ETSI SAGE)
during their evaluation of the SUPI protection mechanism for 5G [59]. We pro-
pose an alternative SUPI protection mechanism for 5G (detailed in Chapter 5)
which prevents such SUCI replay attacks [83]. We stress that adoption of such a
mechanism will render attacks such as AMA infeasible.
4.6.1.2 Requesting Batch of AVs
Unlike the previous generations, Clause 6.1.3.2.0 of [14] does not support requests
for issuing multiple Authentication Vectors (AVs) for 5G-AKA. Also, after issuance
of each 5G AV, the HN waits for a response from the SN after successful mutual
authentication and key agreement between UE and SN, as elaborated in Figure 2.3.
Hence, the adversary has to wait for the expiration of the timeout of the currently
issued AV before the next AV issuance request can be entertained by the SN. This
considerably increases the time complexity of AMA’s online phase in 5G.
3In this case the identity confidentiality and location confidentiality are already compromised as
the attacker can already identify the target and is aware of its location.
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4.6.1.3 The Accuracy of AMA Assumptions
Essentially AMA tries to reveal the n least significant bits of SQNUE at two dif-
ferent time frames for the target user. Thereafter, based upon the assumption
that each sequence number increment corresponds to a successful AKA session, it
deduces that the difference between the two SQNUE reveals the user’s service con-
sumption during that time interval. The problem with this assumption is that the
difference between the sequence numbers does not “fully” corresponds to successful
AKA sessions. Many times, due to network failure or channel noise (bad weather,
etc), legitimate messages may get lost during transmission and may not reach the
intended destination. On the other hand, it may be the case that a user is gen-
uinely under attack by some active attacker. In such cases, the end result would
be the non-utilization of the affected sequence numbers. Thus, while a difference in
sequence numbers may give a rough idea about the user’s service consumption, its
efficacy is dependent upon many other factors.
Another assumption that adversely affects AMA’s accuracy is the inference of SQNUE
from SQNHN . Note that at the start of the AMA, SQNUE is forced to update to the
value SQN0HN , the initial value of the SQNHN . The presumption behind this step
is that the two values should be equivalent, which may or may not be the case. It
is quite possible (due to a variety of circumstances) for SQNHN to be much higher
than that of SQNUE at the start of AMA. In such scenarios, AMA’s accuracy about
the target’s activity is negatively impacted.
4.6.1.4 Severity of AMA
In [38], it is claimed that AMA breaches subscribers’ privacy more severely than
either location confidentiality or identity confidentiality attacks. This seems to be
an overstatement as compromise of the permanent identity or location is arguably a
more severe breach of privacy than the exposure of a number of voice calls or SMSs
sent by a user. Otherwise, such a breach of privacy would have been mentioned in
the official 3GPP mobile subscribers’ privacy requirements [9]. In fact, breach of a
user’s identity and location does not only violate the user’s privacy but can lead to
physical attacks. For (a sensational) example, consider the scenario where a bomb
explosion is triggered automatically when a high value target’s presence is detected
in the near vicinity of an IMSI-catcher [66, 36].
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4.6.2 Analysis of LCA
4.6.2.1 No Activity Monitoring
Unlike AMA, LCA does not presume any prerequisite compromises (such as identity
and location confidentiality) about the target which makes it a much easier attack to
launch in practice. Moreover, LCA targets location confidentiality of a user instead
of its service consumption, which is a more severe breach of privacy as discussed in
§4.6.1. In a way, LCA can be considered as a more direct application of the logical
vulnerability of §4.3. Though [38] presented LCA as an extension of their primary
attack AMA, we argue that LCA is a much more significant attack than AMA as it
does not require fetching of authentication vectors from the SN, nor running of the
SQN Inference Algorithm, and is simple to execute. However, we stress that there is
no activity monitoring (contrary to the claim made in the Footnote No. 2 of [38]).
This is because, now, what the attacker gets after a successful LCA is:
CONC∗UE ⊕ CONC∗? = SQNoldUE ⊕ SQN currentUE .
Note that the presumption for this is that the value SQNoldUE ⊕ SQN currentUE will be
small (less than some threshold value). So there are two aspects which hinder the
accurate inference of activity monitoring :
1. The attacker is already operating the LCA under the presumption of a small
increase in SQNUE , which renders the aspect of activity monitoring ineffective.
2. Unlike AMA, in LCA the attacker is unable to extract the n least significant
bits of SQNUE . What the attacker actually gets are the positions of the
bits of SQNUE which flipped their value (either 0 to 1 or 1 to 0), hindering
an accurate estimate of the difference between the two values. Nevertheless,
there is some leakage from a cryptographic viewpoint.
4.6.2.2 No Requirement of Dedicated Fixes
Having established that LCA is not another version of AMA but, rather, an attack
targeting location confidentiality in its own right, we turn our attention to another
important dimension. All generations of mobile telephony (including 5G Release 15)
suffer from an existing location attack known in the literature as Linkability of Fail-
ure Messages (LFM) attack [31] (discussed previously in §3.3.11). The LFM attack
66
4.6 Analysis
exploits the fact that in the case of an erroneous authentication challenge, the reason
of the authentication failure is exposed to the attacker; i.e. either MAC Failure or
Sync Failure. This allows an attacker to link two failure messages together to iden-
tify a target user. LFM is much simpler to execute than LCA. In LFM, the attacker
first observes an AKA session of the target user and records the authentication chal-
lenge (RAND,AUTN). Later, when the attacker wants to check whether another
AKA session belongs to the same user or not, he replays the recorded authenti-
cation challenge and observes the type of failure message received. In the case of
MAC Failure it is some other user, while in the case of Sync Failure it is the same
user. Note that in LFM, unlike LCA, no further computations are required and the
results are precise. Hence, it is a more devastating attack than LCA.
In [38] it is claimed that LCA will work even if LFM attack gets patched. The reason
behind this claim seems to be the (erroneous) assumption that a countermeasure
for the LFM attack will only hide the reason of authentication failure and not the
rest of the failure message contents (including AUTS token) leading to the logi-
cal vulnerability of Section 4.3. However, the solutions in the literature proposing
countermeasures to the LFM attack suggest otherwise. This is essentially because
the indistinguishability experiments proving unlinkability in these solutions cover all
aspects of unlinkability and not only the reason of the authentication failure. As a
concrete example, we consider the countermeasure proposed in [31]. In case of an
authentication failure (due to any reason), the whole failure message including the
resync token is encrypted by the network public key. Hence, the logical vulnerabil-
ity of §4.3 gets resolved before it can be exploited. This leads us to the deduction
that, in reality, LCA is a more complex version of the LFM attack. Surprisingly, in
5G Release 15 no countermeasures for this potent LFM attack have been adopted.
Though the authors of [38] present LCA as a distinct attack from the LFM attack,
suggesting that dedicated countermeasures independent of existing attacks would be
required, it is not hard to see that a suitable countermeasure (as already suggested
in §3.5.3) against the LFM attack will also render both AMA and LCA ineffective.
This is because now the attacker will not be able to the exploit the resync tokens
AUTS to launch AMA or LCA.
4.6.3 The Curious Case of Out-of-Order Message Delivery
Although there have been a number of formal analyses of the 5G-AKA [33, 49] in the
symbolic model using tools such as Tamarin Prover [106], and 3GPP has been using
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this approach for protocol evaluations [5], the problem has always been the necessary
abstraction required during the transformation from the real-world conditions to
the underlying mathematical model of the system being evaluated. As a concrete
example, consider the case of the analysis carried out in [5]. Even after formal
analysis, a number of vulnerabilities were later discovered in the 3G-AKA. Another
example is that of [33], whose analysis of the 5G-AKA failed to capture the privacy
flaws pointed out in [38]. While the formal analysis of 5G-AKA undertaken in [38]
is based upon enhanced system models which consider the AUTS tokens of the
Sync Failure messages, there is an important aspect which was missed; i.e. how
the 5G-AKA (and the earlier AKA protocols) handle out-of-order delivery of the
authentication challenges from the SN to UE.
As per 3GPP specifications [9], the mechanism in the UE for verifying the freshness of
sequence numbers should to some extent allow the out-of-order delivery of sequence
numbers. This is to ensure that the authentication failure rate due to synchroniza-
tion failures resulting from such messages is sufficiently low. The standard requires
that the UE should store in its memory the sequence numbers of a certain number
of past successful authentication events. Such a mechanism ensures that a (stale)
sequence number can still be accepted if it is among the last 32 sequence numbers
generated (i.e. 4 = 32 in Figure 2.3) and was not previously used. Unfortunately,
the formal models of [33, 38] have ignored this important aspect of sequence number
freshness verification, which renders their security and privacy analysis of 5G-AKA
imprecise.
4.7 Summary and Recommendations
In this chapter we analyzed two recent attacks (AMA and LCA) on 5G subscription
privacy by [38]. We established that AMA is infeasible in practice to execute in 5G
networks. We also showed that LCA is trying to achieve what the existing LFM
attack [31] already does with much less effort and greater effectiveness. Moreover,
we demonstrated that both these attacks will become irrelevant if the LFM attack
is patched. Additionally, we highlighted how the history of the symbolic modeling
of the AKA protocol has been plagued with serious gaps that lead to various vul-
nerabilities. Looking at the results of our analysis in hindsight, it seems that the
authors of [38] were overoptimistic in interpretation of their results. Keeping in mind
the current development status of the 5G-AKA, the following recommendations are
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made to 3GPP:
 To improve user privacy, 3GPP should consider appropriate countermeasures
(as detailed in §3.5.3) for the LFM attack.
 Considering the aspects of protocol analysis discussed in §4.6.3, it is suggested
that a comprehensive security and privacy analysis of the 5G-AKA in an ap-
propriate computational model should be carried out.
 To prevent any further future attacks, there is a need to remediate the existing
vulnerability of the 5G-AKA identification phase to replay attacks. We detail
a proposal in Chapter 5 which prevents such replay attacks.
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Chapter 5
An Alternative Proposal for SUPI
Protection
In this chapter we present an alternative private identification scheme for 5G which
utilizes only symmetric cryptographic primitives. We also provide a detailed for-
mal security analysis of the scheme in a novel security framework. This scheme
was published at the International Conference on Security Standardization Research
2018 [83].
5.1 Introduction
While many mobile users may be comfortable with the fact that their service provider
is able to identify them and track their geographical location ubiquitously, fewer
are likely to be comfortable with an arbitrary third party having this capabil-
ity. In the hands of a third party, such a capability could lead to undesirable
breaches of end-user privacy, opening the door to a range of potential consequences,
such as harassment, stalking, employee monitoring, commercial profiling, etc. As
elaborated earlier in §2.4, the subscribers are identified over the radio access link
via frequently-changing temporary identifiers (called Temporary Mobile Subscriber
Identity (TMSI) until 3G systems and a Globally Unique Temporary User Equip-
ment Identity (GUTI) for 4G and 5G systems) by the serving network. However,
despite the use of these temporary identifiers, IMSI-catching attacks [52, 53, 63, 104,
113, 118, 120] persist in today’s mobile networks including the 4G LTE [108].
5.1.1 Countermeasures to IMSI-catchers in 5G
As highlighted in §3.3.1, IMSI-catching attacks have been a threat to all generations
(2G/3G/4G) of mobile telecommunication [63]. As a result of technological barri-
ers, this privacy problem appears to have persisted for decades [7]. However, 3GPP
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decided to address this issue in 5G. In the event of identification failure via a 5G-
GUTI, unlike earlier generations, 5G security specifications do not allow plaintext
transmissions of the SUPI over the radio interface [14]. Instead, an Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)-based privacy-preserving identifier contain-
ing the concealed SUPI is transmitted [131]. We elaborate upon the details of this
scheme further in §5.4.1.
5.1.2 Motivation
5G Release 15 - the first full set of standalone 5G specifications - was finalized in
June 2019. However, it will almost certainly take a decade or so before all legacy
systems are upgraded to 5G. Hence, IMSI-catching attacks remain an issue during
the mid-term future, possibly even beyond the year 2030. By then it is likely that
practical quantum computers will pose a much more immediate threat than they
do today [80, 45]. The impact of quantum computers on mobile networks is al-
ready being discussed within the telephony industry [105], with a call to implement
quantum-secure cryptography [21]. It is thus imperative that 5G security specifica-
tions such as 3GPP TS 33.501 [14] (hereafter referred as TS 33.501) include options
for quantum-secure schemes. Fortunately, 5G security has mostly relied upon sym-
metric cryptography (whose security is less impacted by quantum computers) for
achieving its security objectives. However, the ECIES-based identification mecha-
nism is an exception since it is known to be vulnerable to quantum algorithms. We
suggest that one viable way forward is to develop a symmetric alternative to the
ECIES mechanism. Any proposal for an alternative user identification protection
scheme for 5G systems should ideally strive to satisfy the following requirements:
 Provision privacy guarantees such as anonymity and unlinkability [122] against
a quantum adversary.
 The computational and communication overhead should be minimal. Specif-
ically, the number of communication passes should not increase as it impacts
the call-setup durations the most.
 Offer protection against replay attacks.
 Fulfill “Lawful Interception” requirements (for details see §2.9) in mobile telecom-
munications.
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 Adhere to the existing 3GPP message structures as specified in current 5G
specifications.
5.1.3 Chapter Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
 We detail limitations of the ECIES-based identification scheme of TS 33.501.
 We present an alternative quantum-secure scheme which overcomes the limi-
tations identified in the 3GPP scheme.
 We develop an appropriate model of security and formally prove the privacy
guarantees offered by our proposal in this model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: §5.2 discusses the related work while
§5.3 details the pertinent aspects of the 5G-AKA. The current identity protection
mechanism of 5G Release 15 is detailed in §5.4. §5.5 presents our identity protection
proposal. §5.6 explains the security framework and §5.7 provides the analysis of our
proposal. §5.8 provides a discussion about the impact of parameter sizes and §5.9
summarizes the chapter.
5.2 Related Work
To our knowledge, this is the first work on 5G identity protection since the publica-
tion of TS 33.501. Before a protection scheme was chosen, a study was conducted
by 3GPP to evaluate a number of potential solutions. In total 24 proposals were
considered, details of which can be found in the associated report 3GPP TR 33.899
(Clause 5.7.4) [8]. Most (but not all) proposals were based on public-key cryptog-
raphy, and the ECIES-based mechanism was selected as the final candidate. The
few symmetric-key proposals all relied on utilizing pseudonyms for privacy purposes,
and thus were susceptible to desynchronization attacks potentially causing perma-
nent DoS attacks on the mobile users.
Various academic works have considered IMSI-catching attacks. The major thrust of
these papers has been to devise a solution for 3G/4G without modifying the existing
message structures out of concern for legacy devices and backwards-compatibility.
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Broek et al. [138] introduced a proposal based on changing pseudonyms and required
no modifications to the existing infrastructure. As a result of reliance on changing
pseudonyms, this solution was susceptible to desynchronization attacks. A similar
proposal was that by Khan and Mitchell [87], which relied on using a set of IMSIs
for a particular user to offer some degree of pseudonymity, however, as in the case
of [138], this solution could also get knocked out of the service permanently. Khan
and Mitchell, based upon their previous work, subsequently presented an improved
solution [88]. This solution relied on using a dynamic pseudo-IMSI for identifica-
tion purposes, however identity desynchronization attacks still had the potential to
cause permanent denial of service. Thus their solution is accompanied with an iden-
tity recovery mechanism (in case of desynchronization) which required no changes
to the existing message structures. However, this solution fails to satisfy the Law-
ful Interception (LI) requirements without further changes to the existing message
structures.
5.3 The 5G-AKA
Our proposal for private identification in 5G (§5.4) works in tandem with the 5G-
AKA protocol. Hence, before we layout our proposal, we detail the message flow
of the 5G-AKA. As already elaborated earlier in §2.7, 5G-AKA utilizes various
symmetric cryptographic algorithms. Detail of how these cryptographic algorithms
are used for calculation of various 5G-AKA parameters can be found in Table 5.1.
A pictorial representation of the 5G-AKA message flow is given in Figure 5.1 and
elaborated further in the following:
0. 1 To initiate authentication, the UE sends the SN either the 5G-GUTI in
a “registration request” message or the SUCI as response to an “identifier
request” message (see §2.6 for further details).
1. In case of a 5G-GUTI, the SN extracts the corresponding SUPI from its
database and forwards it along with its serving network name (SNname) to
the HN in an “authenticate request” message. Otherwise the SUCI is sent
instead of the SUPI.
2. If the SUCI is received in an authenticate request message by HN, it de-conceals
(for details see §5.4.1) the SUPI from it. It further derives the expected re-
1This first Step is numbered 0 because its not an exclusive part of the AKA but rather the
identification phase.
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Table 5.1: Description of 5G-AKA parameters.
Parameter Content/Description
RAND 128-bit Random Challenge
SQN 48-bit Sequence Number
AMF 16-bit Authentication Management Field
SNname Serving Network Name
AK f5(K,RAND)
CK f3(K,RAND)
IK f4(K,RAND)
RES f2(K,RAND)
MAC f1(K,SQN‖RAND‖AMF )
AUTN (SQN ⊕AK)‖AMF‖MAC
RES∗/XRES∗ KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖RAND‖RES/XRES)
HXRES∗/HRES∗ SHA256(RAND‖XRES∗/RES∗)
KAUSF KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖SQN ⊕AK)
KSEAF KDF (KAUSF , SNname)
5G AV RAND‖AUTN‖HXRES∗
sponse XRES* and generates the authentication vector 5G AV. The 5G AV
consists of a random challenge RAND, an authentication token AUTN and a
hash of expected response HXRES*.
3. The HN stores XRES*.
4. The HN forwards the 5G AV (RAND, AUTN, HXRES*) in an “authenticate
response” message to the SN.
5. The SN forwards RAND, AUTN to the UE in an Auth-Req message.
6. Upon receiving the RAND and AUTN, the UE verifies the freshness and au-
thenticity as described in [9]. It then computes the response RES* and derives
the anchor key KSEAF to be used for establishment of the secure channel with
the SN.
7. The UE returns RES* in an Auth-Resp message to the SN.
8. The SN then computes the hash of the response HRES* from the received
RES* and compares HRES* with XHRES*. If they are equal, the SN considers
the authentication successful.
9. The SN then sends RES*, as received from the UE, to the HN in an “authen-
tication confirmation” message (containing the SUPI or SUCI and the serving
network name).
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the 5G-AKA protocol.
10. When the HN receives a confirmation message, it compares RES* with the
stored XRES*. If these two are equal, the HN considers the confirmation
message as successfully verified.
11. Finally, the HN indicates to the SN in a “confirmation response” message
whether the confirmation was successful or not. In case of a success, an an-
chor key KSEAF which is cryptographically bound to the requesting SN is also
provided by the HN. If the HN received a SUCI from the SN when authen-
tication was initiated, and if the confirmation is successful, then the HN also
includes the SUPI in this message.
5.4 Identity Privacy in 5G
In the 5G system, Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) is a privacy preserving
identifier containing the concealed SUPI. The UE generates a SUCI using a protec-
tion scheme (see §5.4.1) with the public key of the HN that was securely provisioned
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to the USIM during the USIM registration. Only the MSIN part of the SUPI is con-
cealed by the protection scheme, while the home network identifier (MCC/MNC) is
transmitted in plaintext. The data fields constituting the SUCI are:
 Protection Scheme Identifier. This field represents the null scheme2 or
any other specified protection scheme.
 Home Network Public-Key Identifier. This represents the public key
provisioned by the HN. In case of a null scheme, this field is set to null.
 Home Network Identifier. This contains the MCC and MNC part of the
SUPI.
 Protection Scheme Output. This represents the output of the public-key
based protection scheme.
The subscriber identification mechanism of 5G allows the identification of a UE
on the radio path by means of the SUCI. This mechanism is usually invoked by
the SN by sending an identifier request message (§2.6) to the UE when the UE
is not identifiable by means of a temporary identity. The UE then responds with
the identifier response message (§2.6), containing the SUCI. Additionally, if the
UE sends a registration request message (§2.6) of the type “initial registration” to a
mobile network for which it does not already have a 5G-GUTI, then the UE includes
a SUCI to the registration request.
5.4.1 ECIES-based Protection Scheme
We now provide an overview of the ECIES-based protection scheme as described in
TS 33.501 (Annex C.3) [14]. ECIES [131] is a hybrid encryption scheme that com-
bines Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [69] with symmetric-key cryptography;
it is a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme ensuring that successive
encryptions of the same plaintext with the same public key result in different ci-
phertexts with very high probability. To compute a fresh SUCI, the UE generates a
fresh ECC ephemeral public/private key pair utilizing the HN public key. Processing
on the UE side is done according to the encryption operation defined in [128] and
as further illustrated in Figure 5.2a. The final output of this protection scheme is
2The null-scheme is used only if the UE is making an unauthenticated emergency session or if
the HN has configured “null-scheme” to be used or if the HN has not provisioned the public key
needed to generate SUCI.
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(a) Encryption at UE side
(b) Decryption at HN side
Figure 5.2: Detail of ECIES-based protection scheme
the concatenation of the ECC ephemeral public key, the ciphertext value, the MAC
tag value, and any other parameters, if applicable. The HN uses the received ECC
ephemeral public key and its private key to deconceal the received SUCI. Processing
on the HN side is illustrated in Figure 5.2b.
The ECIES-based protection scheme is a framework, not a concrete algorithm. It
can be implemented by plugging different algorithms, e.g. the secp256k1 or P-521
elliptic curve for the public-key calculations, PBKDF2 or Scrypt for KDF func-
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tion, AES-CTR or AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 for symmetric cipher and
authentication tag, HMAC-SHA512 for MAC algorithm, etc. Hence, TS 33.501 in-
cludes two ECIES profiles which specifies the exact algorithms to be used for various
cryptographic operations within the ECIES framework, both for the approximately
128-bit security level. Both profiles use AES-128 in CTR mode for confidentiality,
ANSI-X9.63-KDF for KDF and HMAC-SHA-256 for authenticity in the symmetric-
key cryptography part, but use either Curve25519 or secp256r1 elliptic curves for
the public-key cryptography part.
5.4.2 Limitations of the 3GPP Protection Scheme
Although the ECIES-based scheme is oblivious to loss of synchronization between
the UE and HN and has simple key management requirements, both of which lead
to significant reduction in connection failures, there are still aspects which require
further improvement [59].
 Quantum Insecurity. As the ECIES-based scheme employs ECC to provi-
sion identity privacy, it relies on the hardness assumption of the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [144]. An adversary capable of issuing
quantum queries to an appropriate quantum computer can easily break this
scheme by employing Shor’s algorithm [130].
 Chosen SUPI Attacks. Any arbitrary third party can always select a SUPI
of its choosing and send the corresponding SUCI to the HN. Thereafter the ad-
versary can look out for various responses from the HN, depending on whether
the target user is present in that particular cell tower area or not. Any notice-
able variation in the perceived output would allow the adversary to confirm or
deny the presence of the target in that particular cell. There is no mechanism
in the ECIES-based scheme to prevent these attacks.
 Replay Attacks. Note that the ECIES-based scheme does not have any
inherent mechanism to provide freshness guarantees to the HN and is thus
susceptible to replay attacks. An adversary can always resend a previously
encrypted SUPI to the HN and look out for various responses (such as au-
thentication challenge or a failure message). Based on the received response,
a device whose SUPI is unknown to the attacker may be tracked with some
confidence.
78
5.5 Towards Quantum-secure Identity Privacy
 Downgrade Attacks. An active adversary simulating a (false) base station
can force the UE to use one of the previous generation (GSM/UMTS/LTE)
and can then get hold of the IMSI / SUPI using an identity request message.
In 3GPP Release 15 [14], the SUPI is derived directly from the IMSI, so these
downgrade attacks also compromise the 5G SUPI.
 Update of HN Public Key. There could be situations which require the
HN to have a robust way of quickly updating its public key to subscriber UEs,
such as a malware attack which tries to recover the home network’s private
key. Such situations enforce the need to have a quick way of updating the
corresponding public keys.
5.5 Towards Quantum-secure Identity Privacy
We now detail our proposal for an alternative identity protection scheme. Unlike the
ECIES-based scheme (§5.4.1), our proposal mostly requires the cryptographic prim-
itives already provisioned by the current 5G specifications. We utilise the previously
specified key derivation and message authentication functions of the 5G-AKA for
our proposal. Specifically, we use function f1 for message authentication and func-
tions f3, f4, f5 and f5
∗ for key derivation. As elaborated in 3GPP TS 33.102, no
valuable information can be inferred from the values of any of these functions about
other functions [9]. Table 5.2 gives a summary of notations used in the proposed
scheme and Figure 5.3 provides an overview of the proposed scheme PQID. Various
phases of the PQID are explained further.
5.5.1 System Setup Phase
The HN generates a long-term secret key KHN for the calculation of identification
parameters for its subscribers. HN stores this value internally in a secure manner,
allowing no other entity access. HN randomly chooses KN and KID during the USIM
registration and computes the (data) confidentiality key CKID = f4(KHN ,KN ) for
the protection scheme as well as identification parameters A = SUPI ⊕ CKID and
B = KHN ⊕ KN . In addition to the SUPI , the AKA sequence number SQN and
the shared key K (which are all from the original 5G-AKA), the USIM also stores
KID , identification parameters A and B along with an additional 48-bit identifica-
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Table 5.2: Notation used in the proposed scheme.
Notation Description
A and B Identification parameters generated by HN for UE
SQNID Counter used for replay prevention
KHN Long term secret key of HN
KN Randomly generated ephemeral parameter
KID Randomly generated long-term secret key for UE
RANDID Freshly generated random number
CKID Confidentiality key
AKID Anonymity key
MACID MAC Tag
f1 Message Authentication Function
f3, f4, f5, f5
∗ Key Derivation Functions
AE.Enc Authenticated Encryption Function
AE.Dec Authenticated Decryption Function
f(K,X) Execution of keyed-function f upon input X with key K
tion sequence number SQNIDUE
3 with initial value set to 1. HN initializes a cor-
responding identification sequence number SQNIDHN
4 with initial value of 0 and
stores SQNIDHN in its database. HN also stores the value of KID in its database
for the particular subscriber. An algorithmic description of the computation of this
phase can be found in Figure 5.4.
5.5.2 Identification Phase
An algorithmic description of the operations of UE and HN during this phase is
presented in Figure 5.5. Note that the output of f3(KID ,RANDID) is truncated
to get a 48-bit AKID . The UE prepares the SUCI = (labelps, ε, labelHN ,
(D‖A‖B‖C‖MACID)) using various data fields5, as explained in §5.4, and forwards
SUCI to SN. The SN appends its SNname (Clause 6.1.1.4 of [14]) to the received
SUCI and forwards the resulting message to the HN. Upon successful MAC verifi-
cation, HN accepts the extracted SUPI as valid for subsequent processing.
3As the ME and the USIM together form the UE and the trust model within the UE is reasonably
simple i.e. there are two trust domains, the tamper proof UICC on which the the USIM resides
as trust anchor and the ME; for sake of simplicity, we label user side notations with UE instead of
distinct USIM or ME.
4Note that HN will maintain a separate distinct value of SQNIDHN for each registered USIM in
its database.
5Note that labelps is a constant value indicating the protection scheme, and labelHN is a
constant value identifying the HN.
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Figure 5.3: Our proposed protection scheme PQID.
KHN
$← {0, 1}λ // init master secret key KHN
for each USIM do
// init secret keys and identification parameters
KN
$← {0, 1}λ
KID
$← {0, 1}λ
SQNIDUE ← 1
SQNIDHN ← 0
CKID ← f4(KHN ,KN )
A← SUPI ⊕ CKID
B ← KHN ⊕KN
end
USIM ← (KID , A,B,SQNIDUE )
HN ← (KID ,SQNIDHN )
Figure 5.4: Algorithmic description of system setup phase.
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// description of UE’s operations
RANDID
$← {0, 1}λ
CKID ← A⊕ SUPI
AKID ← f3(KID ,RANDID)
IKID ← f5(KID ,RANDID)
C ← RANDID ⊕ CKID
D ← SQNIDUE ⊕AKID
MACID ← f1(IKID , D‖A‖B‖C)
SUCI ← (labelps, ε, labelHN , D‖A‖B‖C‖MACID)
SQNIDUE ← SQNIDUE + 1
// description of HN’s operations
KN ← KHN ⊕B
CKID ← f4(KHN ,KN )
SUPI ← A⊕ CKID
RANDID ← C ⊕ CKID
AKID ← f3(KID ,RANDID)
IKID ← f5(KID ,RANDID)
SQNID∗ ← D ⊕AKID
if SQNID∗ ≤ SQNIDHN then
abort
else
MACID∗ ← f1(IKID , D‖A‖B‖C)
end
if MACID 6= MACID∗ then
abort
else
SQNIDHN ← SQNID∗
end
Figure 5.5: Algorithmic description of identification phase.
5.5.3 Update Phase
An algorithmic description of the operations of UE and HN during this phase can
be found in Figure 5.6. The output of the encryption scheme AE.Enc(EK,A+‖B+)
is appended to the 5G-AKA authentication vector 5G AV and is forwarded to the
SN as part of the authenticate response message (Step 4 in Figure 5.1) of the 5G-
AKA. The SN, upon receipt of the response message, undertakes the required steps
necessary for 5G-AKA and forwards the encrypted identification parameters to the
UE along with the 5G-AKA authentication challenge parameters RAND (note that
RAND is unrelated to RANDID) and AUTN (Step 5 in Figure 5.1).
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// description of HN’s operations
KN
+ ← {0, 1}λ
CKID+ ← f4(KHN ,KN +)
A+ ← SUPI ⊕ CKID+
B+ ← KHN ⊕KN +
EK ← f5∗(KID ,RANDID)
EKID ← AE.Enc(EK , A+‖B+)
// description of UE’s operations
EK ← f5∗(KID ,RANDID)
A+‖B+ ← AE.Dec(EK ,EKID)
A, B ← A+, B+
Figure 5.6: Algorithmic description of update phase.
5.6 Security Framework
In this section we introduce our Symmetric Updatable Private Authentication (SUPA)
framework, which follows in the long tradition of standard Bellare-Rogaway (BR)
key-indistinguishability games. Essentially, a protocol within the SUPA framework
is a protocol that authenticates an end-user to a central node via a shared symmet-
ric key in a private way. In comparison to similar BR-styled mutual authentication
games, our SUPA experiment diverges by considering identity privacy. In particu-
lar, the SUPA-based security experiment asks the adversary to decide which of two
parties attempted to authenticate itself to a centralised home network. In addition,
SUPA distinguishes itself by considering a multi-stage authentication protocol - i.e.
subsequent authentication attempts between the UE and the HN (after the first
successful authentication) are not independent, but instead dependent on values de-
rived from previous stages. This allows us to capture both identity confidentiality
and untraceability from the 3GPP requirements of user privacy (see §5.1). We can
now formally define a SUPA protocol.
Definition 1 (Symmetric Updatable Private Authentication). A Symmetric Updat-
able Private Authentication (SUPA) protocol is a tuple of algorithms
{SetupHN, SetupUE, Identify,Update}.
 SetupHN(λ) → KHN : SetupHN takes as input some security parameter λ and
outputs a long-term symmetric key KHN .
 SetupUE(λ,KHN )→ K, st: SetupUE takes as input some security parameter λ
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and a long-term symmetric key KHN , and outputs some shared (between the
UE and the HN ) secret state st and a shared symmetric key K.
 Identify(role,m, st,KHN )→ (id,m′, st′): Identify takes as input the role of the
party in the protocol execution, a (potentially empty) message m, the internal
state of the party st and (if role = HN ) the long-term HN key KHN , and
outputs an identifier id, a new (potentially empty) message m′, and an updated
state st′. Note that the identifier id doubles as a failure flag if the Identify
algorithm is forced to abort.
 Update(role,m, st,KHN ) → (m′, st′): Update takes as input the role of the
party in the protocol execution, a (potentially empty) message m, the internal
state of the party st and (if role = HN ) the long-term HN key KHN , and
outputs a new (potentially empty) message m′, an updated state st′. As in
Identify, the output message m′ doubles as a failure flag if the Update algorithm
is forced to abort.
5.6.1 Execution Environment
We now describe the execution environment of the SUPA security experiment. The
experiment ExpSUPAΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ) is played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
The challenger C maintains a single HN , running a number of instances of the SUPA
protocol Π, and a set of (up to) nN users UE 1, . . . ,UEnN (representing nodes com-
municating with the home network HN ), each potentially running a single session
executing (up to) nS consecutive stages of Π. The protocol Π is represented as a
tuple of algorithms SUPA = {SetupHN,SetupUE, Identify,Update}. We abuse nota-
tion and use πsi to refer to both the identifier of the s-th stage of Π being run by
node UE i and the collection of per-session variables maintained for this stage. Each
session maintains the following set of per-session variables:
 i ∈ {1, . . . , nN} - the index of the party UE i;
 ltk ∈ {0, 1}λ - the long-term symmetric secret of UE i, shared with HN ;
 id ∈ {0, 1}∗ - the identifier of party UE i;
 ms ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the concatenation of messages sent by the session, ini-
tialised by ⊥;
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 mr ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the concatenation of messages received by the session,
initialised by ⊥;
 st ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the per-stage secret state of the session, initialised by ⊥;
 s ∈ {1, . . . , nS} - the index of the most recently completed authentication
stage, initialised by 1 and increased monotonically;
 α ∈ {active, accept,⊥} - the current status of the session, initialised by ⊥.
Our experiment begins with the challenger C sampling the random test bit b $←
{0, 1}. The challenger generates the long-term symmetric key KHN of the HN and
initializes its corruption registers (which maintain the list of secrets A has leaked).
At this point, A now gains access to the queries listed in §5.6.2 and eventually
terminates and outputs a single guess bit b′. The freshness predicate fresh for our
SUPA security experiment is defined next.
Definition 2 (SUPA-fresh). A session πsi in the SUPA experiment is fresh if clean(π
s
i ) =
true (as defined in Definition 3) and πsi .mr = ⊥ ∧ πsi .ms = ⊥ at the start of the
experiment.
If A causes the challenger to:
 either execute Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN )→ (id,m′, st′) such that there ex-
ists some session πsi .id = id, but m 6⊂ πsi .ms6 or;
 execute Update(UE ,m, πsi .st, ε) → (m′, st′) such that m′ 6= ⊥ but there was
no execution of Update(HN ,m∗,HN .st,KHN )→ (m,HN .st′).
If either of the above is true and fresh(i, s) = true then C returns 1. Otherwise, if
A issued a Test(i∗, s∗) query, then C computes fresh(i∗, s∗). If fresh(i∗, s∗) is true,
then the challenger returns (b = b′), otherwise the challenger returns b∗
$← {0, 1}.
5.6.2 Adversary Queries
Here we describe the intuition behind each query that A has access to during the
SUPA experiment. For full details on each of these queries, see Figure 5.7.
6Note that here we are using ⊂ to indicate substrings
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ExpSUPA,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ):
1: b
$← {0, 1}
2: KHN
$← SetupHN(λ)
3: LSKflagi, . . . , LSKflagnN ← clean
4: PSSflag11, . . . ,PSSflag
nN
nS ← clean
5: ctr ← 0
6: b′
$← ASend?,Create,Corrupt,StateReveal(λ)
7: if ∃ (i∗, s∗) s.t.
((Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) →
(id,m′, st) s.t πs
∗
i∗ .id = id,
m 6= πs∗i∗ .ms) ∧ (clean(πs
∗
i∗ )))
∨ ((Update(UE ,m, πs∗i∗ .st, ε) →
(m′, st′) s.t. m′ 6= ⊥,
@Update(HN ,m∗,HN .st,KHN ) →
(m,HN .st′))) ∧ (clean(πs∗i∗ ))) then
8: return 1
9: end if
10: if clean(πb) ∧ clean(π1−b) then
11: return (b′ = b)
12: else
13: return b∗
$← {0, 1}
14: end if
Test((i, s), (i′, s′)):
1: if (πsi .α = active) ∨ (πs
′
i′ .α = active)
then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: if (b = 0) then
5: πb ← πsi
6: πb−1 ← πs
′
i′
7: else
8: πb ← πs
′
i′
9: πb−1 ← πsi
10: end if
11: m← Identify(UE ,⊥, πb.st,⊥)
12: return m
StateReveal(i, s):
1: if πsi .st = ⊥ then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: PSSflagis ← corrupt
5: return πsi .st
Create(λ):
1: ctr ← ctr + 1
2: π.s← 1
3: π.ltk, π.st← SetupUE(λ,KHN )
4: π.i← ctr
5: return π.i
SendTest(m):
1: Send(πb,m)→ m′
2: return m′
Send(role, i, s,m):
1: if role = HN then
2: (HN .st′,m′)← F (λ,HN ,m)
3: end if
4: let s = max{s : πsi .α 6= ⊥}
5: if πsi .α 6= active then
6: return ⊥
7: end if
8: πsi .mr ← πsi .mr‖m
9: (πsi ,m
′)← F (λ, πsi ,m)
10: πsi .ms ← πsi .ms‖m′
11: return m′
Corrupt(i):
1: LSKflagi ← corrupt
2: return πi.ltk
Figure 5.7: An algorithmic description of the SUPA security experiment. We assume
the existence of a function F that is capable of taking as input a message m and
the current internal state πsi .st of the protocol execution and forwarding the inputs
to either Update or Identify as appropriate. We refer to the “test” session in the
description of the SUPA experiment as πb (and the other session as π1−b).
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 Create(i): Allows A to initialise a new UE party with shared symmetric state
and shared symmetric key with HN .
 Send(role, i, s,m)→ m′: Sends a message m to session πsi , which updates the
per-session variables, returning a (potentially empty) message m′.
 Corrupt(i)→ πi.ltk: Reveals to A the long-term symmetric key of UE i7.
 Test(i, s, i′, s′) → m: Uses the random bit b sampled by C to begin a new
Identify phase with either πsi (if b = 0) or π
s′
i′ (if b = 1). For ease of notation,
we refer to the “test” session as πb (and the other session as π1−b). Note
that A cannot issue this query if there exists some stage s such that either
πsi .α = active or π
s′
i′ .α = active, nor can A issue Send queries to πsi or πs
′
i′
until πb has either accepted or rejected the protocol execution.
 SendTest(m) → m′: Allows A to send a message m to the test session πb
after A has issued a Test query. After πb.α 6= active, the challenger responds
to SendTest queries with ⊥.
 StateReveal(i, s)→ πsi : Reveals to A the full internal state of πsi .
We require a cleanness predicate, in order to disallow combinations of Corrupt
and StateReveal queries that allow an adversary to trivially break SUPA security.
We do not capture notions of forward secrecy, so our cleanness predicate is very
simple: A is not allowed to break sessions that it has issued either a Corrupt or a
StateReveal query to.
Definition 3 (SUPA-clean). A session πsi in the SUPA experiment defined in Fig-
ure 5.7 is clean if LSKflagi 6= corrupt and PSSflagsi 6= corrupt.
5.6.3 Security Definitions
Here we define the security of a SUPA protocol, and additionally show that the
PQID scheme described in Figure 5.3 executes correctly in the presence of a passive
adversary.
Definition 4 (Private Authentication Security). Let Π be a SUPA protocol, and nN ,
nS ∈ N. For a given cleanness predicate clean, and a PPT algorithm A, we define
the advantage of A in the SUPA game to be:
AdvSUPA,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = |Pr[Exp
SUPA,clean
Π,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = 1]−
1
2
|.
7In PQID, this is the key KID , not the independent 5G-AKA key K.
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We say that Π is SUPA-secure if, for all A, AdvSUPA,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ) is negligible in the
security parameter λ.
We also need to define identification correctness as well as update correctness, to
ensure that we only capture protocols that are actually useful.
Definition 5 (Identification Correctness). Let Π be a SUPA protocol. We say that Π
has identification correctness if after an execution of Identify(HN ,m′, HN .st,KHN )→
(id′,m∗, st′) in the presence of a passive adversary A such that for some session
πsi .ms = m
′, then πsi .id = id
′.
It is fairly straightforward to see that the proposed protocol in Figure 5.3 has iden-
tification correctness: The fields A = SUPI ⊕ CKID and B = KHN ⊕ KN sent by
the UE contains all the information necessary to recompute the identifier SUPI
of the UE . HN first computes KN = B ⊕ KHN and then CKID = f4(KHN ,KN ).
Retrieving SUPI is then simply a matter of SUPI ← A⊕ CKID .
Update correctness is a little different to identification correctness. We only require
that the session executing an Update using output from HN simply updates their
state without aborting the protocol execution, instead of having to agree to some
shared updated state. This is to capture stateless HN sessions that simply regenerate
per-session state when required, usually by processing client-maintained tokens. In
this sense, the A and B values sent by the UE during our PQID protocol are tokens
that allow HN to recover per-session state.
Definition 6 (Update Correctness). Let Π be a SUPA protocol. We say that Π has
update correctness if after an execution of Update(UE ,m′, πsi .st, ε)→ (m∗, πsi .st′) in
the presence of a passive adversary A such that for some execution of
Update(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN )→ (m′,HN .st′), then m∗ 6= ⊥ and πsi .st′ 6= πsi .st.
Similarly to identification correctness, it is straightforward to see that the proposed
protocol in Figure 5.3 has update correctness: The fields A+ = SUPI ⊕ CKID+
and B+ = KHN ⊕ KN + encrypted under EK = f5∗(KID ,RANDID) sent by the
HN contains all the information necessary to update the values A, B and CKID .
UE computes EK = f5∗(KID ,RANDID) (where RANDID was sampled initially by
UE and KID is the long-term symmetric key shared by UE and HN in the PQID
protocol, so both are known to UE ), and decrypts A+ and B+. Afterwards, UE
updates A← A+, B ← B+, CKID ← A+ ⊕ SUPI .
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5.7 Analysis of the Proposed Protection Scheme
5.7.1 Formal Analysis
We discuss and analyse our proposed 5G identity protection scheme PQID within the
SUPA security framework, and show that it achieves the notion of SUPA protocols.
Theorem 1. The identity protection scheme PQID given in Figure 5.3 is SUPA-
secure under cleanness predicate clean and assuming all hash functions are random
oracles. For any PPT algorithm A against the SUPA experiment, AdvSUPA,cleanPQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ)
is negligible under the ae, kdf and eufcma security assumptions of the AE, KDF and
MAC schemes, respectively.
Proof. Before we begin our analysis in earnest, we show that an adversary A is
unable to recover the long-term symmetric key of the home network KHN (with
non-negligible probability) even if A reveals all long-term secrets K of all nodes
and all per-stage secret states st, assuming underlying hash functions are random
oracles. In our proof we work within the random oracle model, and A cannot learn
anything about KHN from hash outputs H(KHN , X) (where X is any concatenation
of arbitrary values).
We turn to A attempting to learn KHN that has been “blinded” through exclusive-or
(XOR) operations, which are only sent in the following values: B = KHN ⊕KN and
B+ = KHN ⊕KN +. KN and KN + are acting as one-time-pads encrypting the long-
term symmetric key of the home network HN , and each KN /KN
+ is a value internal
to the home network that cannot be compromised via A issuing a Corrupt or
StateReveal query. A therefore cannot recover KHN in this way, but can attempt
to guess and verify the guess by first querying StateReveal to any UE party,
recovering CKID and B, and querying the random oracle with (KHN
′, B ⊕ KHN ′)
and comparing the output of the random oracle with CKID . The probability of A’s
success in this strategy is qr/2λ−1. (where qr is the number of queries that A makes
to the random oracle and λ is the bit-length of KHN ). During our analysis then, we
assume that in each stage of a protocol execution KHN is indistinguishable from a
uniformly-random value KHN
∗ from the same distribution.
In our analysis, we split our proof into three cases:
1. A has caused a session πsi to reach a status accept when calling Update(UE ,
m, πsi .st, ε) such that m is not the output of HN and clean(π
s
i ) = true.
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2. A has caused HN to call Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN )→ (id′,m′,HN .st′) such
that ∃ πsi .id = id′, but m was not the output of Identify(UE , ε, πsi .st, ε) and
clean(πsi ) = true.
3. A has output a guessed bit b′ after issuing a Test(i, s, i′, s′) query
We show that A has negligible advantage in causing the first two cases to occur, and
thus A also has negligible advantage in winning the SUPA experiment in the third
case. Each of these three cases are disjoint by the definition of the SUPA experiment:
the experiment terminates immediately in the first two cases when a (clean) session
has reached the accept state after recieving a message m that is not the honest
output of either the HN or the UE . It follows that A cannot output the guessed bit
b′ in these cases. Thus:
AdvSUPA,cleanPQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) ≤ Adv
SUPA,clean,C1
PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ)+Adv
SUPA,clean,C2
PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ)+Adv
SUPA,clean,C3
PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ).
Case 1. In this case, we show that the advantage that A has in causing a session
πsi to set π
s
i .α ← accept when calling Update(UE ,m, πsi .st, ε) and m is not the
output of the home network HN is negligible.
Game 0
This game is Case 1 with cleanness predicate clean in the SUPA experiment as
described in Definition 4. Thus we have:
AdvSUPA,clean,C1PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game we guess the session πsi such that π
s
i has reached a status accept when
calling Update(UE ,m, πsi .st, ε) and m is not an output of the home network HN .
Thus we have:
Pr(break0) = nSnN ·
(
Pr(break1)
)
.
Game 2
In this game we replace the keys AKID , IKID and EK computed in the session
πsi with uniformly-random values AKID
∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗ from {0, 1}|KDF|, where
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|KDF| represents the output length of KDF. Recall that AKID , IKID , EK are com-
puted honestly as f3(KID ,RANDID), f5(KID ,RANDID) and f5∗(KID ,RANDID) re-
spectively. We note that KID is not used in any other context (and is independent
of the long-term key K used in the rest of the 5G AKA), and that for Case 2
clean(πsi ) = true, so A has not issued Corrupt(πsi ) or StateReveal(πsi ). Thus,
KID is a uniformly random value that is independent of the protocol execution,
and any algorithm that can distinguish Game 2 from Game 1 can be used to con-
struct a simulator B that distinguishes the output of KDF from random. When
the random bit b sampled by the KDF challenger is 0, AKID = f3(KID ,RANDID),
IKID = f5(KID ,RANDID), EK = f5∗(KID ,RANDID) and B provides a perfect
simulation of Game 1. When b = 1, AKID∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗
$← {0, 1}|KDF| and B
provides a perfect simulation of Game 2. An A capable of distinguishing Game 2
from Game 1 can therefore break the kdf security of KDF, and thus we have:
Pr(break1) = Adv
kdf
KDF,A(λ) + Pr(break2).
Game 3
In this game, we define an abort event abortdec that occurs when π
s
i sets π
s
i .α ←
accept during a call to Update(UE ,m, πsi .st, ε) and m is not the output of the home
network HN . We do this by constructing a simulator B that interacts with an AE
challenger, computing AE.Enc(EK ∗, A+‖B+) by querying (A+‖B+, A+‖B+) to the
LoR AE challenger’s AuthEnc oracle instead of computing it honestly. Similarly, πsi
decrypts the ciphertext C received in the Update Phase by querying AE challenger
with C. Note that EK ∗ is already uniformly random and independent of the protocol
run by Game 3, and this replacement is sound. We note that, by the definition of
Case 1, abortdec must occur. In addition, π
s
i is the first session that sets π
s
i .α ←
accept during a call to Update(UE ,m, πsi .st, ε) and m is not the output of the home
network HN . Moreover, A cannot terminate and output a guess bit b′, and as such
the advantage of A in winning the SUPA experiment in Game 3 is negligible. Thus
we have:
Pr(break2) = abortdec.
We now show that the probability of A causing abortdec is negligible. Note that
if abortdec occurs that A caused πsi to accept when m is not the output of the
home network HN . In the proposed protocol, the message m purely consists of
AE.Enc(EK ∗, A+‖B+). Thus, if abortdec occurs, then m is a ciphertext that de-
crypts correctly by the AE challenger, but was not the output of the query (A+‖B+,
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A+‖B+) to the LoR AE challenger’s AuthEnc oracle. Thus, when abortdec occurs, B
has broken the ae security of the AE challenger, and thus:
abortdec = Adv
ae
AE,A(λ).
Thus we have:
AdvSUPA,clean,C1PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = nNnS ·
(
AdvKDFKDF,A(λ) + Adv
ae
AE,A(λ)
)
.
Case 2. In this case, we show that the advantage that A has in causing HN to call
Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN )→ (id′,m′,HN .st′) such that ∃ πsi .id = id′, but m was
not the output of some Identify(UE , ε, πsi .st, ε) and clean(π
s
i ) = true is negligible.
Game 0
This game is Case 2 with cleanness predicate clean in the SUPA experiment as
described in Definition 4. Thus we have:
AdvSUPA,clean,C2PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game we guess the index of the session πsi such that π
s
i .id = id
′ when calling
Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) → (id′,m′,HN .st′) and m is not the output of πsi .
Thus we have:
Pr(break0) = nN ·
(
Pr(break1)
)
.
Game 2
In this game we replace the keys AKID , IKID and EK computed in the HN and any
stage s of session πsi with uniformly-random values AKID
∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗ from
{0, 1}|KDF|, where |KDF| represents the output length of KDF. We do so by interact-
ing with nS KDF challengers. Recall AKID , IKID , and EK are computed honestly
as f3(KID ,RANDID), f5(KID ,RANDID) and f5∗(KID ,RANDID) respectively. We
note that KID is not used in any other context (and again, is independent of the
long-term key K used in the 5G-AKA), but RANDID is sampled independently in
each of the nS stages, and that for Case 2 clean(π
s
i ) = true, so A has not issued
Corrupt(πsi ) or StateReveal(π
s
i ).
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Thus, KID is a uniformly random value that is independent of the protocol execu-
tion, and such any algorithm that can distinguish Game 2 from Game 1 can be used
to construct a simulator B that distinguishes the output of KDF from random.
When the random bit b sampled by the KDF challenger is 0,
AKID = f3(KID ,RANDID), IKID = f5(KID ,RANDID), EK = f5∗(KID ,RANDID),
and B provides a perfect simulation of Game 1. When b = 1, AKID∗, IKID∗ and
EK ∗
$← {0, 1}|KDF| and B provides a perfect simulation of Game 2. Any A capable
of distinguishing Game 2 from Game 1 can therefore break the kdf security of KDF,
and thus we have:
Pr(break1) = nS · AdvkdfKDF,A(λ) + Pr(break2).
Game 3
In this game, we define an abort event abortmac that occurs when HN outputs π
s
i .id =
id′ during a call to Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) and m is not the output of some
stage s of the sessions owned by UE i. We do this by constructing a simulator B that
interacts with an MAC challenger, computing MAC(IKID∗, D‖A‖B‖C) by querying
(D‖A‖B‖C) to the MAC challenger instead of computing it honestly within HN or
any session owned by UE i. Note that the various IKID
∗ keys are already uniformly
random and independent of the protocol run by Game 2, and this replacement is
sound. We note that by the definition of Case 2 and this case that abortmac must
occur. In addition, A cannot terminate and output a guess bit b′, and as such the
advantage of A in winning the SUPA experiment in Game 3 is negligible, and thus
we have:
Pr(break2) = abortmac.
We now show that the probability of A causing abortmac is negligible. Note that if
abortmac occurs that A caused πsi to accept when m is not the output of some session
owned by UE i. In PQID, the message m purely consists of D‖A‖B‖C‖MACID .
Thus, if abortmac occurs, then A has managed to produce a MAC tag under a
key IKID∗ that verifies correctly, but was not the output of a query to the MAC
challenger. Thus, when abortmac occurs, B can forward this to the MAC challenger
and break the eufcma security of the MAC, and thus:
abortmac = nSAdv
eufcma
MAC,A(λ).
Thus we have:
AdvSUPA,clean,C2PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = nNnS ·
(
AdvkdfKDF,A(λ) + Adv
eufcma
MAC,A(λ)
)
.
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Case 3. In this case we show that the advantage that A has in guessing the test
bit b is negligible.
Game 0
This game is Case 3 with cleanness predicate clean in the SUPA game as described
in Definition 4. Thus we have:
AdvSUPA,clean,C3PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game we guess the session πsi such that A issues a Test(i, s, i′, s′) query and
πsi = πb. Thus we have:
Pr(break0) = nSnN ·
(
Pr(break1)
)
.
Game 2
In this game we replace the key KHN used in the test session π
s
i with a uniformly
random values KHN
∗ from the same distribution {0, 1}λ. We argued at the beginning
of §5.7 that A has negligible chance in detecting this change, and thus:
Pr(break1) = qr/2λ−1 + Pr(break2).
Game 3
In this game we replace the value CKID+ computed in the previous stage of the
test session πs−1i with a uniformly-random value CKID
+∗ from {0, 1}|KDF| where
|KDF| represents the output length of KDF. Note that CKID+ is computed hon-
estly as f4(KHN
∗,KN ) respectively. We note that KHN is not used in any other
context, and that for Case 3 clean(πsi ) = true, so A has not issued Corrupt(πsi ) or
StateReveal(πsi ). Thusly, KHN
∗ is a uniformly random value that is independent
of the protocol execution, and as such any algorithm that can distinguish Game 3
from Game 2 can be used to construct a simulator B that distinguishes the output
of KDF from random. When the random bit b sampled by the KDF challenger is 0,
CKID+ = f4(KHN
∗,KN ), and B provides a perfect simulation of Game 2. When
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b = 1, CKID+∗
$← {0, 1}|KDF| and B provides a perfect simulation of Game 3. An A
capable of distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2 can therefore break the kdf security
of KDF, and thus we have:
Pr(break2) = Adv
kdf
KDF,A(λ) + Pr(break3).
Game 4
In this game we replace the keys AKID , IKID and EK computed in the previous
stage of the test session πs−1i with uniformly-random values AKID
∗, IKID∗ and
EK ∗ from {0, 1}|KDF| where |KDF| represents the output length of KDF. Note that
AKID , IKID ,EK are computed honestly as f3(KID ,RANDID
∗), f5(KID ,RANDID
∗)
and f5∗(KID ,RANDID
∗) respectively. We note that KID is not used in any other
context (again, KID is independent of the long-term key K used in the 5G-AKA),
and that for Case 3 clean(πsi ) = true, so A has not issued Corrupt(πsi ) or
StateReveal(πsi ).
Thus, KID is a uniformly random value that is independent of the protocol execution,
and any algorithm that can distinguish Game 4 from Game 3 can be used to construct
a simulator B that distinguishes the output of KDF from random. When the ran-
dom bit b sampled by the KDF challenger is 0, AKID = f3(KID ,RANDID
∗), IKID =
f5(KID ,RANDID
∗),EK = f5∗(KID ,RANDID
∗), and B provides a perfect simula-
tion of Game 3. When b = 1, AKID∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗
$← {0, 1}|KDF| and B provides
a perfect simulation of Game 4. An A capable of distinguishing Game 4 from Game
3 can therefore break the kdf security of KDF, and thus we have:
Pr(break3) = Adv
kdf
KDF,A(λ) + Pr(break4).
Game 5
In this game, we replace the A+, B+ values sent from HN to the test session’s previ-
ous stage πs−1i with uniformly-random values A
+∗, B+∗. We do this by constructing
a simulator B that interacts with an AE challenger, computing AE.Enc(EK ∗, A+‖B+)
by querying (A+‖B+, A+∗‖B+∗) to the LoR AE challenger’s AuthEnc oracle instead
of computing it honestly. Similarly, πs−1i decrypts the ciphertext C received in the
update phase by simply querying it to the AuthDec oracle, ignoring the result of the
decryption and using the A+, B+ values created by HN instead. Note that EK ∗
is already uniformly random and independent of the protocol run by Game 4, and
95
5.7 Analysis of the Proposed Protection Scheme
this replacement is sound. We note that this means that when the bit b sampled
by the AE challenger is 0, then A+, B+ values are sent honestly, but when the bit
b sampled by the AE challenger is 1, then A+∗, B+∗ values are sent instead and A+
and B+ are established independently of the ciphertext sent during the Updation
Phase. Any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into an
adversary capable of breaking the security of the AE scheme, and thus we have:
Pr(break4) = Adv
ae
AE,A(λ) + Pr(break5).
Game 6
In this game we replace the value CKID computed in the test session πsi with a
uniformly-random value CKID∗ from {0, 1}|KDF| where |KDF| represents the output
length of KDF. Note that CKID is computed honestly as f4(KHN
∗,KN ). We note
that KHN is not used in any other context, and that for Case 3 clean(π
s
i ) = true,
so A has not issued Corrupt(πsi ) or StateReveal(πsi ). Thus, KHN ∗ is a uniformly
random value that is independent of the protocol execution, and as such any algo-
rithm that can distinguish Game 3 from Game 2 can be used to construct a simulator
B that distinguishes the output of KDF from random. When the random bit b sam-
pled by the KDF challenger is 0, CKID = f4(KHN
∗,KN ), and B provides a perfect
simulation of Game 5. When b = 1, CKID∗
$← {0, 1}|KDF| and B provides a perfect
simulation of Game 6. An A capable of distinguishing Game 6 from Game 5 can
therefore break the kdf security of KDF, and thus we have:
Pr(break5) = Adv
kdf
KDF,A(λ) + Pr(break6).
Game 7
In this game we replace the keys AKID , IKID and EK computed in the session πsi
with uniformly-random values AKID∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗ from {0, 1}|KDF| where |KDF|
represents the output length of KDF. Note that AKID , IKID , EK are computed
honestly as f3(KID ,RANDID), f5(KID ,RANDID) and f5∗(KID ,RANDID) respec-
tively. We note that KID is not used in any other context and also that RANDID is
independent from the RANDID∗ sampled in the previous stage, and that for Case
3 clean(πsi ) = true, so A has not issued Corrupt(πsi ) or StateReveal(πsi ).
Thus, KID is a uniformly random value that is independent of the protocol execution,
and any algorithm that can distinguish Game 7 from Game 6 can be used to construct
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a simulator B that distinguishes the output of KDF from random. When the random
bit b sampled by the KDF challenger is 0, AKID = f3(KID ,RANDID), IKID =
f5(KID ,RANDID), EK = f5∗(KID ,RANDID) and B provides a perfect simulation
of Game 6. When b = 1, AKID∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗
$← {0, 1}|KDF| and B provides a
perfect simulation of Game 7. An A capable of distinguishing Game 6 from Game
7 can therefore break the kdf security of KDF, and thus we have:
Pr(break6) = Adv
kdf
KDF,A(λ) + Pr(break7).
Game 8
In this game we replace SQNIDUE in both the test session and its matching home
network HN with a uniformly-random value from the same distribution. Note
that SQNIDUE sent once during the protocol execution: as the first field D =
SQNIDHN ⊕ AKID∗ in the SUCI message during the Identification Phase. By
Game 7, AKID∗ is a uniformly-random value independent of the protocol execu-
tion, and thus we can consider it a one-time-pad to SQNIDUE , perfectly hiding it.
As a result, we can replace SQNIDUE with any value without detection. In addi-
tion, in any future sessions πs+1i we instead increment SQNIDUE from session π
s−1
i
instead of incrementing from πsi . Thus we have:
Pr(break7) = Pr(break8).
Game 9
In this game, we replace the A+, B+ values sent from HN to the test session’s previ-
ous stage πsi with uniformly-random values A
+∗, B+∗. We do this by constructing a
simulator B that interacts with an AE challenger, computing AE.Enc(EK ∗, A+‖B+)
by querying (A+‖B+, A+∗‖B+∗) to the LoR AE challenger’s AuthEnc oracle instead
of computing it honestly. Similarly, πsi decrypts the ciphertext C received in the
update phase by simply querying it to the AuthDec oracle, ignoring the result of the
decryption and using the A+, B+ values created by HN instead. Note that EK ∗
is already uniformly random and independent of the protocol run by Game 7, and
this replacement is sound. We note that this means that when the bit b sampled
by the AE challenger is 0, then A+, B+ values are sent honestly, but when the bit
b sampled by the AE challenger is 1, then A+∗, B+∗ values are sent instead and
A+ and B+ are established independently of the ciphertext sent during the update
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phase. Any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can be turned into an
adversary capable of breaking the security of the AE scheme, and thus we have:
Pr(break8) = Adv
ae
AE,A(λ) + Pr(break9).
We argue now that all values sent in the tested session πsi are independent from any
value sent in previous and future sessions. Thus we have:
Pr(break9) = 0.
Thus we can show:
AdvSUPA,clean,C3PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) ≤ nNnS ·
(
qr/2λ−1 + 4 · AdvkdfKDF,A(λ) + 2 · AdvaeAE,A(λ)
)
.
Summing the previous cases allows us to show:
AdvSUPA,cleanPQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) ≤ nNnS ·
(
AdvkdfKDF,A(λ) + Adv
ae
AE,A(λ)
)
+ nNnS ·
(
AdvkdfKDF,A(λ) + Adv
eufcma
MAC,A(λ)
)
+ nNnS ·
(
qr/2λ−1 + 4 · AdvkdfKDF,A(λ) + 2 · AdvaeAE,A(λ)
)
.
5.7.2 Other Improvements
We now discuss how our proposal prevents certain attacks and motivate our propos-
als to change aspects of the 3GPP specification.
 Update of Long-Term Secret Parameters. As elaborated in §5.4.2, it
may be required for HN to update its long-term secret key. In the current
ECIES-based mechanism this is a difficult proposition as it requires a suitable
mechanism to transport the updated public key of the HN to all of its sub-
scribers and also an update-confirmation mechanism used by the subscribers.
With our proposal, no such mechanism is required as the secret key is inter-
nal to HN. However, updating the KHN will require an interim period during
which the HN has to operate with both the new and old key, but this would
be handled within domains of the identification phase (§5.5.2) itself.
 Migration to Authenticated Encryption in 5G. Our proposal uses au-
thenticated encryption to update identification parameters. Currently, the
3GPP specifications do not list authenticated encryption algorithms, but in-
stead separate encryption and integrity algorithms, ascribed to historical rea-
sons. Previous generations of mobile telephony used to avoid integrity protec-
tion of user traffic (voice/data) because of the substantial errors during the
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radio channel propagation. Only the signalling traffic used to be integrity pro-
tected. But as the quality of radio traffic improved, provisions for integrity
protection of user traffic were also created. Though we could have achieved
the requisite security guarantees in our scheme using the currently specified
primitives by following the “Encrypt-then-authenticate” paradigm, we stress
that our approach is clearer and suggest that the 3GPP specifications should
introduce such primitives.
 Replay Prevention. We include and authenticate sequence numbers SQNID
in our protection scheme to prevent replay attacks. Moreover, they also provide
appropriate resilience to desynchronization between the UE and HN as now an
arbitrary third party cannot initiate an identification request without access
to the shared secret key KID .
 Chosen SUPI Attacks. Our scheme is resilient to chosen SUPI attacks
(§5.4.2), due to inclusion of the shared secret key KID as the keying input for
the computation of the MAC tag MACID .
 Multiple Identification Parameters. In the case of an unexpected inter-
ruption, the UE will re-attempt identification using the same parameters A
and B . Although this does not violate the session unlinkability criterion (as
it is effectively the same session), one could imagine the UE storing multiple
pairs of identification parameters in these cases.
5.8 Parameter Sizes
For 5G, the most cryptographically relevant quantum algorithms are Grover’s search-
ing algorithm [68] (quadratically faster than any classical brute force searching
scheme) and Shor’s factoring algorithm [130] (exponentially faster than the best
known classical factoring algorithm - the number field sieve). It is worth noting,
however, that if an alternative was suggested that utilizes the symmetric-key prim-
itives offered by the current 3GPP specification (and their associated parameter
sizes), then this may not achieve quantum security. For example, the output of the
MAC algorithm (referred to as f1, see Table 5.2) could be 64 bits. For such a pro-
posal to realize resilience against quantum algorithms [45], the standard technique
to achieve is to increase the length of the classical-secure key size, preferably to
256 bits. In this regard, 3GPP is already working towards supporting 256-bit algo-
rithms [21]. As regards the effects of bidding down attacks, in the current 3GPP
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specifications the SUPI is derived directly from the IMSI, and is thus susceptible to
bidding down attacks (§5.4.2) by an active adversary. To thwart such attacks, the
derivation of SUPI should be independent of the previous generations' IMSI.
5.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we introduced a new private identification scheme for the 5G speci-
fication, a quantum-secure alternative to the current public-key based solution. We
described the limitations of the existing solution and discussed how our proposal
mitigates these drawbacks. We introduced a security model for our protocols and
proved the security of our proposal. Our proposal is compatible with the current
5G specifications, depending mostly on cryptographic primitives already specified
in 5G, adding minimal performance overhead and requiring minor changes in the
existing message structure.
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Mitigating Downgrade Attacks on
5G
The 5G Release 15 SUPI protection mechanism (§5.4.1) and our alternative SUPI
protection scheme PQID (§5.5) are both vulnerable to downgrade attacks, i.e. an ac-
tive attacker is able to force the connection down to 2G/3G/4G and exploit previously
known vulnerabilities. In this chapter we show how a recent downgrade protection
proposal for 5G Release 15 can be amalgamated with our SUPI protection scheme to
provide a quantum-secure and downgrade-resistant private identification mechanism
for 5G.
6.1 Introduction and Background
Despite the SUPI protection provisioned by 3GPP Release 15 (§5.4.1), IMSI-catching
remains unaffected in GSM/UMTS/LTE networks, which opens the possibility of
a downgrade attack on 5G user privacy. When a 5G UE wants to connect to a
GSM/UMTS/LTE SN, the SN wants to know the identity of the user so that the
user can be billed. The SN can send an IMSI inquiry to the UE. Since the link
between the UE and the SN is initially unprotected, the UE has to respond with
its IMSI in plaintext. A passive IMSI-catcher can listen to the radio channel and
read IMSIs sent in plaintext. An active IMSI-catcher can impersonate a legitimate
SN and can make an IMSI inquiry. The UE has no way to distinguish an active
IMSI-catcher from a legitimate SN before authenticating the SN. Hence, the UE
invariably has to send the plaintext IMSI to the attacker, otherwise it will be locked
out of the network. As in 5G networks, this identification is followed by mutual
authentication between UE and SN based upon a challenge-response based AKA
protocol.
Khan et al. [89] looked at this issue in 5G networks and proposed a solution to
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countermeasure downgrade attacks. Although we will only consider LTE networks
in our discussion about downgrade attacks, our analysis is equally applicable to
UMTS networks. As GSM networks lack mutual authentication between UE and
HN, this solution is not applicable to GSM networks in a straightforward manner.
The solution in [89] basically proposes the following:
 When interacting with LTE networks: To use an existing pseudonym-
based solution [90] to protect identity of 5G users against IMSI-catchers.
 When interacting with 5G networks: To include a mechanism for up-
dating the LTE pseudonyms using the 5G ECIES-based identity protection
scheme.
The update mechanism helps in recovering from an (unlikely) loss of pseudonym
synchronization between a UE and its HN once they reconnect over a 5G network.
The proposed solution utilizes existing LTE messages and requires minimalistic
changes to the 3GPP Release 15 messages. It requires modifications only in the
UE and HN (not within SN) in order to provide identity privacy. The solution
uses pseudonyms that have the same format as LTE IMSIs to defeat the downgrade
attack. A pseudonym looks like a normal LTE IMSI, but its MSIN part is ran-
domized and frequently changing. The UE is provisioned with two pseudonyms at
the beginning and it obtains fresh pseudonyms during further AKA protocol runs.
It uses these pseudonyms instead of IMSI to identify itself when connecting to an
LTE SN. This solution piggybacks on existing messages involved in the LTE-AKA
and 5G-AKA protocols to deliver new pseudonyms to the UE and does not require
separate messages.
Since the total number of pseudonyms is limited, pseudonyms need to be reused,
i.e., disassociated from one user and reallocated to another. In this solution the
UE updates its pseudonyms by interacting with HN via either an LTE SN or 5G
SN. The UE does not need a pseudonym to connect to a 5G SN. Hence, even in
the unlikely event where the UE and HN lose synchronization of pseudonyms, the
synchronization can be restored by obtaining a new LTE pseudonym from the HN,
simply by connecting to a 5G SN.
The work in this chapter shows how the downgrade protection proposal by Khan
et al. [89], which was originally for 5G Release 15, can be combined with our
SUPI protection scheme PQID (Chapter 5) to provision both quantum-security and
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downgrade-resistance for private identification in 5G. The rest of the chapter is or-
ganized as follows: §6.2 details the proposal by Khan et al, 6.3 presents an analysis
of the downgrade protection proposal, while §6.4 shows the amalgamation of the
downgrade proposal with our PQID. §6.5 discusses the combined solution and §6.6
provides the summary.
6.2 The Downgrade Protection Solution
We now explain the details of the 5G downgrade protection solution as proposed
by [89]. We use similar notation to that used in [89] for ease of comparison. In
this solution, instead of IMSI, a 5G UE when interacting with an LTE network uses
pseudonyms that have the same format as an LTE IMSI. In addition, when a 5G
UE runs the 5G-AKA, it synchronizes its LTE pseudonyms with the HN. In this
solution:
 A 5G UE uses pseudonyms to connect with LTE SNs and SUCI to connect
with 5G SNs.
 Only the HN allocates and releases pseudonyms of mobile users; initially the
HN allocates two pseudonyms per 5G user and provisions them into the users
USIMs.
 A 5G UE obtains new pseudonyms by participating in authentication protocols
(LTE-AKA or 5G-AKA). The two latest pseudonyms received by the UE are
denoted by p1 and p2.
 In order to support simultaneous connections with multiple 5G SNs, the solu-
tion:
– Uses a subscriber-specific counter d of pseudonyms maintained by the
HN.
– Keeps track of in-use pseudonyms in 5G UE and HN, using sets PUE
and PHN , respectively; the elements of these sets are pairs (pi, di) of
pseudonyms and their respective counters (see Figure 6.1).
– Transmits information about pseudonyms being used in 5G UE via the
SUCI.
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PUE = {(pi, di)| where di < d1} (p1, d1) (p2, d2)UE Side:
d1 < d2
PHN = {(pi, di)| where di < dc} (pc, dc) (pn, dn) (pf , df )HN Side:
dc < dn < df
Figure 6.1: Pseudonym state in UE and HN.
The 5G UE uses only p1 or p2 when replying to an IMSI inquiry from an LTE
SN. The set PUE contains pseudonyms that 5G UE received before p1 and p2. The
UE deletes pseudonyms from PUE based on policy provided by the HN that could
include, for example, pseudonyms' lifetime or the maximum size of PUE . The PHN
contains pseudonyms that the HN thinks are in PUE , and it deletes pseudonyms
from PHN according to another policy. One objective of these policies is that the
HN should not delete a pseudonym which the UE has not yet deleted. Thus, PUE
is a subset of PHN . In short, the UE informs the HN about its older pseudonyms
when it connects with a 5G SN using SUCI, and then the HN is able to reduce the
set PHN . Note that as long as the UE is connecting to LTE SN only, the size of
PHN grows.
This solution does not introduce any new messages on top of what 3GPP has stan-
dardized. Although the authors of [89] claim that their scheme is completely trans-
parent to a participating 5G SN, it is not. It modifies the length of a couple of
existing 5G-AKA messages (for details see Steps (3) and (4) of Figure 6.3) while the
LTE-AKA messages remain fully transparent to the SN. It only introduces changes
in the 5G UE and its HN. However, to enable Lawful Interception, this solution does
require some modifications within the LTE SNs.
As standardized, a 5G USIM comes with an IMSI, a master key K and the HN’s
public key pk embedded in it. In this solution, a 5G USIM is also provisioned with
two pseudonyms p1, p2 and a key k, shared with HN for decrypting the pseudonyms.
Similarly, along with the user’s IMSI, and master key K, the HN in this solution
has to store additional information: the shared key k for encrypting pseudonyms
and three pseudonyms pc, pn, and pf (where the subscripts stand for current, next
and future). Ideally p1 = pc and p2 = pn. When a pseudonym p is allocated to a
subscriber, it is associated with a subscriber-specific counter d, which is a strictly
monotonically increasing counter value that increments each time the HN allocates
a new pseudonym to the subscriber.
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6.2.1 LTE-AKA based Solution
This part of the solution, when the 5G UE interacts with an LTE SN, is shown in
Figure 6.2 and works as follows:
UE(5G) SN(LTE) HN(5G)
(2) q ← p1 or q ← p2
(9) LTE-AKA operations
(11) Update pseudonyms (12) Verify RES
?
= XRES
(5) UE identification, RAND construction
(6) Remaining LTE-AKA operations
(14) User identification via
q and pseudonym update
(1) IMSI Inquiry
(4) AV request with q(3) q
(8) RAND,AUTN (7) RAND,AUTN,XRES,KASME
(13) LU message for pseudonym q
(10) RES
Figure 6.2: LTE-AKA based solution. The differences to the standard LTE-AKA
are highlighted in red.
1. An LTE SN requests the IMSI from the UE.
2. The UE chooses one of the pseudonyms p1, p2 and assigns it to q.
3. The UE sends q to the SN.
4. The SN sends an AV request for the pseudonym q to the HN. The user mostly
identifies itself with the GUTI. Sometimes the user may implicitly identify itself
by responding to a paging message. In either case, if the SN wants to perform
an LTE-AKA, the SN requests an AV from the HN for the pseudonym/IMSI
that was associated with the GUTI or was used in the paging message.
5. The HN checks whether the pseudonym q is in use for any subscriber. If it
is, the HN starts to prepare the AV. It first constructs the random challenge
RAND. A new pseudonym is embedded in the RAND as follows:
 The 128-bit long random challenge RAND is created by encrypting (using
key k that can be generated from the master key K) the pseudonym pf ,
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its counter df , an error correction flag (ECF) and a randomly chosen
l-bit long salt. If the pseudonym pf is null, a new m-bit long pf is
chosen randomly from the pool of unused pseudonyms. Then df is set to
the current value of the counter CTR, which is a strictly monotonically
increasing counter maintained by the HN. It increases each time the HN
generates a new pseudonym. The flag ECF is by default set to 0 but a
5G HN may set it to some other values to notify the UE about an error
in the UEs pseudonym state.
 The length of l is equal to (128 − length(df ) − length(ECF ) −m) bits.
The length of m depends on how many digits of the IMSI are randomized.
Since the number of randomized digits can be at most 10, m ≤ 34. The
length of df and ECF depends on implementation; length(df ) ≤ 24 and
length(ECF ) ≤ 2 bits should be enough. This implies length(l) ≥ 68.
6. The HN computes other parts of the authentication vector AV (in addition to
the RAND), including the expected response XRES to the challenge RAND,
anchoring key KASME , and authentication token AUTN [16].
7. The HN sends RAND, AUTN, XRES and KASME to the SN.
8. The SN forwards RAND and AUTN to the UE.
9. The UE performs LTE-AKA related operations, like verifying the MAC in
AUTN and computing the response RES [16].
10. If everything is fine in Step (9), the UE sends RES to the SN.
11. The UE decrypts RAND to extract the embedded pseudonym p, and the
counter d, and updates the pseudonyms p1, p2 if p is new. These operations
are as follows:
 UE decrypts RAND using key k and obtains p, d, ECF and salt.
 In an LTE-AKA, the ECF field is always set to 0.
 If the pseudonym p is a new pseudonym, i.e., d > d2, then the UE inserts
(p1, d1) into PUE and sets (p1, d1),(p2, d2) ← (p2, d2),(p, d).
 If d ≤ d2, then p is considered as an old pseudonym and the UE does
not update pseudonyms. If somehow the value of d2 (in the UE) gets
corrupted and becomes larger than df (in the HN), the UE would no
longer be able to accept new pseudonyms just by running LTE-AKA. In
this case, the UE can still obtain a new pseudonym by running a 5G-AKA.
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12. The SN compares RES and XRES and aborts if RES 6= XRES.
13. The SN sends a Location Update (LU) message to the HN for the pseudonym
q.
14. The HN searches for a user q ∈ {pn, pf}. If found, and pf is not null, then the
HN inserts (pc, dc) into PHN and sets (pc, dc),(pn, dn),(pf , df )← (pn, dn),(pf ,
df ),(NULL, NULL).
6.2.2 5G-AKA based Solution
The following are the major aims of this phase of the solution:
 Deliver a new pseudonym to a 5G UE using the 5G-AKA;
 Notify the HN about pseudonyms that the UE is not using any more so that
those pseudonyms can be reused by the HN;
 Re-synchronize pseudonym states in the (rather unlikely) erroneous situation
where d2 becomes greater than df .
It is required that new pseudonyms be delivered to a 5G UE even when the UE
has not used the existing pseudonyms to connect with a legitimate LTE SN. This
is because the UE may have used those pseudonyms with an active IMSI-catcher.
If a 5G UE always connects with a 5G SN and does not get new pseudonyms by
participating in the 5G-AKA, then the 5G UE will have the same pseudonyms for a
long time. If an active IMSI-catcher makes many IMSI inquiries over this time then
the UE would respond to each of those IMSI inquiries with the same pseudonym.
Thus, an active IMSI-catcher would be able to track and monitor the user with this
long-lived pseudonym.
This solution is built on the 5G-AKA protocol of Release 15 [14] with changes only
in the 5G UE and the HN. The solution is thus mostly transparent to the 5G SNs
of Release 15 except for the length of a couple of messages (Steps (3) and (4)). This
part of the solution requires the HN and the USIM to contain all the information of
the LTE-AKA based part of the solution. Moreover, it requires the HN to have a
public/private key pair pk, sk and the USIM to be provisioned with the HNs public
key pk. This solution is presented in Figure 6.3 and proceeds as follows:
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UE(5G) SN(5G) HN(5G)
(2) Generate SUCI
(10) 5G-AKA operations
(12) Update pseudonyms
(13) Verify HRES
?
= HXRES∗
(5) UE identification, generate RAND
(6) Purge PHN
(7) Remaining 5G-AKA operations
(15) Verify RES∗
?
= XRES
(16) If verification is successful and
AV request came with a SUCI not
SUPI, then update pseudonyms
(1) SUPI Inquiry
(4) AV request with SUCI(3) SUCI
(9) RAND,AUTN (8) RAND,AUTN,HXRES∗
(14) RES∗
(11) RES∗
Figure 6.3: 5G-AKA based solution. The differences to 5G-AKA are highlighted in
red.
1. A 5G SN requests the SUPI from the UE.
2. The UE generates a SUCI. Here, the plaintext encrypted into SUCI is differ-
ent from that of Release 15 (see §5.4.1). Two counters, δmin and δmax, are
also encrypted along with the MSIN. δmin is the smallest counter of all the
pseudonyms in the UE. The HN can thus know which pseudonyms the UE is
no longer using. Consequently, they can be allocated to other UEs. The value
of the counter δmax is always set to d2. The construction of the SUCI is as
follows:
 UE computes MAC T of message MSIN ||δmin||δmax with master key K.
 UE encrypts MSIN ||δmin||δmax||T with HNs public key pk.
 The ciphertext is concatenated with other plaintext like HN identifier, the
public-key identifier of the HN, and the SUPI protection scheme identifier.
The outcome is returned as the SUCI.
3. The UE sends the SUCI to the SN.
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4. The SN forwards the SUCI to the HN, requesting an AV. Most of the time
the user identifies with the GUTI. Sometimes the user may implicitly identify
itself by responding to a paging message. In either case, if the SN wants to
perform a 5G-AKA, the SN requests an AV from the HN with the SUPI that
was associated with the GUTI or paging.
5. The HN constructs the RAND by embedding a pseudonym in it as follows:
 The HN extracts MSIN, δmin, δmax and T from the encrypted part of
the SUCI using the private key sk.
 HN verifies the MAC T using master key K. If this verification fails, the
HN aborts.
 HN checks if pf is NULL. If yes, an m-bit long pf is randomly allocated
(from the pool of free pseudonyms) and df is set to CTR, which is a
subscriber-specific counter maintained by the HN. It increases every time
the HN generates a new pseudonym.
 HN checks whether δmax is greater than df . If yes, it sets ECF to 1,
otherwise ECF is set to 0.
 A l-bit long random salt is chosen.
 (p, d)← (pf , df ).
 (p, d, ECF, salt) is encrypted with key k. The resultant ciphertext is
RAND.
6. Further, HN removes pseudonyms from PHN which have counter smaller than
δmin.
7. HN performs the other operations of 5G-AKA, except the construction of
RAND.
8. HN then sends an AV (RAND,AUTN,HXRES∗) to the SN.
9. SN forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE.
10. UE performs the 5G-AKA related operations.
11. UE then sends the response RES* to the SN.
12. UE further decrypts RAND, extracts the embedded pseudonym from the
RAND, and updates the pseudonyms in the UE. In 5G-AKA, the ECF might
be set to 1 by the HN. In this case the UE will empty the set PUE , set
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(p1, d1), (p2, d2) ← (p, d − 1), (p, d) and terminate the algorithm at this step.
This is needed to recover from a very unlikely error situation where d2 gets
corrupted in the UE.
13. SN computes HRES* as a function of RES* and then compares HRES* with
HXRES*.
14. If the comparison in Step (13) matches, SN forwards the RES* to the HN.
15. The HN compares RES* and XRES.
16. If the comparison in Step (15) matches, HN checks whether the AV (associated
with the current 5G-AKA run) came with a SUCI or a SUPI. If with a SUCI,
HN checks if the pseudonym p that was embedded in the RAND is still pf .
If yes, the HN moves (pc, dc) to PHN and sets (pc, dc), (pn, dn), (pf , df ) ←
(pn, dn), (pf , df ), (NULL,NULL). Consequently, the HN would embed a new
pseudonym in the RAND while responding to the next AV request. If the
UE identified itself with GUTI or responded to a paging message, then the
subsequent AV request sent by the SN would be with a SUPI. Hence, the
pseudonyms would not get updated in HN. This means that in response to the
next AV request, the HN will embed the same pseudonym in the RAND.
Step (16) helps the system to avoid generating unnecessary pseudonyms. If a 5G
UE attempts to connect with an LTE SN using a pseudonym, but the subsequent
LTE-AKA fails or no LTE-AKA follows (possibly because the SN is an active IMSI-
catcher), then the next time the UE tries to connect with a 5G SN it can use
SUCI instead of GUTI. In this way the UE can notify the HN that it needs a new
pseudonym, and it will receive a new pseudonym in the next AKA. Thus, the solution
avoids generating unnecessary pseudonyms.
6.2.3 Pseudonym Allocation and Removal Process
The HN randomly allocates a new pseudonym for a user from a pool of free
pseudonyms. A pseudonym p can be in the pool of free pseudonyms only if it is
not in the set PHN (or used as pc, pn or pf ) for any user. As new pseudonyms are
generated for a user, the older pseudonyms are stored in the sets PHN and PUE . A
pseudonym should not be allocated to a new user as long as it is in PHN and PUE of
any other user. If pseudonyms are never removed from PHN and PUE , the system
will eventually run out of free pseudonyms. To keep the pool of free pseudonyms
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large enough, the HN needs to remove old pseudonyms that are no longer used by
a UE from PHN . Hence, a policy is required for removal of pseudonyms from these
sets. One objective of this policy should be that a pseudonym should not be deleted
from PHN of a user that is not yet deleted from the set PUE of that user.
In this downgrade protection solution, a UE removes pseudonyms from PUE accord-
ing to the policies provisioned in the UE by the HN. The UE notifies the HN about
the pseudonyms that the HN can remove from the PHN . The UE sends (encrypted
in the SUCI message) the smallest counter value δmin of all the pseudonyms avail-
able in the UE. The HN then removes (from PHN ) all pseudonyms that have smaller
counter values than δmin . The UE sends δmin with both integrity and confidentiality
protection within the encrypted part of SUCI, as discussed in §6.2.2.
It is important to define when the UE can decide that it no longer uses a pseudonym
and it can be removed from PUE . The pseudonyms in PUE are stored because the
UE should be able to respond to paging messages sent by the SN. Therefore, if a UE
has a pseudonym (and the associated GUTI) that has not been used for a reasonably
long time (as defined in the policy) and the UE is currently connected to a different
SN, the pseudonym can be removed.
The UE may have an old pseudonym in PUE that is associated with a GUTI and a
security context but has no other pseudonyms associated with the same SN and the
UE is currently connected to this SN. In such a case, the UE would initiate a new
registration procedure with the SN using pseudonym p1 or p2. If this registration
is successful, the UE can remove the old pseudonym from PUE . The UE may also
follow a guideline set by the HN to remove pseudonyms from PUE ; for example,
removing pseudonyms that are older than one day.
6.3 Analysis of the Proposed Solution
In the downgrade protection proposal by [89], new pseudonyms are delivered to the
UE under confidentiality protection of the key k. Therefore, an LTE-based IMSI
catcher cannot know a pseudonym before the UE uses it. This ensures unlinkability
between various pseudonyms being utilized by the same user. We further analyze
this downgrade protection proposal now.
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6.3.1 Pseudonym Synchronization
Desynchronization between UE and HN means that the pseudonyms p1 and p2 asso-
ciated a user within the UE are no longer associated with same user within the HN.
We say that a UE is desynchronized with its HN if the following condition occurs:
(p1, d1), (p2, d2) /∈ {(pc, dc), (pn, dn), (pf , df )} ∪ PHN .
In this downgrade protection mechanism, if both UE and HN function correctly, a
desynchronization scenario cannot occur. However, if due to some unlikely error
(such as HN memory erasure, etc.) desynchronization occurs, the UE can easily
resynchronize by connecting to a 5G SN. This is because, to participate in a 5G-
AKA, there is no requirement for pseudonyms and, after a successful 5G-AKA, the
UE will be allotted new valid pseudonyms.
6.3.2 Lawful Interception
The 3GPP LI requirements state that a network operator should be able to intercept
communications independently without the need to rely on another network operator
or party. In particular, a SN should not be required to provide the identity of the
target user to the HN and vice versa [10, 25]. In 5G Release 15, LI is ensured via
two features:
1. The HN provides the SUPI of the user to the SN during the 5G-AKA (see §2.7).
In this way, even if a SUCI was utilized by the user for initial identification,
the SN comes to know of the actual long-term identifier of the user before
provisioning actual services.
2. Both UE and SN use SUPI as one of the inputs to derive the master session
key [14]. This ensures that communication can only occur if both parties agree
on the same SUPI.
The authors of [89] propose LI in their solution by suggesting to incorporate Fea-
ture 1: i.e., after a successful LTE-AKA, the HN should provision the IMSI of the
user to the SN as part of the LTE-AKA protocol. This of course will require soft-
ware updates in both LTE SN and HN. Incorporating Feature 2 is more involved
and will require the MSIN part of the user’s IMSI as an additional input during the
derivation of the master session key by UE and SN.
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6.3.3 Performance Overheads
In this downgrade protection solution, the pseudonym delivery and update is under-
taken via existing (LTE/5G) AKA messages. The overall structure of these existing
messages remains unchanged, however parts of these messages are constructed and
interpreted differently. Hence, there is no communication overhead and delay as ex-
isting message lengths remain the same (except for a minor increase in two messages
of the 5G-AKA) with no extra messages. There is some additional computational
overhead involved, such as during embedding of pseudonyms within the RAND, etc.
However, most of these additional operations are carried out in the HN and consist
of symmetric cryptographic operations, hence the impact is negligible.
6.4 Quantum Security with Downgrade Resistance
In this section we present the details of the combining of our PQID proposal (§5.5)
with the downgrade protection proposal (§6.2) to come up with a 5G user identifica-
tion mechanism which is both quantum-secure and downgrade resistant. Basically,
the aim is to replace the public-key based operations of §6.2 with the symmetric-key
based operations of §5.5. The LTE-AKA based part (§6.2.1) will remain unchanged,
hence we do not discuss it further. The 5G-AKA based part (§6.2.2) will require
some amendments.
While combining the two solutions, the overall structure and message flow of §6.2.2
remains unaffected. The only difference is in the way the SUCI is calculated, and
transmission of additional parameters along with a few of the original messages.
Figure 6.4 shows the overall message flow and structure of the combined solution
and highlights the various steps that are different from those of §6.2.2. We further
explain each of these individual steps as follows:
1. A 5G SN requests the SUPI from the UE.
2. The UE generates a SUCI. Here, the SUCI is computed according to the details
provided in §5.5. However, as the downgrade protection solution also requires
the two counters, δmin and δmax, to be sent to the HN along with the MSIN,
the SUCI calculation here caters for it. Figure 6.5 details the construction of
the SUCI.
3. The UE sends the SUCI to the SN.
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UE(5G) SN(5G) HN(5G)
(2) Generate SUCI
(10) 5G-AKA and PQID operations
(12) Update pseudonyms
(13) Verify HRES
?
= HXRES∗
(5) UE identification, generate RAND
(6) Purge PHN
(7) Remaining 5G-AKA and PQID operations
(15) Verify RES∗
?
= XRES
(16) If verification is successful and
AV request came with a SUCI not
SUPI, then update pseudonyms
(1) SUPI Inquiry
(4) AV request with SUCI(3) SUCI
(9) RAND,AUTN,AE.Enc(EK,A+||B+) (8) RAND,AUTN,HXRES∗, AE.Enc(EK,A+||B+)
(14) RES∗
(11) RES∗
Figure 6.4: Combining PQID with 5G-AKA based downgrade protection solution.
The differences to Figure 6.3 are highlighted in red.
4. The SN forwards the SUCI to the HN, requesting an AV.
5. The HN extracts MSIN , δmin and δmax from the encrypted part of the SUCI
according to Figure 6.5. Further, the HN constructs the RAND by embedding
a pseudonym in it as follows:
 HN checks if pf is NULL. If yes, an m-bit long pf is randomly allocated
(from the pool of free pseudonyms) and df is set to CTR, which is a
subscriber-specific counter maintained by the HN. It increases every time
the HN generates a new pseudonym.
 HN checks whether δmax is greater than df . If yes, it sets ECF to 1,
otherwise ECF is set to 0.
 A l-bit long random salt is chosen.
 (p, d)← (pf , df ).
 (p, d, ECF, salt) is encrypted with key k. The resultant ciphertext is
RAND.
6. HN removes pseudonyms from PHN which have counter smaller than δmin.
7. HN performs other operations of 5G-AKA (except the construction of RAND)
and PQID (as per Figure 6.5).
8. HN then sends an AV (RAND,AUTN,HXRES∗) to the SN along with the
encrypted update parameters AE.Enc(EK,A+||B+).
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Figure 6.5: The amended PQID for the combined solution. The differences to Fig-
ure 5.3 are highlighted in red.
9. SN forwards the RAND, AUTN and AE.Enc(EK,A+||B+) to the UE.
10. UE performs the 5G-AKA and PQID related operations (see Figure 6.5).
11. UE then sends the response RES* to the SN.
12. UE further decrypts RAND, extracts the embedded pseudonym from the
RAND, and updates the pseudonyms in the UE. In 5G-AKA the ECF might
be set to 1 by the HN. In this case the UE will empty the set PUE , set
(p1, d1), (p2, d2) ← (p, d − 1), (p, d) and terminates the algorithm at this step.
This is needed to recover from a very unlikely error situation where d2 gets
corrupted in the UE.
13. SN computes HRES* as a function of RES* and then compares HRES* with
HXRES*.
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14. If the comparison in Step (13) matches, SN forwards the RES* to the HN.
15. The HN compares RES* and XRES.
16. If the comparison in Step (15) matches, HN checks whether the AV (associ-
ated with the current 5G-AKA run) came with a SUCI or a SUPI. If with a
SUCI, HN checks if the pseudonym p that was embedded in the RAND is still
pf . If yes, the HN moves (pc, dc) to PHN and sets (pc, dc), (pn, dn), (pf , df )←
(pn, dn), (pf , df ), (NULL,NULL). Consequently, the HN will embed a new
pseudonym in the RAND while responding to the next AV request. If the UE
identified itself with GUTI or responded to a paging message, then the subse-
quent AV request sent by the SN will be with a SUPI. Hence, the pseudonyms
will not get updated in HN. This means, in response to the next AV request,
the HN will embed the same pseudonym in the RAND.
6.5 Discussion
A quick look at Figure 6.5 shows that the impact of this amalgamation is minimal
upon our original PQID (§5.5) proposal. The only difference is that, in addition to
masking of the MSIN, the two counters δmin and δmax are also masked. This can
easily be accommodated by truncating the 128-bit masking parameter AKID (see
§5.5.2) to 96 bits instead of the 48 bits in the original scheme. Consequently, the
formal security analysis of PQID (§5.7) and the results also remain valid for these
changes. We therefore omit repeating the details here.
With regards to the impact of this amalgamation upon the original downgrade pro-
tection proposal of [89], as mentioned before the LTE-AKA based part remains
unaffected. The changes to the 5G-AKA based part retain the original properties
provisioned by the solution, as detailed in §6.4. The original message structure is
maintained after the amalgamation, avoiding any additional communication over-
head. Moreover, due to replacement of the public-key cryptography with symmet-
ric cryptographic operations, a reduction in computational overhead is expected.
Achieving resynchronization and provisioning of LI remains unaffected after this
amalgamation because both these features are related to the LTE-AKA based part
of the downgrade protection proposal, which remains unaltered.
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6.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter explored the feasibility of combining our symmetric private identifi-
cation scheme (PQID, for details see §5.5) with the downgrade protection proposal
by Khan et al. [89] to come up with a 5G identification mechanism that is both
quantum-secure and downgrade-resistant. We showed how the combining of our
PQID scheme with the downgrade protection proposal can be undertaken in a seam-
less manner. The impact of this amalgamation is minimal upon both our PQID
scheme and the downgrade protection proposal of [89].
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Privacy-Preserving Key Agreement
for IEEE Std 802.15.6
In this chapter we propose two key agreement protocols for the international WBAN
standard IEEE Std 802.15.6. In addition to the requisite security properties, the
proposed protocols also offer privacy guarantees. We develop a formal security and
privacy model and prove the proposed protocols secure in this model.
7.1 Introduction
The security of traffic in IEEE Std 802.15.6 is protected using authenticated en-
cryption, which requires the establishment of symmetric keys. The procedure for
agreeing these keys is thus critical to the overall security and privacy of a WBAN.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the key agreement protocols of IEEE Std 802.15.6 have
been shown to have security weaknesses [134]. In this chapter, we present two key
agreement protocols for IEEE Std 802.15.6 which render a comprehensive range of
security and privacy properties, which are regarded as essential [102] for WBANs.
We start by elaborating upon the desired security, privacy and functional objectives.
7.1.1 Desired Objectives
The list of the requisite properties (and, where required, the associated rationale)
of a Privacy-Preserving Key Agreement (PPKA) protocol to be executed between a
node N and HN is as below:
7.1.1.1 Security Properties
 Mutual Entity Authentication. Entity authentication is the process by
which one entity (the verifier) is assured of the identity of a second entity (the
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claimant) [139]. The PPKA protocol should provision mutual entity authen-
tication between N and HN.
 Mutual “Implicit” Key Authentication. The assurance that only a par-
ticularly identified other party may possibly know the negotiated key [139].
Mutual “implicit” key authentication is required between N and HN.
 Known Key Security. An adversary compromising a session key in a single
session should not impose any threat to the session key security in any other
sessions.
 Key Randomness. The assurance that any successful key agreement should
output a uniformly distributed session key among the set of all possible session
keys [133].
 Partial Forward Secrecy. The compromise of the long-term secret of a node
N should not enable an adversary to compromise previously established session
keys of that node. Partial Forward Secrecy (PrFS) is crucial as client nodes
(unlike HN) in typical WBAN deployment scenarios are not tamper-proof and
their internal storage can be accessed by an adversary easily. Note that, as
already explained in §2.11, we do not consider the compromise of the long-term
secret of HN. This enables us to consider a more pragmatic version of forward
secrecy for WBANs. PrFS is a well-documented [41] and discussed [40, 46, 47,
121] security notion for key exchange protocols. In contrast to the standard
notion of Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), PrFS considers the compromise of
the long-term secret of only one of the protocol participants. We remark that
PrFS is distinct from the related notion of Weak Forward Secrecy (WFS) [96],
where the concerned adversary is a passive one. PrFS considers an active
adversary.
 Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Suppose N’s long-
term secret gets disclosed. Clearly an adversary that knows this value can now
impersonate N, since it is precisely this value that identifies N. However, it is
highly desirable that this loss should not enable an adversary to impersonate
other entities to N [100]. Consider the scenario where a cardiac pacemaker
is part of a WBAN deployed upon a chronic patient by a hospital for remote
administration and monitoring purposes. The leakage of the pacemaker’s long-
term secret should not enable the adversary to issue “stop” commands to the
pacemaker by impersonating as the hospital administrator. Such a case could
potentially lead to a life-threatening situation.
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 Replay Prevention. An adversary should not be able to successfully re-
play previously captured copies of legitimate messages between the protocol
participants.
 Desynchronization Resistance. If the authentication parameters get up-
dated during the protocol execution, then usually the participants need to
have the same updated values at the end of a protocol run. Otherwise, they
will not authenticate each other in later associations and we say they have
been desynchronized. In a desynchronization attack, the adversary forces the
protocol participants to update their authentication parameters to different
values. A PPKA needs to be resistant to these types of attacks.
7.1.1.2 Privacy Properties
We focus on two privacy aspects:
1. Node Anonymity. An adversary A, who is observing all communications,
should not be able to learn the identity of any node N who is participating in
a PPKA protocol with HN. The privacy attribute of anonymity is a necessity
for typical application scenarios of WBANs, such as healthcare and military.
2. Unlinkability. An adversary A, who is observing communications, should
not be able to link one successfully-executed PPKA instance of node N to
another successfully-completed instance of the same node. Unlinkability is
imperative in addition to anonymity. Although the PPKA instances could
be anonymous, if the adversary is able to link various PPKA instancess and
group them together then A would be able to attribute a group of captured
instances to a particular node with high probability, due to his knowledge of
the operations of the WBAN. For example, consider a medical WBAN in which
a pacemaker is to communicate with the remote healthcare providers every five
minutes, while the body temperature sensor communicates only three times
per day.
7.1.1.3 Functional Requirements
 Support for Multi-Hop Communication. As discussed in §2.11, depend-
ing upon the network topology, nodes would either be communicating directly
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with the Hub Node HN or via an Intermediary Node IN. Therefore, the PPKA
protocol should be designed to be suitable for both single-hop and two-hop
communication modes of [3].
 Energy Consumption. As nodes in a WBAN are severely energy-constrained,
the PPKA protocol needs to be minimalistic in terms of computation, commu-
nication and storage overhead. Energy consumption in WBANs is dominated
by radio communications [54], which mainly depends on the number of bits to
be transmitted within the network. Consequently, the PPKA protocol should
be designed such that the number of bits to be exchanged between the protocol
participants and the computational overhead for nodes N should be minimal.
 Stateless HN. HN is the consistent nucleus of the network whose lack of
accessibility will have devastating effects on the complete WBAN. As the net-
work topology in WBANs is dynamic (client nodes join and leave the network
on a frequent basis), it is imperative for HN’s accessibility that it be inde-
pendent of such dynamism. Consequently, an important requirement is that
the PPKA protocol should not require HN to maintain a state of the WBAN
nodes.
7.1.2 Design Principles
During the design of the PPKA protocols for IEEE Std 802.15.6 we focus on the
following principles:
 Offloading of Expensive Operations. As nodes in a WBAN are resource-
constrained, it makes sense to offload energy-expensive operations to more
resourceful entities such as SA and HN. An example of this is discussed in
more detail in §7.4.2.
 Minimizing the Implementation Footprint. Ideally, the proposed solu-
tion should not introduce new cryptographic primitives as this will adversely
affect the implementation footprint (both hardware and memory). Specifically,
we aim to use the already specified block cipher function in [3] for achieving
the various security and privacy objectives. A more detailed discussion is given
in §7.4.2.
 Reducing Management Costs. A PPKA solution should not place man-
agement costs on the WBAN nodes after the network initialization. Consider
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the situation where a third party wants to add its node (for example a fit-
ness tracker) to an already deployed WBAN. The third party should be able
to contact the SA who (after registration of the new node) dispatches it to
the WBAN owner, who begins using the new device upon receipt. Note that
all this was done without any interaction between the SA and the currently
operational WBAN.
7.1.3 Related Work
Toorani [134] discovered various security weaknesses in the key agreement methods
of IEEE Std 802.15.6, all of which were susceptible to KCI attacks (see §7.1.1.1), as
well as attacks on forward secrecy. Wang and Zhang [142] proposed a key agreement
scheme for WBANs that claimed to provide anonymity and unlinkability in addition
to the requisite security guarantees. However, Jiang et al. [76] showed that the
scheme in [142] is vulnerable to a client impersonation attack. They proposed an
authenticated key agreement scheme which rectified this flaw. However, their scheme
was based on computing bilinear pairings [64], which means that it is not suitable for
deployment in resource-constrained WBANs. To avoid the overhead of managing
public-key certificates, He et al. proposed a certificateless authentication scheme
[71], which provides anonymity and unlinkability. However, the computation and
communication overheads associated with their scheme also render it unsuitable for
WBAN deployment. Li et al. [103] presented an authenticated key agreement scheme
based only upon symmetric cryptographic primitives. This is an attractive proposal
since there is no requirement of any additional infrastructure and the associated
computation and communication overheads are negligible. The authors claimed
that this scheme achieved almost all of the security and privacy objectives defined
in §7.1.1.
7.1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
 We provide an analysis of [103] which, in addition to showing that Li et al.’s
scheme does not provide unlinkability and forward secrecy, also exhibits its
vulnerability to KCI attacks.
 We propose two key agreement protocols (PPKA-1 and PPKA-2) which provide
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Table 7.1: Comparison of security and privacy features.
Security/Privacy
Feature
Li et al. [103] PPKA-1 [§7.3.1] PPKA-2 [§7.3.2]
PrFS 7 7 3
KCI Resilience 7 7 3
Unlinkability 7 3 3
Anonymity 3 3 3
unlinkability and resolve the privacy flaws found in [103]. PPKA-2 additionally
provisions PrFS and KCI resilience. Table 7.1 lists the security and privacy
features provisioned by each protocol.
 We develop a formal security and privacy model in an appropriate complexity-
theoretic framework and prove the proposed protocols secure in this model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: §7.2 details Li et al.’s scheme while
§7.3 presents our PPKA protocols. §7.4 discusses the design decisions regarding the
PPKA protocols. §7.5 presents the formal security model followed by §7.6, which
analyzes the PPKA protocols. Finally, §7.7 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Li et al.’s Scheme
In this section we present an overview and analysis of Li et al.’s scheme [103]. For
ease of comparison we use the same notation (details in Table 7.2) as used in [103].
7.2.1 The Key Agreement Protocol
Li et al.’s PPKA protocol between the HN and N consists of three phases. For a
pictorial overview of the protocol see Figure 7.1.
7.2.1.1 Initialization Phase
The SA generates a master secret key kHN and stores it in HN.
123
7.2 Li et al.’s Scheme
Table 7.2: Notations used in Li et al.’s protocol.
Symbol Description
h(.) Cryptographic hash function
(a, b) Concatenation of a and b
⊕ Bitwise XOR operation k
SA System Administrator (initializes the WBAN)
N Normal Node
HN Hub Node
IN Intermediary Node
idN Long term secret/identity of node N
id′IN Relay identity of node IN
tidN Temporary identity of node N
kHN Long term master secret key of HN
kN , fN Temporary secret parameters chosen by HN/SA
rN Temporary secret parameter chosen by N
aN , bN Authentication parameters stored in N
xN , yN Auxiliary authentication parameters
α, β, η, µ Authentication parameters computed by HN
kS Resultant shared key
tN Timestamp generated by node N
X → Y : Z Entity X sends message Z to entity Y
7.2.1.2 Registration Phase
The SA generates a unique secret identity idN for node N. It then randomly chooses
the temporary secret parameter kN and calculates aN = idN ⊕ h(kHN , kN ) and
bN = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕ kN . A unique relay identity id′IN for the intermediary node
IN is chosen and the parameters 〈idN , aN , bN 〉 and 〈id′IN 〉 are stored in N and IN
respectively, while id′IN is stored by HN as the identity of IN when communicating
in relay mode.
7.2.1.3 Authentication Phase
We can think of the authentication phase of Li et al.’s scheme as a two-pass protocol.
The individual steps are outlined below:
Step 1: N → IN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN 〉. N picks a random rN and creates
timestamp tN . Then it computes xN = aN ⊕ idN , yN = xN ⊕ rN and tidN =
h(idN ⊕ tN , rN ) and forwards the tuple 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN 〉 to IN.
Step 2: IN → HN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′IN 〉. IN adds its relay identity id′IN to
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N
(idN ,aN ,bN )
IN
(id′IN )
HN
(id′IN ,kHN )
Picks rN
Generates timestamp tN
Computes xN = aN ⊕ idN ,
yN = xN ⊕ rN ,
tidN = h(idN ⊕ tN , rN )
Checks that id′IN exists
Validates tN
Computes k∗N = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕ bN ,
x∗N = h(kHN , k
∗
N ),id
∗
N = x
∗
N ⊕ aN ,
r∗N = x
∗
N ⊕ yN ,
tid∗N = h(id
∗
N ⊕ tN , r∗N )
Verify that tidN
?
= tid∗N
Picks fN
Computes α = xN ⊕ fN , γ = rN ⊕ fN
Picks new k+N
Computes a+N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k
+
N ),
b+N = kHN ⊕ a
+
N ⊕ k
+
N , η = γ ⊕ a
+
N ,
µ = γ ⊕ b+N , β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ),
kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
Stores session key kS
Computes f∗N = xN ⊕ α,
β∗ = h(xN , rN , f
∗
N , η, µ),
Verifies β∗
?
= β
Computes γ = rN ⊕ fN ,
a+N = γ ⊕ η, b
+
N = γ ⊕ µ,
kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
Replaces (aN , bN ) with (a
+
N , b
+
N )
Stores session key kS
< tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN > < tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
IN >
< α, β, η, µ > < α, β, η, µ, id′IN >
Figure 7.1: Li et al.’s protocol.
the tuple and forwards it to HN. Note that IN, when operating in relay mode, uses
id′IN not idIN .
Step 3: HN → IN : 〈α, β, η, µ, id′IN 〉. After receiving the parameters from IN, HN
verifies the relay identity id′IN from its database and substantiates the validity of the
timestamp tN . Upon success of these checks, it computes k
∗
N = kHN⊕aN⊕bN , x∗N =
h(kHN , k
∗
N ), id
∗
N = x
∗
N ⊕ aN , r∗N = x∗N ⊕ yN and tid∗N = h(id∗N ⊕ tN , r∗N ). It then
verifies whether tidN
?
= tid∗N . Then, a random fN is chosen and α = xN ⊕ fN and
γ = rN ⊕ fN are computed. A new k+N is picked and a
+
N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k
+
N ), b
+
N =
kHN ⊕ a+N ⊕ k
+
N , η = γ ⊕ a
+
N , µ = γ ⊕ b
+
N , β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ) are computed.
The shared key is computed as kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) and is stored in memory.
Finally, HN forwards the tuple 〈α, β, η, µ, id′IN 〉 to IN.
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Step 4: IN → N : 〈α, β, η, µ〉. IN removes the relay identity id′IN from the received
tuple and forwards 〈α, β, η, µ〉 to N.
Step 5: Upon receipt of the response from IN, N computes f∗N = xN ⊕ α and
β∗ = h(xN , rN , f
∗
N , η, µ) and verifies that β
∗ ?= β. If true, N computes γ =
rN ⊕ fN , a+N = γ ⊕ η and b
+
N = γ ⊕ µ. The shared key kS is computed as
h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) and the authentication parameters (aN , bN ) are replaced
by (a+N , b
+
N ).
7.2.2 Analysis of the Li et al.’s Scheme
In this section we discuss vulnerabilities and attacks on the security and privacy of
Li et al.’s scheme.
7.2.2.1 Security Analysis
In addition to provisioning of mutual authentication [55], Li et al.’s scheme fulfills
all the security criteria as defined in §7.1.1 except KCI resilience and PrFS. More-
over, the scheme also protects the master secret (kHN ) in the event of compromise
of various nodes of the WBAN. For sake of brevity, we will restrict our security
analysis to highlight only the vulnerabilities of Li et al.’s scheme.
Discussion about Forward Secrecy. Li et al. claimed a forward security prop-
erty of their scheme. Their definition of forward secrecy varies from the generally
accepted one. According to Li et al., the goal of forward secrecy is to protect other
(past/future) keys in the event of compromise of the current key kS . However, the
conventional definition of forward secrecy states that in the event of compromise
of the long-term secrets of the protocol participant(s), an adversary should not be
able to obtain any of the past keys [107]. While Li et al.’s scheme is forward secure
according to their own definition, it is not forward secure in a conventional sense.
KCI Attack. We demonstrate a KCI attack on Li et al.’s scheme. A observes the
first pass of the protocol and notes the message contents. As the value idN is known
to A, he calculates the following values as follows:
xN = aN ⊕ idN ; rN = yN ⊕ xN .
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A chooses a random fN and calculates α = fN ⊕ xN . A then chooses arbitrary
values of η and µ and calculates β as:
β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ).
Finally, A sends the tuple 〈α, β, η, µ〉 back to node N. N cannot detect this KCI
attack as N’s computed value β is the same as in the received tuple. As a result,
node N will end up sharing the key kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) with A, incorrectly
believing itself to be sharing kS with HN.
7.2.2.2 Privacy Analysis
The Anonymity Dilemma. It is known a priori to the attacker that all nodes
ultimately communicate with HN. As the node identifier idN is always masked (by
taking an XOR of it with a fresh random value), anonymity in Li et al.’s protocol
is preserved from “direct” privacy attacks. However, now consider the situation
depicted in Figure 7.2, where an intermediary node IN is providing the relaying
service to various nodes. In the second pass of Li et al.’s scheme, it is not clear
Figure 7.2: The privacy dilemma of Li et al.’s scheme.
how the intermediary node IN would be able to identify the original node N out of
the “anonymity set” [122] for onward forwarding of the tuple 〈α, β, η, µ〉 received
from HN. One naive way to resolve this is to allow IN to broadcast the second pass
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of protocol for all nodes. However, this approach is unsuitable for already energy-
constrained WBAN nodes as they will need to perform additional communication
(radio reception) and computational steps for each transmission.
Unlinkability. While Li et al. claim their scheme provides unlinkability, we show
this to be untrue. We highlight a weakness in Li et al.’s key agreement protocol,
which allows a passive attacker to easily link two or more key agreement instances
of the same node N. The attack proceeds as follows:
Instance # 1. Suppose that a run of Li et al.’s key agreement protocol is being
carried out between node N and HN. A passive attacker A observes the contents
of the messages being exchanged. From Step 1 of §7.2.1.3, A records the value
yN = xN ⊕ rN . Then, from Step 3 of §7.2.1.3, A records α = xN ⊕ fN . Now, A
obtains the value γ = rN ⊕ fN = α ⊕ yN . Further, A records the values η and µ
from Step 3 of §7.2.1.3 and uses γ to compute:
a+N = γ ⊕ η; b
+
N = γ ⊕ µ.
Instance # 2. Now, A observes key exchange protocol exchanges between various
nodes and HN. A compares the values of the parameters aN and bN from Step
1 of the protocol with the saved values of a+N and b
+
N . When A finds a match,
A concludes with almost certainty that another key exchange instance has been
initiated by the same node N. This is correct because node N uses the updated
authentication parameters a+N and b
+
N in its next run of the protocol. In this way, A
can track and link instances of node N, demonstrating that Li et al.’s scheme does
not achieve unlinkability.
7.2.2.3 Functional Requirements
Li et al.’s scheme can easily be adapted for direct communication between N and HN
without the involvement of IN. Since this scheme employs only symmetric crypto-
graphic primitives, it is extremely efficient from a computation, communication and
storage-overhead perspective and there is no requirement for any additional network
infrastructure. Assuming a hash function with a digest length of B-bits and 16-bit
intermediary node IDs (i.e. id′IN ), Table 7.3 highlights the communication, compu-
tation and storage overhead of Li et al.’s scheme. In this table, h denotes one hash
operation, ⊕ denotes an XOR operation and m denotes the number of intermediary
nodes in the WBAN.
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Table 7.3: Overheads associated with Li et al.’s scheme.
Index Node N Hub Node HN
Computation Overhead 3h+ 7⊕ 5h+ 12⊕
Communication Overhead 5B bits 4B + 16 bits
Storage Overhead 3B bits (B + 16m) bits
Table 7.4: Detail of additional symbols.
Symbol Description
id′N Temporary identity chosen randomly by N
zN Security parameter stored in memory of N by HN/SA
Enc(k,m) Encryption of message m under symmetric key k
Dec(k, c) Decryption of ciphertext c under symmetric key k
γ Additional authentication parameter computed by HN
Note that, contrary to the assumption made by Li et al. in §5.4 of [103] about the
arbitrary length of the timestamp field, it is implicitly the same length as the hash
function digest because, as described earlier in §7.2.1.3, tidN = h(idN ⊕ tN , rN ).
This is not commensurate with the length of the timestamp field as defined in IEEE
Std 802.15.6, which is three octets or 24-bits. Regarding state maintenance by HN ,
in case of [103], HN needs to maintain states concerning the relay nodes IN , which
is an undesirable feature as already explained in §7.1.1.3.
7.3 Our PPKA Protocols
In this section we propose two PPKA protocols which rectify the problems high-
lighted in §7.2.2. While devising these PPKA protocols, we have tried to preserve
the original elegance, simplicity and efficiency of the scheme in [103]. The first
PPKA protocol (PPKA-1) addresses the privacy flaws of unlinkability and anonymity
dilemma faced by IN (§7.2.2.2) in Li et al.’s scheme. The second protocol (PPKA-2),
additionally provides PrFS and KCI resilience (in case of compromise of the long-
term secret of node N). Note that although in our protocols the intermediary node
IN is not an active participant from a cryptographic standpoint (this was a conscious
design consideration), we have included IN in our protocol description for verifica-
tion of the resolution of the anonymity dilemma of IN. Detail of additional notation
used in our PPKA protocols is given in Table 7.4.
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7.3.1 PPKA-1
PPKA-1 is separated into three distinct phases:
1. An Initialization Phase, that generates the long-term secret values for HN.
2. A Registration Phase, that generates the long-term values for the rest of the
nodes and stores them with HN.
3. An Authentication Phase where the nodes N and HN generate an authenticated
shared secret key, and update the authentication parameters.
We next describe these three phases.
7.3.1.1 Initialization Phase
This phase is identical to the Initialization Phase of [103]. Specifically, the SA
generates a master secret key kHN and stores it in HN.
7.3.1.2 Registration Phase
This phase is also similar to that of [103]. However, in the case of PPKA-1, the
intermediary node IN is not provided with a relay identity id′IN .
7.3.1.3 Authentication Phase
The various steps of the Authentication Phase of PPKA-1 are depicted in Figure 7.3
and are as follows:
Step 1: N → IN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′N 〉. N picks a random rN and creates
timestamp tN . It then computes xN = aN ⊕ idN , yN = xN ⊕ rN . It further picks a
random pseudonym id′N to be used as a temporary identifier for this key agreement
instance only, calculates tidN = h(idN , id
′
N , tN , rN ) and sets the “Relay Field” of
the underlying “MAC Header” to value 1, according to sub-clause 6.10 of [3].
Step 2: IN → HN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′N 〉. IN checks the value of “Relay
Field” and forwards the tuple to HN.
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N
(idN ,aN ,bN )
IN
()
HN
(kHN )
Picks rN
Generates timestamp tN
Computes xN = aN ⊕ idN ,
yN = xN ⊕ rN ,
Picks id′N
tidN = h(idN , id
′
N , tN , rN )
Sets “Relay Field” to 1
Checks “Relay Field”
Checks “Relay Field”
Validates tN
Computes k∗N = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕ bN ,
x∗N = h(kHN , k
∗
N ),id
∗
N = x
∗
N ⊕ aN ,
r∗N = x
∗
N ⊕ yN ,
tid∗N = h(idN , id
′
N , tN , rN )
Verify that tidN
?
= tid∗N
Picks fN
Computes α = xN ⊕ fN , γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN )
γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N )
Picks new k+N
Computes a+N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k
+
N ),
b+N = kHN ⊕ a
+
N ⊕ k
+
N , η = γ ⊕ a
+
N ,
µ = γ′ ⊕ b+N , β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ, id′N ),
kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
Stores session key kS
Sets “Relay Field” to 1
Computes f∗N = xN ⊕ α,
β∗ = h(xN , rN , f
∗
N , η, µ, id
′
N )
Verifies β∗
?
= β
Computes γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN ),
γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ),
a+N = γ ⊕ η, b
+
N = γ
′ ⊕ µ,
kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
Replaces (aN , bN ) with (a
+
N , b
+
N )
Stores session key kS
< tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
N >
< tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
N >
< α, β, η, µ, id′N >
< α, β, η, µ, id′N >
Figure 7.3: Protocol PPKA-1. Steps different from Li et al.’s protocol (Figure 7.1)
are highlighted in red.
Step 3: HN → IN : 〈α, β, η, µ, id′N 〉. After receipt of the tuple from IN, HN
verifies the validity of the timestamp tN . Upon success of this check, it computes
k∗N = kHN⊕aN⊕bN , x∗N = h(kHN , k∗N ), id∗N = x∗N⊕aN , r∗N = x∗N⊕yN and tid∗N =
h(id∗N , id
′
N , tN , r
∗
N ). It then verifies whether tidN
?
= tid∗N . Then, a random fN is cho-
sen and α = xN⊕fN , γ = rN⊕fN⊕h(idN , tN ) and γ′ = rN⊕fN⊕h(idN , tN , rN , id′N )
are computed. Then a new k+N is picked and a
+
N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k
+
N ), b
+
N =
kHN⊕a+N⊕k
+
N , η = γ⊕a
+
N , µ = γ
′⊕b+N , β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ, id′N ) are computed.
Finally, the shared key kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) is computed and stored in memory,
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and the value of the underlying “Relay Field” is set to 1.
Step 4: IN → N : 〈α, β, η, µ, id′N 〉. IN checks the “Relay Field” of the message
received from HN. If “Relay Field” value is set to 1, then it notes the identifier id′N
received in the tuple for onward forwarding of the tuple to node N.
Step 5: Upon receiving a response from IN, N computes f∗N = xN ⊕ α and
β∗ = h(xN , rN , f
∗
N , η, µ, id
′
N ) and verifies that β
∗ ?= β. If so, N computes γ =
rN⊕fN⊕h(idN , tN ), γ′ = rN⊕fN⊕h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ), a
+
N = γ⊕η and b
+
N = γ
′⊕µ.
The shared key kS is computed as h(idN , rN , fN , xN ), and the authentication pa-
rameters (aN , bN ) are updated by being replaced with (a
+
N , b
+
N ).
7.3.2 PPKA-2
The second PPKA protocol PPKA-2 is structurally similar to PPKA-1. We now
describe the execution of PPKA-2.
7.3.2.1 Initialization Phase
This phase is unchanged from PPKA-1.
7.3.2.2 Registration Phase
The Registration Phase is also identical to PPKA-1. However, SA additionally com-
putes zN = h(kHN , idN , kN ). Parameters 〈idN , aN , bN , zN 〉 are stored in N.
7.3.2.3 Authentication Phase
The authentication phase of PPKA-2 is depicted in Figure 7.4 and detailed as fol-
lows:
Step 1: N → IN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′N 〉. This is identical to Step 1 of PPKA-1
except that the value of tidN is calculated as h(idN , id
′
N , zN , tN , rN ).
Step 2: IN → HN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′N 〉. This is identical to Step 2 of
PPKA-1.
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N
(idN ,aN ,bN ,zN )
IN
()
HN
(kHN )
Picks rN
Generates timestamp tN
Computes xN = aN ⊕ idN ,
yN = xN ⊕ rN ,
Picks id′N
tidN = h(idN , id
′
N , zN , tN , rN )
Sets “Relay Field” to 1
Checks “Relay Field”
Checks “Relay Field”
Validates tN
Computes k∗N = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕ bN ,
x∗N = h(kHN , k
∗
N ),id
∗
N = x
∗
N ⊕ aN ,
r∗N = x
∗
N ⊕ yN , z∗N = h(kHN , idN , k∗N ),
tid∗N = h(idN , id
′
N , zN , tN , rN )
Verify that tidN
?
= tid∗N
Picks fN
Computes α = xN ⊕ fN , γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN )
γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N )
Picks new k+N
Computes a+N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k
+
N ),
b+N = kHN ⊕ a
+
N ⊕ k
+
N , η = γ ⊕ a
+
N ,
µ = γ′ ⊕ b+N , β = h(xN , zN , rN , fN , δ, η, µ, id′N ),
kS = h(idN , zN , rN , fN , xN , 1),
kz = h(idN , zN , rN , fN , xN , 0)
Stores session key kS
Computes z+N = h(kHN , idN , k
+
N ),
δ = Enc(kz, z
+
N )
Sets “Relay Field” to 1
Computes f∗N = xN ⊕ α,
β∗ = h(xN , zN , rN , fN , δ, η, µ, id
′
N )
Verifies β∗
?
= β
Computes γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN ),
γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ),
a+N = γ ⊕ η, b
+
N = γ
′ ⊕ µ,
kS = h(idN , zN , rN , fN , xN , 1),
kz = h(idN , zN , rN , fN , xN , 0),
z+N = Dec(kz, δ)
Replaces (aN , bN , zN ) with (a
+
N , b
+
N , z
+
N )
Stores session key kS
< tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
N >
< tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
N >
< α, β, η, µ, δ, id′N >
< α, β, η, µ, δ, id′N >
Figure 7.4: Protocol PPKA-2. Steps different from PPKA-1 (Figure 7.3) are high-
lighted in red.
Step 3: HN → IN : 〈α, β, η, µ, δ, id′N 〉. After receipt of the tuple from IN,
HN proceeds identically to Step 3 of PPKA-1. Additionally z∗N is calculated as
h(kHN , idN , kN ) and tid
∗
N as h(id
∗
N , id
′
N , z
∗
N , tN , r
∗
N ). It then verifies whether tidN
?
=
tid∗N . Then, α, η and µ are computed as in PPKA-1. kS is computed as
h(idN , zN , rN , fN , xN , 1) while an additional key kZ is computed as
h(zN , idN , rN , fN , xN , 0) . HN then computes z
+
N = h(kHN , idN , k
+
N ) and encrypt it
with kz as δ = Enc(kz, z
+
N ). Lastly, β is calculated as h(xN , zN , rN , fN , δ, η, µ, id
′
N ).
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Step 4: IN → N : 〈α, β, η, µ, δ, id′N 〉. Identical to Step 4 of PPKA-1.
Step 5: This is identical to Step 5 of PPKA-1, except that β∗ is calculated as
h(xN , zN , rN , f
∗
N , δ, η, µ, id
′
N ) and the shared key kS is computed as
h(idN , zN , rN , fN , xN , 1). Additionally, N decrypts z
+
N = Dec(kz, δ) and replaces
zN with z
+
N .
7.4 Discussion
7.4.1 Why a Bespoke Solution?
If we consider the scenario of direct communication between N and HN (without
the involvement of IN), at first glance it seems to be similar to that of RFID,
where a tag needs to be authenticated in a secure and private manner by the reader.
However, there is a fundamental distinction between the two scenarios. As discussed
in §7.1.1.3, in the WBAN case the HN does not maintain any state about the network
nodes and is oblivious to the identity management of the network while, in the RFID
setting, the reader has access to the back-end database server(s) which maintain
nodes' status in the RFID network. This means that in the case of RFID, SA needs
to update the status at the back-end servers whenever it introduces a new node or
removes an old one from the system. As explained in §7.1.1.3, this is problematic
for WBANs.
7.4.2 Random Number Generation on WBAN Nodes
The Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) for a WBAN needs to be com-
putationally inexpensive and there should be no requirement for entropy collection
from environmental resources, as this would entail extra communication. To achieve
this, we recommend the approach outlined in [99]. During the “Registration Phase”,
SA can allocate each node N with a unique (randomly chosen) secret key K. There-
after, N can encrypt the sequence {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} under key K using AES (already
available for message security purposes) as the block cipher. This arrangement can
securely generate 260 bytes without the need for re-seeding the key K.
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7.4.3 Post-Quantum Significance
Given recent progress towards achieving practical universal quantum computers [45],
it is imperative that proposals for any standard should also cater for this future
threat. Our PPKA protocols avoid any public-key cryptography and are thus well
suited to post-quantum deployment scenarios.
7.4.4 Why Timestamps?
Timestamps are generally avoided in key agreement protocols as they present various
practical problems, such as the need for a reliable source of time. Our setting
does not face these difficulties, as a comprehensive mechanism already exists in
Clause 6.11 of [3] which provisions for HN to act as the central time source for the
WBAN and regularly broadcasts time-synchronization beacons.
7.4.5 Why Two Proposals?
As already highlighted in Table 7.1, PPKA-2 offers additional security and privacy
features over and above those offered by PPKA-1. The question then arises that why
there is a need for two separate proposals for IEEE 802.15.6? This is because these
additional features offered by PPKA-2 come at a cost of additional computational,
communication and storage overheads, the detail of which is further elaborated in
Tables 7.5 and 7.6. As discussed in Section 7.1.1.3, nodes in a WBAN are severely
energy-constrained; hence, the PPKA protocol needs to be minimalistic in terms
of computation, communication and storage overhead. By providing two separate
proposals, IEEE will have the flexibility to choose from two options that offer a
trade-off between overheads and the provided features.
7.5 Security Model
We now introduce our security model for the analysis of PPKA protocols. Our first
security experiment is based on standard key-exchange models in the tradition of
Bellare-Rogaway [34] key indistinguishability games. This allows our model to easily
capture known key secrecy, as well as generically capture key randomness notions,
since our adversary is tasked merely with the goal of distinguishing the targeted
session key from a random session key from the same distribution.
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Our second security experiment allows us to capture privacy notions of sessions
by challenging an adversary to determine which of two previously selected nodes
ran a given protocol execution. Our cleanness predicates (see §7.5.4) allows us to
model KCI attacks by allowing the adversary to reveal the long-term key of the node
running the PPKA protocol, as well as the notions of partial forward secrecy. We
begin by describing the execution environment for our security frameworks.
7.5.1 Execution Environment
Consider an experiment ExpPPKA-INDΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ) played between a challenger C and an ad-
versary A. C maintains a single node HN , running a number of instances of the
PPKA protocol Π, and a set of (up to) nN nodes N1, . . . , NnN (representing nodes
communicating with the hub node HN ), each potentially running one stage of (up
to) nS consecutive stages of Π. The PPKA protocol Π is represented as a tuple
of algorithms Π = (HKeyGen,HF,NKeyGen,NF, StateGen,StateUpdate). We abuse
notation and use πsi to refer to both the identifier of the stid-th stage of Π being
run by node Nid and the collection of per-session variables maintained for this stage.
We describe the algorithms as follows:
 Π.HKeyGen(λ)
$→ (kHN ) is a probabilistic symmetric key generation algorithm
taking as input a security parameter λ and outputting a long-term hub node
secret key (kHN ).
 Π.HF(λ, kHN ,m)
$→ (m′) is a (potentially) probabilistic algorithm that takes a
security parameter λ, the long-term key of the hub node kHN , and an arbitrary
bit string m ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {∅}, and outputs a response m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {∅} and an
updated per-session state π′.
 Π.NKeyGen(λ)
$→ (ltk) is a probabilistic symmetric key generation algorithm
taking as input a security parameter λ and outputting a long-term hub node
secret key (ltk). Note that in our proposed PPKA protocols, we denote this
long-term secret key with idN .
 Π.NF(λ, π,m)
$→ (m′, π′) is a probabilistic algorithm taking a security pa-
rameter λ, the set of per-session variables π and an arbitrary bit string m ∈
{0, 1}∗ ∪ {∅}, and outputs a response m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {∅} and an updated per-
session state π′.
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 Π.StateGen(λ, kHN , ltk)
$→ (psstate) is a probabilistic symmetric key genera-
tion algorithm taking as input a security parameter λ and the long-term secret
keys of the hub node and the “normal” node, outputting secret state informa-
tion for node N (psstate). In PPKA-1, this per-stage secret state is 〈aN , bN 〉.
In PPKA-2, this is 〈aN , bN , zN 〉.
 Π.StateUpdate(λ, π)
$→ (psstate) is a probabilistic symmetric key generation
algorithm taking as input a security parameter λ and a set of per-session
variables, outputting the next stage’s per-stage secret state (psstate) for node
N .
The experiment begins with C running Π.HKeyGen once to generate a long-term
secret key for the hub node (kHN ), and randomly sampling a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. A
then interacts with C via the queries listed in §7.5.2, eventually terminating and
outputting a guess bit b′ of C’s bit b. A wins the key-indistinguishability game if
b′ = b and the session πsi , such that A issued Test(id, stid), satisfies the cleanness
predicate clean, which we discuss in §7.5.4. Each session maintains the following set
of per-session variables:
 ltk ∈ {0, 1}λ - the long-term symmetric-secret of Nid;
 id ∈ {1, . . . , nN} - the index of the node Nid;
 ms ∈ {0, 1}∗∪{⊥} - the concatenation of messages sent by the node, initialised
by ⊥;
 mr ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the concatenation of messages received by the node,
initialised by ⊥;
 psstate ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the per-stage secret state of the node, initialised by
⊥;
 sk ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the session key, initialised by ⊥;
 stid ∈ {1, . . . , nS} - the index of the most recently completed stage, initialised
by 1 and increased monotonically;
 α ∈ {active, accept,⊥} - the current status of the node, initialised by ⊥.
Finally, the challenger manages the following set of registers, which indicate A’s
compromise of secrets:
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 long-term symmetric keys {LSKflag1, . . . , LSKflagnN }, where LSKflagi ∈
{corrupt, clean,⊥} ∀ i ∈ [nN ];
 per-stage secret state {PSSflag11,PSSflag12, . . . ,PSSflag1nS , . . . PSSflag
nN
1 ,PSSflag
nN
2 ,
. . . ,PSSflagnNnS } where ∀i ∈ nN , j ∈ nS , PSSflag
i
j ∈ {corrupt, clean,⊥};
 session keys {SKflag11, SKflag12, . . . ,SKflag1nS , . . . SKflag
nN
1 , SKflag
nN
2 , . . . ,SKflag
nN
nS
}
where ∀i ∈ nN , j ∈ nS , SKflagij ∈ {corrupt, clean,⊥}.
7.5.2 Adversarial Interaction
In the game, the adversary A is able to communicate with the challenger and thus
interact with the parties/sessions via the following set of queries:
 Register(λ)→ id: Allows A to register a new node with security parameters
λ and givesA an identifier for the node id (which we denote Nid). For protocols
where nodes do not have a public identifier, the index of the node is given to
A.
 NextKey(λ, id)→ m: Allows A to indicate that the node with public identi-
fier id should attempt a new key agreement using (potentially) the new/updated
security parameters λ. The challenger then returns any protocol messages m.
 Corrupt(id) → ltk: Allows A to compromise the long-term key of the node
πid.ltk with public identifier id.
 Reveal(id, stid) → sk: Allows A to compromise the session key established
between the hub node and the node Nid in stage stid. Note that stid indicates
the index of the session key established between the node id and the hub node.
The challenger responds with the session key πsi .sk.
 StateReveal(id, stid) → psstate: Allows A to compromise the per-stage se-
cret state psstate of the node with public identifier id. Note that stid indi-
cates the index of the stage-specific state, and the challenger responds with
πsi .psstate.
 Send(id,m)→ m′: Allows A to send a message m to the node with identifier
id currently running a protocol execution. Note that the node will update its
per-session variables and potentially output a new message m′.
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 Test(id, stid) → sk: If the node Nid has completed its stid-stage key agree-
ment, then the challenger uses the randomly-sampled bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0
the challenger responds with πsi .sk, otherwise the challenger responds with a
random key from the same distribution.
We now formalise the advantage of a PPT algorithm A in winning the PPKA key-
indistinguishability game.
Definition 7 (Key Indistinguishability). Let Π be a PPKA protocol and nN , nS ∈
N. For a given cleanness predicate clean, and a PPT algorithm A, we define the
advantage of A in the key-indistinguishability game to be:
AdvPPKA-IND,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A (λ) = |2 · (Pr[Exp
PPKA-IND,clean
Π,nN ,nS ,A (λ) = 1]−
1
2
|).
We say that Π is PPKA-IND-secure if, for all A, AdvPPKA-IND,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A (λ) is negligible in
security parameter λ.
7.5.3 Unlinkability
The experiments for PPKA key-indistinguishability and unlinkability are mostly
identical. However, instead of using the Test(id, stid) query, at some point A will
stop and output (id0, id1). When A outputs (id0, id1), C runs NextKey(λ, id0)
and responds to queries as before. We will refer to this as the “challenge” node.
However, when πstidid0 .α← accept, C then refers to the random bit b sampled at the
beginning of the experiment and:
 if b = 0, then C runs NextKey(λ, id0);
 if b = 1, then C runs NextKey(λ, id1) instead.
A now uses the SendTest(m) query to send messages to the node Nidb in order to
avoid trivial identification. We will refer to this as the “unnamed node”. A at some
point terminates and outputs a guess bit b′. If b′ = 0, then A is indicating that
the unnamed node Nidb was linked to the challenge node Nid0 . If b
′ = 1, then A is
indicating that the unnamed node Nidb was not linked to the challenge node Nid0 .
We now formalise the advantage of a PPT algorithm A in winning the PPKA un-
linkability game.
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Definition 8 (Unlinkability). Let Π be a PPKA protocol, and nN , nS ∈ N. For a
given cleanness predicate clean, and a PPT algorithm A, we define the advantage of
A in the unlinkability game to be:
AdvPPKA-U,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A (λ) = |2 · (Pr[Exp
PPKA-U,clean
Π,nN ,nS ,A (λ) = 1]−
1
2
)|.
We say that Π is PPKA-U-secure if, for all A, AdvPPKA-U,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A (λ) is negligible in the
security parameter λ.
7.5.4 Cleanness Predicates
The cleanness predicates are used in the security experiments to define the exact
combination of secrets that A is able to compromise without trivially breaking the
PPKA protocol. In order to capture KCI attacks and PrFS notions, we allow A to
leak the long-term secret key of the “normal” nodes if A has not also leaked any
previously established per-stage secret state. Our analysis is focused primarily on
the normal nodes. We do not allow the compromise of the HN ’s long-term secrets,
as security in all stages is lost in this scenario. We additionally describe a cleanness
predicate for PPKA protocols that do not achieve PrFS or KCI resilience.
Definition 9 (PrFS-KCI-clean). A session πsi such that π
s
i .α = accept in the
PPKA-IND experiment defined in Figure 7.5 is PrFS-KCI-clean if SKflagstidid 6= corrupt
and if LSKflagid = corrupt then ∀ s ≤ stid PSSflagsid 6= corrupt.
Definition 10 (nPrFS-clean). A session πsi such that π
s
i .α = accept in the PPKA-IND
experiment defined in Figure 7.5 is nPrFS-clean if SKflagstidid 6= corrupt.
Finally, we describe a cleanness predicate for our unlinkability game. It is straight-
forward to realise that if Corrupt(id0) or Corrupt(id1) were to be issued, it would
trivially allow A to win in either of our PPKA protocols by simply reconstructing
the tidN field sent by the unnamed node. Similarly, we cannot allow the adversary
to reveal the per-stage secret state for the current stage stid of the unnamed node
Nidb .
Definition 11 (U-clean). A session πsi in the PPKA-U experiment defined in Figure
7.5 is U-clean if LSKflagid 6= corrupt and PSSflagstidid 6= corrupt.
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Exp
PPKA-IND,clean
Π,nN ,nS,A
(λ):
1: b $← {0, 1}
2: tested← false
3: kHN
$← HKeyGen(λ)
4: LSKflagi, . . . , LSKflagnN ← clean
5: PSSflag11, . . . , PSSflag
nN
nS
← clean
6: SKflag11, . . . , SKflag
nN
nS
← clean
7: ctr ← 0
8: b′ $← ASend,Register,NextKey,Corrupt,?Reveal,Test(λ)
9: For (id, stid) such that Test(id, stid) was issued:
10: if clean(πsi ) then
11: return (b = b′)
12: else
13: return b′ $← {0, 1}
14: end if
Reveal(id, stid):
1: if πsi .α 6= accept then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: SKflagidstid ← corrupt
5: return πsi .sk
StateReveal(id, stid):
1: if πsi .psstate = ⊥ then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: PSSflagidstid ← corrupt
5: return πsi .psstate
NextKey(λ, id):
1: let stid = max{s : πsid.α 6= ⊥}
2: if (πsi .α 6= accept) then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: stid← stid + 1
6: πsi .α← active
7: πsi ,m
′ ← Π.NF(λ, πsi ,⊥)
8: return m′
Send(id,m):
1: if id = HN then
2: return Π.HF(λ, kHN ,m)
3: end if
4: let stid = max{s : πsid.α 6= ⊥}
5: if πsi .α 6= active then
6: return ⊥
7: end if
8: πsi .mr ← π
s
i .mr‖m
9: (πsi ,m
′)← Π.NF(λ, πsi ,m)
10: πsi .ms ← π
s
i .ms‖m
′
11: if πsi .α← accept then
12: πstid+1
id
.psstate← StateUpdate(λ, πsi )
13: end if
14: return m′
Corrupt(id):
1: LSKflagid ← corrupt
2: return πid.ltk
Test(id, stid):
1: if (tested = true) ∨ (πsi .α 6= accept) then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: tested← true
5: if b = 0 then
6: return πsi .sk
7: else
8: sk $← K
9: return sk
10: end if
Register(λ):
1: ctr ← ctr + 1
2: π.stid← 1
3: π.ltk ← Π.NKeyGen(λ)
4: π.id← ctr
5: π.psstate← Π.StateGen(λ, kHN , π.ltk)
6: return π.id
Exp
PPKA-U,clean
Π,nN ,nS,A
(λ):
1: b $← {0, 1}
2: kHN
$← HKeyGen(λ)
3: LSKflagi, . . . , LSKflagnN ← clean
4: PSSflag11, . . . , PSSflag
nN
nS
← clean
5: SKflag11, . . . , SKflag
nN
nS
← clean
6: ctr ← 0
7: (id0, id1)
$← ASend,Register,NextKey,Corrupt,?Reveal(λ)
8: NextKey(λ, id0)→ m
9: ∅ ← ASend,Register,NextKey,Corrupt,?Reveal(λ,m)
10: if πstidid0 .α← accept then
11: NextKey(λ, idb)→ m′
12: end if
13: b′ $← ASend,Register,NextKey,Corrupt,?Reveal,SendTest(λ,m′)
14: if clean(πstidb
id0
) ∧ clean(πstidb
id1
) then
15: return (b = b′)
16: else
17: return b′ $← {0, 1}
18: end if
SendTest(m):
1: Send(idb,m)→ m′
2: return m′
Figure 7.5: An algorithmic description of the PPKA-IND and PPKA-U security ex-
periments.
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7.6 Analysis of the PPKA Protocols
7.6.1 Security and Privacy Analysis
Before we begin, we show that an adversary A is unable to recover HN ’s long-term
secret kHN (with non-negligible probability) even if A reveals all long-term secrets
idN of all nodes and all per-stage secret states psstate. In our proofs we work
within the random oracle model, and A cannot learn anything about kHN from
hash outputs h(kHN , X) (where X is any concatenation of arbitrary values). We
turn to A attempting to learn kHN that has been “blinded” through exclusive-or
(XOR) operations. The generic construction of messages that include kHN is as
follows:
 bN = kHN ⊕ kN ⊕ idN ⊕ h(kHN , kN );
 µ = kHN ⊕ k+N ⊕ idN ⊕ h(kHN , k
+
N )⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ) ⊕ fN ⊕ rN .
Taking µ first, we note that k+N (independently sampled by HN , uniformly-at-
random, in each stage) acts as the key in a one-time-pad, perfectly hiding the
long-term secret key kHN of HN , the long-term secret key idN of Nid and the
value h(kHN , k
+
N ). As k
+
N is an internal value that is known only to the chal-
lenger implementing HN , it cannot be compromised by A via Reveal, Corrupt
or StateReveal queries. For bN , we note that kN (randomly sampled by HN in a
previous stage) is still acting as the same key k+N in a one-time-pad, and thus still
perfectly hiding the same message; i.e. the long-term secret key kHN of HN , the
long-term secret key idN of Nid and the value h(kHN , kN ). We argue then that A
cannot recover kHN . We can further conclude that an adversary that compromises
fewer internal states and long-term secret keys will also be unable to recompute
kHN . We can continue our proof knowing that the best strategy for A to recover
kHN is to attempt to brute-force the value.
We now show that an adversary A that does not issue a Corrupt(id) query cannot
recover the long-term secret key idN of node Nid. As before, we note that, since
we instantiate the hash function as a random oracle, the adversary cannot invert
hash outputs of the form h(idN , X) (where X is some arbitrary concatenation of
values) in order to learn idN . We can now focus on the adversary attempting to
learn idN from “blinded” values by XORing them with other values. In each stage
of the protocol execution, this is available to A in the following generic ways:
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 aN = idN ⊕ h(kHN , kN );
 bN = kHN ⊕ kN ⊕ idN ⊕ h(kHN , kN );
 η = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ idN ⊕ kHN ⊕ kN ⊕ h(idN , fN )⊕ h(kHN , k+N );
 µ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ idN ⊕ kHN ⊕ k+N ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N )⊕ h(kHN , k
+
N ).
If this is the first stage of the protocol execution for node Nid, then aN and bN are
established in some out-of-band way. Thus h(kHN , kN ) and kN act as uniformly
random and independent keys in a one-time pad, perfectly hiding idN and kHN ⊕
idN ⊕ h(kHN , kN ) (for aN and bN respectively). Since, by the previous argument,
the best strategy for A to recover kHN is simply to guess (and we instantiate the
hash function with a random oracle), in order to recompute h(kHN , kN ) A must
either guess kHN or to guess h(kHN , kN ). Since they are the same bit-length, the
probability of A doing either is the same: 2−λ.
If this is not the first stage of the protocol execution, then aN and bN were sent as
“sub-XOR” of a previous stage η and µ. We argue that h(kHN , k
+
N ) and k
+
N act as
keys to one-time-pads for η and µ respectively, and remain the keys to the one-time-
pad perfectly hiding idN and kHN ⊕ idN ⊕h(kHN , kN ) (for aN and bN respectively)
in the following stage. It follows then that the best strategy A has in recovering idN
is to merely guess idN : 2
−λ.
We now prove the key-indistinguishability of our PPKA protocols given in Fig-
ures 7.3 and 7.4. We begin with PPKA-2, as it captures the strongest notions of
security, capturing PrFS, KCI resilience, key randomness, known key security and
authentication. Afterwards, we turn to proving the unlinkability of PPKA-2. We
then prove key indistinguishability and unlinkability of PPKA-1. As PPKA-1 is es-
sentially a truncated version of PPKA-2, this allows us to omit the most repetitive
details of the proofs.
Theorem 2 (Key Indistinguishability of PPKA-2). The privacy-preserving key agree-
ment protocol PPKA-2 given in Figure 7.4 is PPKA-IND-secure with cleanness pred-
icate PrFS-KCI-clean (capturing PrFS and KCI resilience) and assuming all hash
functions are random oracles. For any PPT algorithm A against the PPKA-IND key
indistinguishability game, AdvPPKA-IND,PrFS-KCI-cleanPPKA-2,nN ,nS ,A (λ) is negligible in the security
parameter λ.
Proof. For our proof, we assume that a test query Test(id, stid) has been issued,
and separate into the following three cases:
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1. πsi has accepted such that π
s
i .mr 6= PPKA-2.HF(λ, kHN , πsi .ms);
2. πsi has accepted such that π
s
i .mr = PPKA-2.HF(λ, kHN , π
s
i .ms) and Corrupt(id)
has not been issued;
3. πsi has accepted such that π
s
i .mr = PPKA-2.HF(λ, kHN , π
s
i .ms) and Corrupt(id)
has been issued; by the definition of the cleanness predicate PrFS-KCI-clean,
we assume that the per-stage secret state has not been revealed for any stage
s ≤ stid.
Case 1. In this case we show that once a Test(id, stid) query is issued, the proba-
bility, the session πsi sets π
s
i .α← accept such that πsi .mr 6= PPKA-2.HF(λ, kHN , πsi .ms),
is negligible.
Game 0
This is a normal PPKA key-indistinguishability game. Thus we have:
AdvPPKA-IND,C1PPKA-2,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game, we guess the index (id, stid) of the session πsi , and abort if, during the
execution of the experiment, a query Test(i∗, s∗) is received and (i∗, s∗) 6= (id, stid).
Thus we have:
Pr(break0) ≤ nNnS · Pr(break1).
Game 2
In this game, we replace the h(kHN , kN ) value computed within π
s
i (and, potentially,
in the hub node processing πsi .ms) with a uniformly-random value
˜h(kHN , kN ). We
note that since we instantiate the hash function with a random oracle, the distribu-
tion is identical to h(kHN , kN ). Thus the only way that A can detect this change is
to query (kHN , kN ) to the random oracle. Since the only way for A to do this is to
recover kHN fully, and we argued previously that A’s probability of success in this
endeavour is 2−λ, we have:
Pr(break1) ≤ 2−λ + Pr(break2).
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Game 3
In this game we argue that the adversary A has a negligible probability of producing
a value β̂ = h( ˜h(kHN , kN ), ẑN , r̂N , f̂N , δ̂, η̂, µ̂, ˆid′N ). Note that for π
s
i .α to reach
accept, A must produce such a value β̂. We know by the definition of Case 1 that
the following must be true:
πsi .mr = 〈α̂, β̂, η̂, µ̂, δ̂, ˆid′N 〉 6= PPKA-2.HF(λ, kHN , π
s
i .ms).
Since all message fields are included in the computation of β̂, and the message re-
ceived by the test session does not match any output from an honest hub node,
we know that the only way that A can cause πsi to reach accept is to query
˜h(kHN , kN ), ẑN , r̂N , f̂N , δ̂, η̂, µ̂, ˆid′N to the random oracle. However, since, by Game 2,
˜h(kHN , kN ) is a uniformly-random value sampled independently from the protocol
flow, the only way for A to produce such an input is to guess ˜h(kHN , kN ). Thus we
have:
Pr(break2) ≤ 2−λ + Pr(break3).
It is clear that if the session πsi such that Test(id, stid) must be issued (by Game 1)
cannot reach πsi .α ← accept, then in Game 3 the experiment proceeds identically
regardless of the bit b sampled by the challenger. Thus:
Pr(break3) = 0.
Case 2. In this case, we show that an adversary who issues a Test(stid, id) query
(and does not also issue a Corrupt(id) query) cannot win the key-indistinguishability
game with non-negligible probability.
Game 0
This is a normal PPKA key-indistinguishability game. Thus we have:
AdvPPKA-IND,C2PPKA-2,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game, we guess the index (id, stid) of the session πsi and abort if, during the
execution of the experiment, a query Test(i∗, s∗) is received and (i∗, s∗) 6= (id, stid).
Thus we have:
Pr(break0) ≤ nNnS · Pr(break1).
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Game 2
In this game, we replace the session key kS computed by the node Nid in stage
stid with a uniformly-random and independent value k̃S . First we note that kS is
computed as kS = h(idN , zN , rN , fN , xN ). Since we instantiate the hash function
as a random oracle, the distributions of k̃S and kS are identical. In order to dis-
tinguish this change, A must be able to query the random oracle with the input
(idN , rN , fN , xN ). Since we argued previously that in order to recover idN (the
long-term secret key of the node Nid), A’s only strategy to distinguish this change
would be to guess the long-term secret idN . The probability of A distinguishing this
replacement is 2−λ, where λ is the bit-length of idN .
After this change, the session key returned to A as the response to the Test(stid, id)
query is a uniformly-random value independent of the protocol execution, regardless
of the bit b sampled by the challenger. Thus we have:
Pr(break1) ≤ 2−λ.
Case 3. In this case, we show that an adversary who issues a Test(stid, id) query
(and does not issue StateReveal queries for all per-stage secret states established
before stage stid) cannot win the key-indistinguishability game.
Game 0
This is a normal PPKA key-indistinguishability game. Thus we have:
AdvPPKA-IND,C3PPKA-2,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game, we guess the index (id, stid) of the session πsi and abort if, during the
execution of the experiment, a query Test(i∗, s∗) is received and (i∗, s∗) 6= (id, stid).
Thus we have:
Pr(break0) ≤ nNnS · Pr(break1).
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Game 2
In this game, we replace the zN = h(kHN , idN , kN ) value held in secret stage by the
node Nid with a uniformly random value z̃N independent from the protocol execu-
tion. Since we instantiate the hash function with a random oracle, the distributions
of zN and z̃N are identical. Thus, in order to detect this change, A must query the
random oracle with the input kHN , idN , kN . Since, by earlier arguments, the best
strategy A has to recover kHN is simply to guess kHN , the probability that A is
able to do this is 2−λ. Thus:
Pr(break1) = 2
−λ + Pr(break2).
Game 3
In this game, we replace the computation of the z+N encryption key
kz = h(z̃N , idN , rN , fN , 0) with a uniformly-random and independent value k̃z. We
note that since z̃N (by Game 2) is already a uniformly random value, and the hash
function is instantiated with a random oracle, this replacement is sound and indis-
tinguishable from the perspective of A. Thus:
Pr(break2) = Pr(break3).
Game 4
In this game, we replace the contents of ciphertext δ with a random string of the
same length, and abort if the ciphertext δ sent by the hub node HN is not the
ciphertext received by Nid, and the output of decrypting δ is not ⊥. We do so
by constructing an algorithm B that interacts with an IND-CCA challenger in the
following way: B acts identically as in Game 3, except for the hub node protocol
execution that computes k̃z. Instead, when B computes δ, B selects a uniformly-
random string z̃+N (of the same length as z
+
N ) and submits (z
+
N , z̃
+
N ) to the IND-CCA
encryption oracle Enc.
When the random bit b sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 0, then δ contains
the encryption of z+N , so B is a perfect simulation of Game 3. However, when the
bit b sampled by the IND-CCA challenger is 1, then δ contains a random string z̃+N
and thus B is a perfect simulator of Game 4. Since, in Game 3, the z+N encryption
147
7.6 Analysis of the PPKA Protocols
key k̃z is uniformly-random and independent of the protocol execution, this replace-
ment is sound. Any adversary capable of distinguishing this change can break the
confidentiality of the IND-CCA encryption scheme and guess b with perfect success.
Thus:
Pr(break3) ≤ AdvIND-CCAEnc + Pr(break4).
Game 5
We now note that by Game 4, z+N has been established in an out-of-band way,
reminiscent of the first stage run by nodeNid. We now repeat the process of Games 2,
3, and 4 (stid− 2) times to establish a zN value for stage stid run by node Nid that
is indistinguishable from establishing zN in some out-of-band way. Thus:
Pr(break4) ≤ (stid− 2) · (2−λ + AdvIND-CCAEnc ) + Pr(break5).
Game 6
We replace zN with a uniformly-random and independent value z̃N in stage stid of
node Nid by the same argument as Game 2. Thus:
Pr(break5) = 2
−λ + Pr(break6).
Game 7
In this game, we replace the computation of the session key ks = h(idN , z̃N , rN , fN , 1)
with a uniformly-random and independent value k̃s. We note that since z̃N (by
Game 6) is already a uniformly random value, and the hash function is instantiated
with a random oracle, this replacement is sound and indistinguishable from the per-
spective of A. Thus Pr(break6) = Pr(break7). We finally note that the session key
established by πsi is now uniformly random and independent of the protocol flow,
and of the bit b sampled by the PPKA-IND challenger. Thus:
Pr(break7) = 0.
We follow our proof of the key-indistinguishability of PPKA-2 by proving the un-
linkability of PPKA-2.
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Theorem 3 (Unlinkability of PPKA-2). The PPKA-2 given in Figure 7.4 is PPKA-U-
secure with cleanness predicate U-clean and assuming all hash functions are random
oracles. For any PPT algorithm A against the PPKA-U unlinkability game described
in Figure 7.5, AdvPPKA-U,U-cleanPPKA-2,nN ,nS ,A(λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Proof. We begin by restating the U-clean cleanness predicate, and reiterating the
impact upon our proof. For both nodes Nid0 and Nid1 , we know that the queries
Corrupt(id0) and Corrupt(id1) have not been issued. In addition, for the stage
stidb run by the unnamed node Nidb , we know that a StateReveal(idb)(stidb) query
has not been issued.
Game 0
This is a normal PPKA unlinkability game. Thus we have:
AdvPPKA-UPPKA-2,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game, in the unnamed session πstidbidb , we replace the hash outputs of the form
h(idN , X) (where X is a concatenation of arbitrary stings) with a uniformly random
values ˜h(idN , X) chosen independently of the protocol flow. As before, since we
instantiate (in our proof) the hash function with a random oracle, the distribution
of this change is indistinguishable. In order to detect this change, A must query the
random oracle with the input (idN , X). As per our previous arguments, in order to
query idN to the random oracle, A must first recover idN . Since the best strategy to
recover idN is simply to guess the value of idN , the probability of A distinguishing
this change is 2−λ. Thus we have:
Pr(break0) = 2
−λ + Pr(break1).
Game 2
In this game, in the unnamed session πstidbidb , we replace the hash outputs of the form
h(kHN , X) (where X is either kN or k
+
N ) with uniformly random values
˜h(kHN , X)
chosen independently of the protocol flow. As before, since we instantiate (in our
proof) the hash function with a random oracle, the distributions of Game 1 and
Game 2 are indistinguishable. In order to detect this change, A must query the
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random oracle with the input (kHN , X). As per our previous arguments, in order
to query kHN to the random oracle, A must first recover kHN . Since the best
strategy to recover kHN is simply to guess the value of kHN , the probability of A
distinguishing this change is 2−λ. Thus we have:
Pr(break1) = 2
−λ + Pr(break2).
Game 3
In this game, in the message output by the hub node for the unnamed session
πstidbidb , we replace the hash outputs β = h(
˜h(kHN , k+N ), zN , rN , fN , δ, η, µ, id
′
N ) with
a uniformly random value β̃ chosen independently of the protocol flow. As pre-
vious arguments, the distributions of Game 2 and Game 3 are indistinguishable.
In order to detect this change, A must query the random oracle with the input
( ˜h(kHN , k+N ), zN , rN , fN , δ, η, µ, id
′
N ). Since
˜h(kHN , k+N ) is already a uniformly ran-
dom value independent of the protocol flow (by Game 2), the best strategy to dis-
tinguish this change is to simply guess the value of ˜h(kHN , k+N ). Thus we have:
Pr(break2) = 2
−λ + Pr(break3).
Game 4
In this game, in the unnamed session πstidbidb we replace the computation of the
z+N key kz = h(zN , idN , rN , fN , 0) with a uniformly-random and independent value
k̃z. We note that, since we instantiate the hash function with a random oracle,
the distributions of k̃z and kz are indistinguishable. Thus, in order to detect this
change, Amust query the random oracle with the input zN , idN , rN , fN , 0. By earlier
arguments, the best strategy A has to recover idN is simply to guess idN . Thus:
Pr(break3) = 2
−λ + Pr(break4).
Game 5
In this game we replace the value δ sent by the hub node to the unnamed session
πstidbidb with a uniformly-random and independent value δ̃
$← {0, 1}λ. We do so by
constructing an algorithm B that interacts with a PRF challenger in the following
way, B acts identically as in Game 4, expect for the hub node protocol execution
that computes k̃z. Instead, B initialise a PRF challenger and queries (z+n ), and uses
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the output δ̃ from the PRF challenger to replace the computation of δ. Since, by
Game 4, k̃z is a uniformly random and independent value, this replacement is sound.
If the test bit sampled by the PRF challenger is 0, then δ̃ ← Enc(k̃z, z+N ) and we are
in Game 4. If the test bit sampled by the PRF challenger is 1, then δ̃
$← {0, 1}λ
and we are in Game 5. Thus any adversary A capable of distinguishing this change
can be turned into a successful adversary against the PRF security of the encryption
scheme Enc, and we find:
Pr(break4) ≤ AdvPRFEnc,A(λ) + Pr(break5).
We pause here to reflect on the consequences of these changes. The first message
sent by the unnamed node is 〈t̃idN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′N 〉. Since tN is a timestamp
and id′N is sampled identically regardless of the identity of the unnamed node, the
distributions of these fields are similarly identical, independent of the choice of the
randomly sampled bit b. t̃idN is a uniformly-random valued and independent of the
protocol flow (by Game 1), as it is the output of a random oracle query that is of
the form (idNb , id
′
N , tn, rn). This is true regardless of the choice of the randomly
sampled bit b of the challenger.
For yN we remark that rN is a uniformly-random value sampled identically from
the same distribution regardless of the node identity. This value acts as the key
in a one-time-pad, perfectly hiding ˜h(kHN , kN ). As rN is not reused (as a key) in
any message in any stage, thus yN is a uniformly-random value, regardless of node
identity. The value aN is also a uniformly random. Here, ˜h(kHN , kN ) acts as the
key in a one-time-pad, perfectly hiding the long-term secret key idN of the node by
Game 2. Since ˜h(kHN , kN ) is not reused (as a key) in any message in any stage, aN
is a uniformly random value, regardless of the node identity, or the bit b randomly
sampled by the challenger. Finally, we turn to bN . We note that this time kN
(randomly sampled by the hub node in a previous stage, uniformly-at-random) acts
as the key in a one-time-pad, perfectly hiding the long-term secret key kHN of the
hub node, the long-term secret key idN of the node and the value ˜h(kHN , kN ). As kN
is not reused (as a key) in any message in any stage, thus bN is a uniformly-random
value, regardless of node identity.
We examine the first message received by the unnamed node, 〈α, β, η, µ, δ, id′N 〉.
Again, id′N is sampled identically regardless of the identity of the unnamed node;
the distributions of the fields are similarly identical independent of the choice of the
randomly sampled bit b. For α we remark that fN is a uniformly-random value
151
7.6 Analysis of the PPKA Protocols
sampled identically from the same distribution regardless of the node identity. This
value acts as the key in a one-time-pad, perfectly hiding ˜h(kHN , k+N ). As fN is not
reused (as a key) in any message in any stage, thus α is a uniformly-random value,
regardless of node identity. Value η is also a uniformly-random. Here, ˜h(idN , tN )
acts as the key in a one-time-pad, perfectly hiding the values rN , fN and a
+
N by
Game 1. Since ˜h(idN , tN ) is not reused (as a key) in any message in any stage, η is
a uniformly random value, independent of the node identity, or the bit b randomly
sampled by the challenger.
A similar argument apples for µ, substituting ˜h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ) for ˜h(idN , tN ).
Value β̃ is a uniformly-random and independent of the protocol flow (by Game 3), as
it is the output of a random oracle query that is of the form ( ˜h(kHN , k+N ), zN , rN , fN ,
δ, η, µ, id′N ). This is true regardless of the choice of the randomly sampled bit b of
the challenger. Finally, we rely on the PRF security of the encryption scheme Enc to
replace the δ field returned by the hub node. By Game 5, the value δ̃ is uniformly-
random and independent of the protocol regardless of the node identity idb. We
note that all message fields have the same distribution regardless of the challenger’s
randomly-sampled bit b. Thus we have:
Pr(break5) = 0.
We now prove key-indistinguishability of our proposed PPKA-1, capturing known
key security, and key randomness, but not forward-secrecy. It follows identically
from Case 2 of the proof of PPKA-2 key-indistinguishability, as it does not capture
PrFS or KCI resilience. However, it still captures known key security, and key
randomness and (obviously) key-indistinguishability.
Theorem 4 (Key Indistinguishability of PPKA-1). The PPKA-1 given in Figure 7.3
is PPKA-IND-secure with cleanness predicate nPrFS-clean (capturing neither PrFS
nor KCI resilience) and assuming all hash functions are random oracles. For any
PPT algorithm A against the PPKA-IND key-indistinguishability game,
AdvPPKA-IND,nPrFS-cleanPPKA-1,nN ,nS ,A (λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Proof. For our proof, we note that we cannot prove PrFS or KCI resilience for
the proposed PPKA-1. Thus, unlike PPKA-2, the cleanness predicate nPrFS-clean
ensures that Corrupt(id) has not been issued. In this case, we assume that the
per-stage secret state has been compromised at any (or perhaps, at all) previous
stages. Since PPKA-1 sends the per-stage secret state 〈aN , bN 〉 in the clear, this has
no bearing on our security proof of PPKA-1.
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Similarly to the proof for PPKA-2, we begin by showing that the adversary is un-
able to recover the HN secret key kHN (with non-negligible probability) even if A
completely reveals the long-term secret keys of every normal node and the per-stage
secret states of the nodes. This argument follows identically to the argument for
the secrecy of kHN in the proof of PPKA-2, and we can continue our proof knowing
that the best strategy A has for recovering kHN is to guess kHN .
In this proof, we show that an adversary which issues a Test(stid, id) query (and
does not also issue a Corrupt(id) query) cannot win the key-indistinguishability
game with negligible probability. Before we begin, we show that an adversary who
does not issue a Corrupt(id) query cannot recover the long-term secret key idN
of node Nid. This argument follows identically to the argument for the secrecy of
idN in the proof of PPKA-2, and we can continue our proof knowing that the best
strategy A has for recovering idN is to guess idN .
Game 0
This is a normal PPKA key-indistinguishability game. Thus we have:
AdvPPKA-IND,C1PPKA-1,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = Pr(break0).
Game 1
In this game, we guess the index (id, stid) of the session πsi , and abort if, during the
execution of the experiment, a query Test(i∗, s∗) is received and (i∗, s∗) 6= (id, stid).
Thus we have:
Pr(break0) ≤ nNnS · Pr(break1).
Game 2
In this game, we replace the session key kS computed by the node Nid in stage
stid with a uniformly-random and independent value k̃S . First we note that kS
is computed as kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN ). Since we instantiate the hash function
as a random oracle, the distributions of k̃S and kS are identical thus, in order to
distinguish this change, A must be able to query the random oracle with the input
(idN , rN , fN , xN ). We argued previously that in order to recover idN (the long-term
secret key of the node Nid), A’s only strategy in distinguishing this change would be
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to guess the long-term secret key idN . Thus the probability of A in distinguishing
this replacement is 2−λ, where λ is the bit-length of idN .
After this change, the session key returned to A as the response to the Test(stid, id)
query is a uniformly-random value independent of the protocol execution, regardless
of the bit b sampled by the challenger. Thus we have:
Pr(break1) ≤ 2−λ + 0.
Finally, we finish our security analysis by proving the unlinkability of PPKA-1.
Theorem 5 (Unlinkability of PPKA-1). The PPKA-1 given in Figure 7.3 is PPKA-U-
secure with cleanness predicate U-clean and assuming all hash functions are random
oracles. For any PPT algorithm A against the PPKA-U unlinkability game described
in Figure 7.5, AdvPPKA-U,U-cleanPPKA-1,nN ,nS ,A(λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Proof. The proof of the unlinkability of PPKA-1 is identical to the proof of unlink-
ability for PPKA-2, (with the exception of Game 4 and Game 5, since PPKA-1 does
not have zN state, nor a δ field in the hub node’s response) and so we omit repeating
it here.
7.6.2 Functional Analysis
The proposed PPKA protocols can easily be adapted for direct communication be-
tween N and HN by removal of Steps 2 and 4 from their respective authentica-
tion phases. As our PPKA protocols are also based on symmetric cryptographic
primitives, they preserve the efficiency of the original scheme from a computation,
communication and storage perspective without the aid of any additional network
infrastructure. Moreover, in our protocols the timestamp field can be of any arbi-
trary length to suit the underlying protocol layers, unlike [103]. Assuming a B-bit
hash digest and 16-bit pseudo-identity id′N for node N , Tables 7.5 and 7.6 depict the
various overheads associated with PPKA Protocols 1 and 2, respectively. In these
tables, h denotes an instance of a hash operation and ⊕ denotes an XOR operation.
From a computational perspective, single instances of hash operation and encryption
operation have been considered equal [1].
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Table 7.5: Overheads associated with PPKA protocol 1.
Index Node N Hub Node HN
Computation Overhead 5h+ 9⊕ 7h+ 14⊕
Communication Overhead 5B + 16 bits 4B + 16 bits
Storage Overhead 3B bits B bits
Table 7.6: Overheads associated with PPKA protocol 2.
Index Node N Hub Node HN
Computation Overhead 6h+ 9⊕ 10h+ 14⊕
Communication Overhead 5B + 16 bits 5B + 16 bits
Storage Overhead 4B bits B bits
7.7 Chapter Summary
We proposed two authenticated key agreement protocols suitable for WBANs. The
protocols are based upon symmetric cryptographic components only and are thus
highly efficient and avoid the additional burden of deploying and managing an asso-
ciated PKI. Our protocols are suitable for any application scenario where efficiency
is of essence and the network can be initialized by a “System Administrator”. In
addition to the requisite security guarantees, the proposed protocols also offer ap-
propriate privacy attributes suitable for a wide variety of application scenarios. In
order to ensure confidence in our proposals, we introduce formal security frameworks
for the analysis of privacy-preserving key agreement protocols, and analyze our con-
structions. The proposed protocols emerge as attractive alternatives to the current
key exchange methods described in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard, which are based
upon legacy public-key based primitives and do not offer any privacy features.
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Conclusion
This chapter provides concluding remarks about the thesis.
8.1 Contributions Summary
Given recent progress towards achieving practical quantum computers [119], it is
crucial that proposals for any cyber security standard should also cater for this
potent future threat. In this regard, NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Standard-
ization project [112] is an ongoing effort to standardize quantum-secure public-key
cryptographic algorithms. The final draft standards are expected to be made pub-
licly available by 2024. However, it is not clear whether the candidate encryption
and signature schemes currently being evaluated by NIST will ultimately be suitable
for deployment in constrained communication environments such as IoT, embedded
SIMs, implantable wireless sensors, etc.
This thesis suggests that, instead of waiting for the outcome of the NIST standardiza-
tion project, wherever possible, we should consider whether public-key cryptography
can be substituted by symmetric cryptography in current security standards. This
especially applies to scenarios where a priori relationships already exists between
the protocol participants. Compared to quantum-secure public-key cryptography,
such an approach offers benefits from a viability and timeliness viewpoint. Moreover,
given the penetration of these modern communication technologies in our everyday
lives, it is desirable that provisions improving user privacy also be made part of
these standards. Unfortunately, this seems to be missing in many widely-adopted
communication standards.
This thesis has explored and analyzed end-user privacy in one of the most important
future communication standards, 5G (Chapter 3). We analyzed the current status
of subscription privacy on the 5G radio interface and found that there are significant
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issues which need rectifying. To shed light on this matter, we catalogued the pri-
vacy vulnerabilities that already exist in previous mobile telephony standards. The
privacy improvements offered by the recently finalized 5G standard were identified.
Consequently, we were able to highlight privacy issues from previous generations
that remain unresolved in 5G Release 15. For completeness, we also explored new
privacy attacks which surfaced after the publication of the 5G standard (Chapter 4).
To address the identified privacy gaps, we also presented improvements.
This thesis presented a symmetric alternative to the current public-key based user
identification scheme of the 5G standard (Chapter 5). As the current 5G identi-
fication scheme is the only public-key cryptography based mechanism within the
standard, adoption of our alternative proposal will make the 5G standard indepen-
dent of any quantum-vulnerable cryptography. We also developed a novel security
framework titled Symmetric Updatable Private Authentication (SUPA) and pro-
vided a detailed formal analysis of our proposed scheme in this framework. Another
contribution of this thesis was to combine our alternative 5G identification scheme
with a downgrade protection proposal to come with a 5G identification mechanism
which is both quantum-secure and downgrade-resistant (Chapter 6).
We adapted the techniques which we developed for our private 5G identification to
come up with two efficient Privacy Preserving Key Agreement (PPKA) protocols
for IEEE Std 802.15.6 (Chapter 7). Our PPKA protocols avoided any public-key
cryptography and are thus well-suited to post-quantum deployment scenarios. We
provided concise game-based security and privacy definitions capturing anonymity
and unlinkability and proved formally that our key agreement protocols achieved
these notions.
8.2 On Interaction with the Standardization Bodies
The journey from a novel cryptographic solution to a fully-specified and implementation-
ready standard is like a bumpy ride down a long, winding road. We decided to
embark on this journey and contacted the relevant standardization bodies' repre-
sentatives about our work. The response was not particularly encouraging. As
the organizational structure and rules of business of 3GPP’s Technical Specification
Groups (TSGs) and IEEE’s Working Groups (WGs) are poles apart, we provide the
details of our interaction with each one of them separately.
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3GPP is an international industry consortia driven by commercial interests. One
cannot participate in the 3GPP activities without a membership. We learned this
the hard way by trying to contact the 3GPP SA3 chair via email. The reply never
came. Fortunately, Royal Holloway’s Information Security Group (ISG) has an
ongoing collaboration with Vodafone, one of the 3GPP members. Steve Babbage of
Vodafone was kind enough to advise that any proposal for 3GPP needs to tabled at
one of its meetings by a member. We forwarded the details of our alternative SUPI
protection proposal (Chapter 5) to Vodafone. Vodafone promised to look at it but
warned that it might not be a 3GPP priority as they were already tied up due to
commercial launching of 5G. Quantum-secure cryptography for 5G is still in a study
phase [21] and may get looked at in Release 17 onwards.
For IEEE Std 802.15.6, we started by emailing the IEEE 802.15 WG chair regarding
our proposals. An intermittent email interaction with the WG chair, which lasted
from August, 2017 until March, 2019, started with the sending of a document sum-
marizing our proposals. This document was to be distributed among the WG email
group. The aim was to distribute “the idea” to the concerned audience for their
opinion and interest and then decide upon any further course of action based on the
response. Unfortunately, this response never came. All this explains why remedial
measures have never been taken for serious security vulnerabilities discovered back
in 2015 [134] in an “international” standard. Our conclusion from this experience is
that the IEEE committees are, essentially, voluntary organizations and the change
process involves a lot of bureaucratic hurdles. As a result, new standards do not
develop quickly and major security modifications may take years.
8.3 Future Research Directions
The study concerning subscription privacy in 5G (Chapter 3) takes into account
enhancements offered up to 3GPP Release 15 (5G Phase 1). The ongoing Release 16
(5G Phase 2) is planned to be placed into “frozen” status in March, 2020 with a
target completion date of June, 2020 [143]. As the list of new features of Release 16
contains support for IoT devices, V2X and a new user identity paradigm, it will be
interesting to evaluate the effect of these new features upon the current status of
subscription privacy in 5G.
We also suggest to conducting a security analysis of the combined 5G-AKA proto-
col and our PQID proposal (Chapter 5) in an AKA security model. Further, our
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SUPA security framework can be augmented to capture quantum adversaries, to
show quantum security of our PQID scheme. Proving quantum security in such an
enhanced model usually requires the proof strategy of history-free reduction [37].
The PPKA-2 protocol (Chapter 7) offers the security properties of Partial Forward
Secrecy and KCI resilience for the WBAN standard IEEE Std 802.15.6 in case of
compromise of the long-term secret (idN ) of the sensor/client node. It would be
interesting to investigate whether future research can yield another PPKA protocol
based on symmetric primitives and still offers (full) Forward Secrecy and KCI re-
silience in the (additional) event of compromise of the long-term secret (kHN ) of the
Hub node.
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[37] Dan Boneh, Özgür Dagdelen, Marc Fischlin, Anja Lehmann, Christian
Schaffner, and Mark Zhandry. Random Oracles in a Quantum World. In
Dong Hoon Lee and Xiaoyun Wang, editors, Advances in Cryptology - ASI-
ACRYPT 2011 - 17th International Conference on the Theory and Application
of Cryptology and Information Security, Seoul, South Korea, December 4-8,
2011. Proceedings, volume 7073 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
41–69. Springer, 2011.
[38] Ravishankar Borgaonkar, Lucca Hirschi, Shinjo Park, and Altaf Shaik. New
Privacy Threat on 3G, 4G, and Upcoming 5G AKA Protocols. PoPETs,
2019(3):108–127, 2019.
163
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[39] Ravishankar Borgaonkar, Lucca Hirshi, Shinjo Park, Altaf Shaik, Andrew
Martin, and Jean-Pierre Seifert. New Adventures in Spying 3G & 4G Users:
Locate, Track, Monitor. In Blackhat, Las Vegas, USA 2017, July 2017.
[40] Colin Boyd, Yvonne Cliff, Juan Manuel González Nieto, and Kenneth G. Pa-
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in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 19th International Symposium, RAID
2016, Paris, France, September 19-21, 2016, Proceedings, volume 9854 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 279–302. Springer, 2016.
[53] Adrian Dabrowski, Nicola Pianta, Thomas Klepp, Martin Mulazzani, and
Edgar R. Weippl. IMSI-catch me if you can: IMSI-catcher-catchers. In Charles
N. Payne Jr., Adam Hahn, Kevin R. B. Butler, and Micah Sherr, editors,
Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
ACSAC 2014, New Orleans, LA, USA, December 8-12, 2014, pages 246–255.
ACM, 2014.
[54] K. S. Deepak and A. V. Babu. Energy efficiency analysis of IEEE 802.15.6
based wireless body area networks in scheduled access mode. Wireless Net-
works, 22(5):1441–1459, 2016.
[55] Whitfield Diffie, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Michael J. Wiener. Authentication
and authenticated key exchanges. Des. Codes Cryptography, 2(2):107–125,
1992.
165
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[56] Danny Dolev and Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. On the security of public key pro-
tocols. IEEE Trans. Information Theory, 29(2):198–207, 1983.
[57] Fred Donovan. Healthcare Data Breach Costs Remain Highest Among In-
dustries. https://healthitsecurity.com/news/healthcare-data-breach-
costs-remain-highest-among-industries, Jul 2018.
[58] Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated, Samsung, Huawei, Hisilicon, and
Intel. SUCI and LI - verification hash integrated in 5G AKA.
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/TSG SA/WG3 Security/TSGS3 90Bis SanDiego/
Docs/S3-180818.zip, Mar 2019.
[59] ETSI-SAGE. First response on ECIES for concealing IMSI or
SUPI. https://portal.3gpp.org/ngppapp/CreateTdoc.aspx?mode=
view&contributionId=832160, Oct 2017.
[60] Mohamed Amine Ferrag, Leandros A. Maglaras, Antonios Argyriou, Dimitrios
Kosmanos, and Helge Janicke. Security for 4G and 5G cellular networks: A
survey of existing authentication and privacy-preserving schemes. J. Network
and Computer Applications, 101:55–82, 2018.
[61] Dan Forsberg, Leping Huang, Tsuyoshi Kashima, and Seppo Alanärä. Enhanc-
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